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Nagovor urednika

Introduction

Spoštovani prijatelji vojaške zgodovine,

pred vami je prva številka novega letnika vojaško zgodovinskega časopisa Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske Vojaška zgodovina.

Že ko so v Centru za vojaško zgodovinsko dejavnost leta 2000 izdali njegov prvo številko, ki je prinašal vsebino referatov s posveta o novejši vojaški zgodovini na Slovenskem, je bilo to mogoče poimenovati za enega od prelomnih trenutkov naša sodobno vojaški zgodovini, saj je pomenil zagon znanstvenoraziskovalne in publicistične dejavnosti in nov prispevek k obravnavi slovenske, pa tudi obče vojaške zgodovine v slovenskem prostoru. V prvih številkah je bila večja pozornost namenjena obravnavi naše polpretekle zgodovine oziroma obdobju osamosvajanja in Obrambni vojni leta 1991. Objavljeni so bili spomini aktivnih udeležencev te vojne, objeni 10. obletnici pa je izšla tudi tematska številka. V šesti številki pa smo začeli objavljati tudi članke, ki obravnavajo slovensko vojaško zgodovino tudi v starejših obdobjih.

Karne kajčasajev Vojaškemu muzeju Slovenske vojske zorela ideja povsebinski in oblikovni prenovi Vojaške zgodovine. Takostoštevilko pričenjamonjegovopostopnopreoblikovanje iz vojaško zgodovinskega zbornika v vojaško-zgodovinski strokovni in znanstveni časopis, kar zagotavljajo ugledni domači in tuji člani uredniškega odbora in recenzenti znanstvenih člankov, kijih objavljamo. V drugem delu časopisa pa boprostortudizapredstavitev ustanov, ki delujejonapodročju vojaške zgodovine posvetu, kongresov, konferenc in simpozijev, kritik in oceno oziroma recenzij, arhivskega gradiva ter zgodovine posameznih vojaških enot, v katerih so se kot vojaki bojevali Slovenci.

Dear Military History Enthusiasts,

this is the first issue of the new volume of the Vojaška zgodovina (Military History) magazine published by the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces.

The very first issue of the Military History was brought out by the Center for Military History in 2000. It contained the research papers presented at the session on Newer Slovenian Military History. The publication of this first issue was a turning point for modern Slovenian military history as it provided impetus to scientific research and publishing activities, in addition to contributing to discussion on both the Slovenian and general military history in Slovenia. The first issues dealt mainly with our modern history, i.e. Slovenia's gaining independence and the defensive war of 1991. These issues included memoirs of the participants in the war. On the tenth anniversary of the war, a special issue was published. After the sixth issue, the publication included articles on older Slovenian military history.

The idea of bringing up to date the content and design of the Military History has been contemplated by the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces for some time. This issue is the beginning of the Military History's gradual transformation from a collection of papers on military history to a military history magazine that includes expert and scientific articles contributed by renowned Slovenian and foreign Editorial Board Members and authors of appraisals. The second part of the magazine concentrates on presentations of the military history institutions throughout the world, congresses, conferences and symposiums, critiques and appraisals, archival materials, and history of individual military units whose members included Slovenians.

V tej številki objavljamo znanstvene članke raziskovalcev vojaške zgodovine iz Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske. Tako stotnik mag. Zvezdan Marković v svojem članku obravnava Vojne načrte vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije v drugi polovici 30. let 20. stoletja kot enega od »krivcev« za poraz kraljeve vojske v aprilski vojni. Za marsikoga povsem neznano in provokativno temo iz naše zgodovine prinaša članek doc. dr. Andreja Gasparija, ki pod naslovom Wotanov hram namesto o toške cerkve Marijinega vnebovzeta obravnava nacistične namere na nepoganskem kulturnem središču na Blejskem otoku. Višji vojaški uslužbenec Blaž Torkar nam v svojem članku skozi mrežo šol za specialno urjenje prikaže podobo agenta medvojnega tajne službe Special Operations Executive (SOE). Kot zadnji pa v članku Preoboroževanje Jugoslovanske ljudske armade mag. DMITAR TASIĆ iz Srbije opisuje oboroževanje armade stehniko iz programov zahodne vojaške pomoči po zaostritvi odnosov Jugoslavije s Sovjetsko zvezo.

V drugem delu časopisa pa predstavljamo publicistično dejavnost Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske oziroma dela, ki so izšla v naši knjižni zbirki Slovenska vojaška zgodovina. Ta odpirana poglavja nacionalne vojaške preteklosti ter s tem pomagajo razumeti našo sedanjost, prav tako pa prispeva k razvoju slovenske vojaške misli.

Ob koncu pa bi rad še posebej pozdravil vse udeležence 8. konference Mednarodnega združenja za vojaško zgodovino (Military History Working Group – MHWG), ki jo v sodelovanju z Landesverteidigungsakademie Österreichisches Bundesheer med 20. in 23. aprilom 2008 gostimo v Ljubljani in Kobaridu.

Podpolkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik
glavni in odgovorni urednik

This issue brings forth scientific articles by the military history researchers from the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces. Captain (M.A.) Zvezdan Marković delves into the war plans of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in late 1930's that can be seen as one of the causes of defeat of the king's army in the April War. In the article Temple to Wotan as a Replacement for the Church of the Assumption on the Bled Island, Dr. Andrej Gaspari deals with a rather unknown and provocative theme from Slovenian history, exploring the Nazi intentions of building a neopagan cult center on the Bled Island. Blaž Torkar presents information on Second World War Special Operations Executive (SOE) agents by describing the network of Special Training Schools. In the last article, DMITAR TASIĆ, M.A., from Serbia describes the technical re-arming of the Yugoslav People's Army through Western military aid program after Yugoslavia's relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated.

These second part of the magazine draws attention to the publishing activity of the Military Museum of the Slovenian Armed Forces, i.e. to the publications from a collection of books we have issued on the subject of Slovenian military history. These open new venues of research of the national military past. Thus, they assist in understanding the present and contribute to the development of Slovenian military thought.

In conclusion, I'd like to express a warm welcome to all participants to the 8th Conference of the Military History Working Group (MHWG) which will be held from 20 April to 23 April 2008 in Ljubljana and Kobarid and is co-hosted by the Military Museum of Slovenian Armed Forces and Landesverteidigungsakademie Österreichisches Bundesheer.

Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Tomaž Kladnik
Chief Editor



Vojni načrti vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije v drugi polovici 30. let 20. stoletja

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia's Military War Plans in late 1930's

mag. ZVEZDAN MARKOVIĆ

Izveček

Prispevek obravnava vojne načrte Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije, kijih je v drugi polovici 30. let 20. stoletja kar nekajkrat spreminjala. Načrti so se morali velikokrat popravljati v duhu novonastalih razmer v mednarodnem okolju, zlastiv soseščini. Zagotovo je med najbolj pretresljivimi dogodki treba omeniti nemško zasedbo Avstrije (anšlus) in njen priključitev k tretjemu rajhu. Vojni načrti nam tudi razkrivajo temeljne doktrinarne in strateške usmeritve vojaškem vrhu Vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije. Dogodki, ki so sledili po 27. marcu 1941. leta, pasoprehitelisovalcevojnihn načrtov, preden so lahko pripravili novega.

Ključne besede: Kraljevina Jugoslavija, Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije, generalštab, vojninačrti, anšlus, mala antanta, ofenziva, defenziva.

Jugoslovanski vojni načrti 1938–1941

Načelnik Glavnega generalštaba je dal temeljno idejo vojnegain operacijskega načrta in bil odgovoren za njegovopripravo, potrjevala in odobrila pa ga je vlada. Vloga ministra vojske in mornarice je bila, da obvešča načelnika Glavnega generalštaba o splošni zunanjepolitični usmeritvivilade, zunanjepolitičnem položaju, pri tem pa se ni spuščal v operativne razprave.

Operativni oddelek Glavnega generalštaba je pripravljaval vsevojne načrte in pri tem moral upoštevati vojaško-političnerazmere in moč armad tistih držav, ki bi bile vpletene v vojno.

Abstract

This article deals with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's military war plans that were revised several times in late 1930's to reflect the new international situation, especially in the neighboring countries. One of the important influencing factors was certainly the entry of German troops into Austria and the annexation of Austria to the Third Reich (Anschluss). The Yugoslav war plans reveal the basic doctrine and the strategic policy directions of the top Kingdom of Yugoslavia's Army officials. However, after the events of 27 March 1941, there was not enough time to formulate a new plan.

Keywords: Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Army, General Staff, War Plans, Anschluss, Little Entente, Offensive, Defensive.

Yugoslav War Plans 1938 – 1941

The Chief of General Staff provided the basic idea for a war and operative plan and was responsible for its elaboration but it fell to the government to confirm and approve it. The Minister for the Army and Navy informed the Chief of General Staff on the general external policy orientation of the government, however, he did not take part in discussing the operations.

The Operative Department of the General Staff prepared the war plans for all conceivable war scenarios while taking into account the military and political situation as well as the strength of the armies of the countries that could be involved in a potential war.



Do leta 1938, tj. do anšlusa, je Jugoslavija imela eno nevarno in močno sosedo, in sicer Italijo. Sosede Avstrija, Madžarska, Bolgarija in Albanija so podoločilih mirovnih sporazumov po prvi svetovni vojni morale spoštovati omejitve za oborožitev in vojsko, drugi sosedi pa stali naravni zaveznici (Romunija, Grčija). Zato so bili v tem obdobju vsi vojni načrti proti Italiji obrambni, proti drugim sosedam pa so predvidevali ofenzivno delovanje. Defenzivni značaj so načrtovalci obdržali tudi v vojnih načrtih, ki so bili izdelani po anšlusu, razen v primerih, ko so predvidevali napad na Madžarsko (natančneje na vzhodno Madžarsko).¹

Vojni načrt I10 N1 M9 Ar3 B10 (D - II)

Oblikovanje tega načrta je bilo končano 24. 8. 1938 v Operativnem oddelku Glavnega generalštaba. V njem so predvidevali isočasni potek vojne Jugoslavije proti združenim silam Italije, Albanije, Nemčije, Madžarske in Bolgarije. Ob takšnem poteku dogodkov bi Jugoslavija bilav zavezništvs Češkoslovaško, Romunijo in Turčijo. Predvidevali so, da bi se jugoslovanski strani pridružila tudi Grčija, v

¹ Arhiv vojnoistorijskog instituta, Beograd – v nadaljevanju AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1.

Until 1938 (i. e. until the Anschluss) Yugoslavia only had one dangerous and powerful neighbor, i. e. Italy. Its other neighbors Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania had to comply with the provisions of the peace agreements concluded after the First World War limiting their armament and the size of their armies. The remaining two neighbors were natural allies (Romania, Greece). Therefore, all plans for war against Italy were of a defensive character in this period, even though offensive actions against the other neighbors were provided for. Even the post-Anschluss war plans kept their defensive character except in the case of planning an attack on Hungary (more precisely, Eastern Hungary).¹

War Plan I10 N1 M9 Ar3 B10 (D - II)

This plan had been formulated by the Operative department of the General Staff before 24 August 1938. It envisaged a simultaneous attack against Yugoslavia by the joint forces of Italy, Albania, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In case of such a development, Yugoslavia would establish an alliance with Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Turkey. It was predicted that Greece would either join the war on the side of Yugoslavia or declare

¹ Archives of the Vojnoistorijski institut (the Institute of War History), Belgrade – hereinafter AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1.

nasprotnem primeru pa bi razglasila nevtralen status. Poleg tega bi Jugoslavija lahko upala na francosko pomoč. Zavezniška pomoč bi bila odvisna od njihove angažiranosti na drugih frontah, kersopredvidevali, dalahkopridedo splošne vojne na evropskih tleh. Kot ugodno okoliščino za Jugoslavijo sopoudarjaliteritorialnonepovezanost njenih morebitnih sovražnikov, zlasti Albanije, Bolgarije in Madžarske, neugodno pa bi bilo, če bi napad potekal z več strani in bi zato morali razmestiti sile na različne konce države.

V načrtu so izpostavili problem številčne neenakosti pripadnikov oboroženih sil. Po ocenah Glavnega generalštaba je bilo za Jugoslavijo to razmerje zelo slabo (1 : 7). Pri tem niso upoštevali še nezakonitih albanskih in bolgarskih enot, njihovih rezervnih enot itn.

V primerjavi z letalskimi silami sta bili Nemčija in Italija močnejši od Jugoslavije, ta pa močnejša od vseh drugih. Vendar, če bi Madžarska, Bolgarija in Albanija združile svoje sile, bi bilo skupno letalstvo močnejše od jugoslovanskega. Vseto je sililo h krepitevi protiletalske obrambe. Načrt poudarja izrazito prednost italijanske in nemške vojske v oborožitvi, preostale vojske pa bi bile še nekaj časa slabše od jugoslovanske.²

V poglavju Cilji in značaj vojne lahko zasedimo: »Vtakšnem primeru, zatakšenvojni primer, mora biti v svojih temeljih naš vojni načrt defenziven, vendar če bi nastali pogoji zanašouspešno obrambo, seomogočaprehod na ofenzivno delovanje.« (tekst je v originalu podčrtan). Pri tem bi bil glavni cilj zavrnitev napada in istočasen napad na Madžarsko »kot najbolj nevarnega nasprotnika v prvem udaru.«³

V načrtu so najprej poudarili nevarnost, da bi prišlo do hkratnega napada iz bolgarske in albanske strani proti »Južni Srbiji«, torej Makedoniji, in sicer v smeri Skopja, kar bi resno ogrozilo jugoslovansko obrambo. Prav tako se jim je zdel nevaren napad Italije in Nemčije proti Zagrebu, kottudidelovanjenemškevojske z madžarskega ozemlja.

V nadaljevanju lahko preberemo, dasooce-njevali Nemčijo kot najmočnejšega in najnevarnejšeganasprotnika, zlasti zaradi njihove sposobnosti za izvajanje hitrih akcij, kottudi

neutrality. Besides, Yugoslavia could hope for the support of France. The help from the allies would depend on their engagements on other fronts since a general war in Europe was regarded as a possibility. Absence of territorial links between potential enemies (particularly Albania, Bulgaria, and Hungary) was emphasized as a favorable circumstance for Yugoslavia with, however, a negative aspect of prospective attack being conducted from several directions at once. Consequently, the Yugoslav army would have to be deployed in several areas of the country.

The plan highlighted the problem of the difference in the number of troops. According to the General Staff's estimate, this ratio was very unfavorable for Yugoslavia (1 : 7), before even taking into account the irregular Albanian and Bulgarian units, reserve units, etc.

As far as respective air forces were concerned, Germany and Italy had an advantage over Yugoslavia while the latter was stronger than other countries concerned. However, should these states (Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania) combine their armies, their joint air force would have an advantage over Yugoslavia. Therefore, air defense had to be developed. The plan stresses the pronounced advantage of the Italian and German armies in armament, even though other armies were expected to remain weaker than the Yugoslav army for some time to come.²

The chapter »Objectives and Character of War« states: »In case of such a war, our war plan is necessarily fundamentally defensive in nature, however, in the event of this defense being successful, the plan allows for transition to offensive operations« (the original text is underlined). The main goal of this course of action would be to repel the attack and to attack Hungary at the same time as it would "pose the greatest threat in the first strike«.³

The plan first highlighted the danger of a simultaneous Bulgarian and Albanian attack on "Southern Serbia", i. e. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, namely in the direction of Skopje, seriously threatening the Yugoslav defense. An Italian and German attack towards Zagreb was equally feared, as well as possible German army operations from the territory of Hungary.

The following text mentions that Germany

² AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2.

³ Prav tam.

² AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2.

³ Ibid.

zaradi teritorialne povezanosti z Madžarsko.

V sklepu tega poglavja lahko preberemo:

- »1. Proti Madžarski je treba nastopiti z najbolj energično ofenzivo, ki bo povezan z delovanjem naših zaveznikov in njen cilj bi bil, da se dotolčenjenaglavnasila, ki bi bila nepotena proti nam z obeh strani Donave.
2. Ko se pustina najpotrebnejšemudelunašihsil, daskupajz zavezniki izkoristijouspehproti Madžarski, sevseprosteenoteuporabijo proti Nemčiji, Italiji ali Bolgariji, da bi tudi njih premagale, in sicer najprej tisto, ki bi bila v konkretnem času najbolj nevarna.
3. V prvem obdobju defenzivna operacija proti Zadru, v ugodnem trenutku preitv napad, katerega cilj jenenogovozavzetjeinodstranitev nevarnosti s te strani.«⁴

V poglavju VII obravnavajo še druge možnosti izdelovanja jugoslovanskih nasprotnikov in na podlagi vsega, kar so analizirali in predvideli v tem vojnem načrtu, sklenejo, »da je osnovni pogoj za uspešno izvedbo obrambnih dejavnosti povečati operativno vojsko in učinkovitost njene oborožitve in opreme; nje no urjenje za hitre Transporte in manevriranje; povečanje in izboljšanje prometnih sredstev in pravočasno fortifikacijsko urjenje na vseh mejnih območjih, ki naj bi bila bodoča vojskovališča, zlasti proti Nemčiji, Madžarski in Italiji.«⁵

Vojni načrt N M8 I9 Ar2 B2 (Varianta »D – 8« osnovnega načrta »D«)

Vojni načrt je bil podpisan 17. 9. 1938, dokončan pa 27. 9. 1938⁶.

V načrtu je predvideno, da se bo Kraljevina Jugoslavija istočasno vojskovala proti Nemčiji in Madžarski ter da se Italija, Albanija in Bolgarija ne bodo vmešavale. Morda bi lahko prišlo do združitve vseh sil teh petih držav. Ob takšnem razvoju dogodkov bi bila Jugoslavija v zvezi s Češko slovaško, Romunijo in Turčijo. V tem taboru bi bila tudi Grčija, ki bi v najslabšem primeru imela status nevtralne države.

Besedilo vojnega načrta je podobno, skoraj enakoprejšnjemu vojnemu načrtu, saj so vse sene le nepomembne spremembe:

was perceived as the strongest and most dangerous enemy, mostly due to German capacity for swift attacks but also because of the territorial vicinity to Hungary.

The conclusion to the chapter states:

- »1. In cooperation with our allies, the most energetic offensive measures have to be taken against Hungary, their aim being to destroy Hungary's main force that would be sent there from both sides of the Danube.
2. After the requisite troops are dispatched together with the allies to take advantage of the success against Hungary, all available units are used against Germany, Italy, or Bulgaria in order to defeat them as well, starting with the country that poses the greatest threat at that particular moment.
3. In the first phase to conduct a defensive operation in the direction of Zadar, in an appropriate moment to switch to an attack with the objective of conquering Zadar and eliminating the threat from this flank.«⁴

Chapter VII deals with alternative possibilities of action by the Yugoslav enemies. Based on analyses and predictions contained in the war plan, it concludes that »the basic condition for successful implementation of defense activities is to increase the number of the operative army units and improve the quality of their weapons and equipment; train it for swift transport and maneuvering; increase the number of vehicles and improve them; and to conduct timely fortification training in all border areas that could become future battlefields, especially against Germany, Hungary, and Italy.«⁵

War Plan N M8 I9 Ar2 B2 (variation 'D - 8' of the basic plan 'D')

This war plan was signed on 17 September 1938 and the process of its elaboration was concluded on 27 September 1938⁶.

The plan originated in the hypothesis that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia would be simultaneously engaged in warfare against Germany and Hungary. Meanwhile, Italy, Albania, and Bulgaria would remain neutral. In the event where all five states concerned would join forces,

⁴ AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2.

⁵ Prav tam.

⁶ AVII, P-17, k. 11, f. 1, br. 46, Str. Pov. Dj. O. Br. 707.

⁴ AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 2.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ AVII, P-17, k. 11, f. 1, br. 46, Str. Pov. Dj. O. Br. 707.



- govori se o prenehanju vojaških določb Neuillyjskega sporazuma, ki je omejeval »svobodo oboroževanja« Bolgarije; podobne določbe Trianonskega sporazuma, ki je bil dosežen z Madžarsko, so izgubile »skoraj ves praktičen pomen«;
- najpomembnejša sprememba naša naša ofenzivne operacije proti Madžarski. Ker so menili, da so močne nemške sile na zahodnem Madžarskem, se je ofenziva proti jugoslovanski severni sosedini zožila na področje vzhodno od Donave (na območju Bačke), in sicer tako, da je prišlo do neposredne povezave s Čehi in Romuni. Tako bi dobili oporišče in strateški naslon za napad zahodno od Donave, v najslabšem primeru bi uporabili Donavo kot naravno oviro med Nemci z ene in oboroženimi silami Češko-slovaške, Romunije in Jugoslavije z druge strani. Opazimo lahko, da niso izključili možnosti, da bi obtakšnem razvoju dogodka Italija ostala nevtralna ali celopristopila jugoslovansko-češko-slovaško-romunski zvezi.
V poglavju o zbiranju jugoslovanskih sil so naredili določene spremembe⁷.

Yugoslavia would find allies in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Turkey. This camp would comprise Greece, as well. In the worst case scenario, Greece would stay uninvolved.

The wording of the plan is similar, almost identical, to the war plan above. Only some minor changes are added:

- the plan mentions the cessation of validity of the military provisions of the Neuilly Treaty limiting "the freedom to arm" to Bulgaria; the similar provisions of the Trianon Treaty with Hungary had lost "almost all meaning in practice";
- the most important change concerns offensive operations against Hungary. Since it was thought there were strong German forces in the west of Hungary, the offensive against the Yugoslav northern neighbor was narrowed to the area to the east of the Danube (the Bačka region) so as to achieve a direct link with Czechoslovakia and Romania. Thus, both a foothold and a strategic base for an attack to the west of the Danube would be gained. In the worst case scenario, the Danube would be a terrain obstacle between the Germans on one side and the armed forces of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and

⁷ AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1.



Ta dva vojna načrta sta izhajala iz predvidevanja, da bi se lahko Kraljevina Jugoslavija uspešno obranila in celo izvajala ofenzivne akcije pred združenimi silami petih sovražnih držav. Koliko je to bilo nerealno zaradi nepripravljenosti Jugoslavije na vojno, se vidi iz dveh dokumentov, in sicer iz poročila Glavnega generalštaba z dne 31. 8. 1938 in poročila Glavnega generalštaba z dne 20. 11. 1938⁸.

Vojni načrt I N M Ar B (»O«)

V tem vojnem načrtu⁹ je predvideno, da bo Jugoslavija vodila vojno »proti združenim

Yugoslavia on the other side. It is worth noting that the plan did not exclude the possibility of Italy remaining neutral or even joining the alliance of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania.

The chapter on the grouping of Yugoslav troops contains certain changes⁷.

Both war plans originated in the assumption that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia could successfully defend itself and even carry out an offensive against joint forces of five enemy states. The fact that such expectations were unfounded (since Yugoslavia was unprepared for war) is evident

⁸ Aprilski rat 1941, Zbornik dokumenata, I, Vojnoistorijski institut Beograd, 1969, dok. 25, str. 68–95; AVII, P-17, k. 84, f. 5, br. 34.

⁹ Nisem mogel najti točnega datuma in podpisa besedila tega vojnega načrta. Vendar sodeč po tem, da se Češkoslovaška ne omenja več kot jugoslovanski zaveznik, še zmeraj pa se govori o Albaniji, sem prepričan, da je bil vojni načrt podpisan med 15. 3. in 7. 4. 1939.

⁷ AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 1.

silam Nemčije in Madžarske. Italija, Albanija in Bolgarija naj bi bile neopredeljene in ne bodotakoj objavile mobilizacije ali, davsa jne bodotakoj nazčetku usmerjene protinam.« Na jugoslovanski strani bi bili Romunija in Turčija, ravnanje Grčije bi bilo odvisno od stališča Italije, Velike Britanije in Francije, vendar bi Grčijav najslabšem primeru ostala nevtralna.

Glavni cilj tega načrta je bil »varovanje celovitostinašegasedanjegadržavnega ozemlja«. Zanajmočnejšegain najnevarnejšega sovražnika so ocenili Nemčijo, takoj za njo je bila Italija. Zaradi svoje bližine »glavni povezavi med Srbijo, Hrvaško in Slovenijo« je bila nevarna Madžarska. Druga mogoča sovražnika, tj. Albanija in Bolgarija, sta ocenjena kot manj nevarna, saj je bilo stališče Albanije odvisno od Italije, Bolgarija pa je bila nevarna zaradi bližine »Solunski bazi«.

Tako je bila predvidena obramba na vseh treh frontah. Proti Madžarski bi bile zbrane 3 armade z 10 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijo; proti Nemčiji in Italiji 2 armadi s 5 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijoter 3 odredi, Primorska armadna oblast in vojna flota bi bili na primorski fronti; III. armadna oblast s 3 pehotnimi divizijami ter odredom in V. armadna oblast z 2 odredoma bi bili postavljeni proti Albaniji in Bolgariji. Menili so, da bodo za izpeljavo koncentracije sil potrebovali od 12 do 14 dni, kar bo odvisno odenot. Vloga strateške rezerve (6 pehotnih divizij, deli Kraljeve garde) bi bila manevrska, »stežiščem grupiranja nasprotiverjetno najmočnejše sovražnikove skupine na Dravskem bojevališču«. Poleg teh pehotnih enot so predvideli tudi zbiranje artilerijskih, letalskih in inženirskih enot ter utrjevanje, rušenje, oviranje in zapiranje meja. Glavni cilj dejavnosti je bil, da onemogočijo prodor oklepni enot.¹⁰

Vojni načrt I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 – »O1«

Vojni načrt I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 – »O1«¹¹ je bil podoben vojnemu načrtu »O«. Edine spremembe so bile v zvezi z zbiranjem

from two documents: the report of the General Staff of 31 August 1938 and the report of the General Staff of 20 November 1938⁸.

War Plan I N M Ar B ('O')

This war plan⁹ foresees Yugoslavia at war with "the joint forces of Germany and Hungary. Italy, Albania, and Bulgaria would remain unallied and would not immediately declare mobilization or at least would not side against us straightaway." Romania and Turkey would be on Yugoslav side while the position of Greece would depend on the views of Italy, Great Britain, and France with, however, the worst possibility being Greece's neutrality.

The main objective of this plan was to "secure the integrity of our present state territory". Germany was estimated to be the most dangerous enemy, closely followed by Italy. Hungary was dangerous because of its proximity to "the main link between Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia". The other two prospective enemies, i.e. Albania and Bulgaria, are assessed as less dangerous as Albania's stand depended on Italy while Bulgaria was dangerous due to its proximity to the "Thessaloniki base".

In such a way, the defense of all three fronts was provided for. 3 armies with 10 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions would be used against Hungary while 2 armies consisting of 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions and 3 detachments would be employed against Germany and Italy. The Primorska (Littoral) Army Zone and the War Fleet would fight on the Primorska Front. In the meantime, the III. Army Zone with three infantry divisions and one detachment and the V. Army Zone with two detachments would stand up to Albania and Bulgaria. It was estimated 12 to 14 days would be needed to concentrate forces, depending on troops. The strategic reserve (6 infantry divisions, part of the King's Guard) would be used as movable forces "with concentration of forces against what would probably be the enemy's strongest point at the Drava battlefield". Besides the infantry troops, the artillery, air force, and engineering units would be assembled.

¹⁰ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1.

¹¹ To je različica načrta »O«, ki je obravnavana v obdobju marec/april do junija 1939.

⁸ *Aprilski rat 1941, Zbornik dokumenata, I, Vojnoistorijski institut Beograd, 1969, dok. 25, pp. 68–95; AVII, P-17, k. 84, f. 5, br. 34.*

⁹ *I was unable to discover information relative to the date of this war plan and its signing. However, since Czechoslovakia is not counted among the allies of Yugoslavia any more while Albania is still mentioned as an ally, I am convinced this war plan was signed between 15 March and 7 April 1939.*

jugoslovanskih sil na fronti proti Albaniji in Bolgariji, v zvezi s sestavo in številom enot strateške rezerve (namesto 6 pehotnih divizij je bilo predvidenih 5, obdelih Kraljeve garde) in v zvezi z delovanjem posameznih enot. Temeljna določila tega vojnega načrta so ostala enaka kot v prej obravnavanem.¹²

Vojni načrt I2 N2 M2 B2 – »P«

To je bil načrt,¹³ ki bi bil uporaben ob morebitnem istočasnem vodenju vojne Kraljevine Jugoslavije proti Italiji, Nemčiji, Madžarski in Bolgariji. Predvideno je bilo, da bi se uporabile naslednje enote: 3 skupine armad, v katerih sestavo bi šlo 6 armad (I., II., III., IV., V. in VII. armada). Za operacije proti Madžarski bi namenili 3 armade z 10 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijo; za operacije proti Nemčiji in Italiji bi uporabili VII. armado (v svoji sestavi je imela 3 pehotne in konjeniško divizijo ter 2 planinska odreda) ter na primorski fronti enote Primorske armadne oblasti (pehotna divizija, poveljstvo Boke Kotorske in Šibenika ter Pomorsko obalno poveljstvo), mornariško letalstvo in vojno floto. Na fronti proti Albaniji III. armada (s 5 pehotnimi divizijami in konjeniško brigado) ter Mornariški odred na Skadarskem in Ohridskem jezeru bi bila nameščena na fronti proti Albaniji in južni Bolgariji. Za operacije proti severni Bolgariji so bile predvidene: V. armada (2 pehotni in konjeniška divizija ter 2 odreda) in del Dravske rečne flotilje. V strateški rezervi (v pristojnosti vrhovnega poveljstva) bi bilo 7 pehotnih divizij in deli Kraljeve garde, ki so bili razporejeni v 3 skupine (jugovzhodna, severna in severozahodna).

Za Jugoslavijo je bilo pomembno, da je bila predvidena zaščita meje proti Italiji, Nemčiji, Madžarski, Bolgariji in Albaniji ter zapiranje meja proti Romuniji in Grčiji. Vse to bi morale početi enote rezervne vojske.

Besedilonačrta je podpisal 1. 6. 1939 načelnik Glavnega generalštaba, armadni general Dušan T. Simović.¹⁴

Z aktom, ki je izšel 9. 9. 1939, je ukazal:¹⁵

- da se izvede sprememba v vojnem načrtu

Fortification, demolition, impeding the enemy, and closing down the borders were planned. The main objective of these activities was to prevent armored units from advancing.¹⁰

War Plan I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 - 'O1'

The War Plan I1 N1 M1 Ar1 B1 - 'O1'¹¹ resembled the War Plan 'O'. The only changes involved the grouping of the Yugoslav forces at the front against Albania and Bulgaria, composition and number of the strategic reserve units (the King's Guard units and 6 infantry divisions instead of 5), and activities of individual units. The basic provisions of this war plan did not differ from the war plan above.¹²

War Plan I2 N2 M2 B2 - 'P'

This plan¹³ would be used in case of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia being involved in warfare against Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The use of the following troops was foreseen: 3 army groups composed of 6 armies (I, II, III, IV, V, and VII Army). 3 armies consisting of 10 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions would be utilized to implement the operations against Hungary, VII Army (consisting of 3 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions as well as 2 mountain detachments) would be employed to fight Germany and Italy. At the Primorska Front, the Primorska Army Zone units (1 infantry division, the Boka Kotorska and Šibenik Commands and the Coastal Army Command), the Navy Aviation Force and the War Fleet would be used. III Army (with 5 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry brigade) and the Navy Detachment at the Skadar and Ohrid lakes would be used on the front against Albania and Southern Bulgaria. Conducting operations against Northern Bulgaria would involve V Army (2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions and 2 detachments) and part of the Drava River Flotilla. The strategic reserve (under the Supreme Command) would number 7 infantry divisions and part of the King's Guard, deployed in three groups (southeastern, northern and northwestern).

A very important factor for Yugoslavia was the anticipated defense of the borders against Italy,

¹² AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1.

¹³ Za ta vojni načrt nisem našel splošnega dela.

¹⁴ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2.


¹⁵ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2.

¹⁰ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1.

¹¹ This is a variation to the War Plan "O", elaborated between March/April and June 1939.

¹² AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 1.

¹³ I was unable to find the General Part of the plan.



Vojni načrt I N M Ar B («O»)

War Plan I N M Ar B ('O')

»P« in da se pripravi različica »P – 1«,¹⁶ v kateri bi ostale enak razpored sil kot v primeru »P«, razlikoval bi se samo razporejanje I. armade;

- da se pripravi tudi različica vojnega načrta »P – 1«, ki bi imela oznako »I4 N4 M4 B4« in šifro »P – 2«. Tu bi bila edina sprememba pri zbiranju Šumadijske in Timoške divizije.¹⁷

Vojni načrt »S« (Severna fronta)

Vojno proti Madžarski in Nemčiji so predvideli v načrtu »NM«.¹⁸ Skupaj s svojimi pomočniki ga je pripravil načelnik Glavnega generalštaba armadni general Simović, ki je bil na tempoložaju od septembra 1938 do 15. januarja 1940, vendar moram opozoriti, da ga je podpisal, ko je bil končan, in sicer maja 1940.¹⁹

Vojni načrt »S« je imel defenzivni značaj. V njem sta bila predvidena nemški in madžarski napad, ob predvidevanju, da bodo Nemci uporabili tudi madžarsko ozemlje in da bi Jugoslavija lahko računala na morebitno pomoč in podporo Francije ter Velike Britanije.²⁰ Posebna pozornost je bila namenjena dejstvu, da ne bi prišlo do prekinitve povezave Solunom, ker so v tej smeri načrtovali umik.

V izjavi, ki jo je dal general Simović 28. 6. 1946 Generalštabu, je posredoval podatke zvezi z vojnim načrtom »S«:

- v prvi črti, za zavarovanje mejne fronte, so obdržali samo najnujnejši in nepogrešljivi del sil, »v glavnem obmejne divizije in posebej formirane odrede«, skupaj je bilo 11 pehotnih in 3 konjeniške divizije ter 10 odredov;
- »Zadrževanje zelo močnih rezerv v drugi liniji (okoli 12 pehotnih, in to prvorazrednih divizij); tem je bilo določeno: da se tajno mobilizirajo v potrebnem trenutku in kobo odkriti sovražnikov načrtal napad ter kobo dokončno razkriti razpored njegovega zbiranja in smeri njegove akcije, da se jih še pred začetkom splošne mobilizacije premestiv

Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, as well as the closing of borders with Romania and Greece. All of this would be done by the reserve army units.

This plan was signed on 1 June 1939 by the Chief of General Staff, Army General Dušan T. Simović.¹⁴

In the Act of 9 September 1939 he ordered:¹⁵

- to amend the War Plan 'P' and to prepare a variation 'P-1',¹⁶ keeping the deployment of troops from the case 'P' and changing only the grouping of the I Army;
- to draw up a variation to the 'P-1' War Plan designated 'I4 N4 M4 B4' and coded 'P-2'. The only change would involve grouping of the Šumadijska and Timoška divisions.¹⁷

War Plan 'S' (Northern Front)

This plan, titled 'NM', incorporated the plans for the war against Hungary and Germany.¹⁸ It was drawn up by the Chief of General Staff, Army General Simović and his assistants. Simović was in office from September 1938 until 15 January 1940, although it need not be stressed he signed the aforementioned plan after its final completion in May 1940.¹⁹

The War Plan 'S' was of a defensive character anticipating a German and Hungarian attack. It foresaw that the Germans would conduct operations from Hungarian territory as well, and that Yugoslavia would be able to count on the support of France and Great Britain.²⁰ Special attention was paid to maintaining the link with Thessaloniki since a retreat was planned in this direction.

In his statement to the General Staff of 28 June 1946 General Simović provided the following data on the War Plan 'S':

- on the first line of battle, the border front was protected only by essential and indispensable troops, »mostly border divisions and newly formed detachments« – in all, 11 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions and 10 detachments;
- »keeping very strong reserves on the second line of battle (app. 12 first-rate infantry divisions); their orders were: a secret mobilization

¹⁶ Verjetno bi bila oznaka v tem primeru I3 N3 M3 B3.

¹⁷ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2.

¹⁸ AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 3, Str. Pov. D. O. Br. 222.

¹⁹ Izjava generala Simovića, ki je bila dana 28. 6. 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, str. 18.

²⁰ V. Terzić: Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije, II, Partizanska knjiga, Narodna knjiga, Pobjeda, Ljubljana, Beograd, Titograd, 1984, str. 159.

¹⁴ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2.

¹⁵ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2.

¹⁶ It would probably be designated I3 N3 M3 B3.


¹⁷ AVII, P-17, k. 103, f. 1, br. 2.

¹⁸ AVII, P-17, k. 102, f. 1, br. 3, Str. Pov. D. O. Br. 222.

¹⁹ General Simović's statement of 28 June 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, str. 18.

²⁰ V. Terzić: Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije, II, Partizanska knjiga, Narodna knjiga, Pobjeda, Ljubljana, Beograd, Titograd, 1984, p. 159.

F.111, P.17, M.102, A.4, B.2



Ратни план "P1"
 К. 102, т. 1, б. 1, 2,
 л. 161

Ратни план "P2"
 Умисле 7 огњача
 на "P1"
 1) Штурмовајућа група
 против 7. р. м. м. у ју 42. у
 поље - 1 м. м. 03. 23
 2) Трнова јули. 02. 71
 3) 408. пушачки ав. се цент
 у јуни 7. август 6. р. м. м.
 К. 103, т. 1, б. 2
 л. 162

4

Vojni načrt I2 N2 M2 B2 - »P«

War Plan I2 N2 M2 B2 - 'P'



zaledje ogrožene fronte z možnostjo uporabe, ali za okrepitev divizij prve linije za obrambo ogroženih smeri, ali za ofenzivno protidelovanje – gledena situacijonadoločeni fronti.«;

- vzaledju sovražnikoviharmadje bilotreba organizirati gverilske odrede;
- izpeljani so bili ukrepi za skrajšanje časa, ki bi bil potreben za mobilizacijo in koncentracijo, na 12 dni, kot tudi izogibanje možnosti, da »bi bila ovirana in morebiti celopreprečenaz napadomsovrážnikovega letalstva«. ²¹

Ocenjujemo, da je vojni načrt »S« večinoma realno prikazoval razmere, ki so prevladoval v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji in njeni vojski. Spričakanjem nemškega in italijanskega napada kot napada najresnejših glavnih sovražnikov, je bil v načrtu »S« predviden umik proti jugu, saj je bilo samostestrani pričakovati morebitno pomoč Francije in Velike Britanije. Poleg tega je »predvidenovodenjegverilskevojevne sovražnikovemzaledju, na ozemlju, odkoder bise umikalelastneenote, kar bi ustrezalo tradicijam jugoslovanskih narodov in ozemlju, ki je zelo ugodno za to obliko vojskovanja«. ²²

Vojni načrt »R - 40«

Ta vojni načrt je bil pripravljen za primer, če bi bila Jugoslavija v vojni z Nemčijo, Italijo, Madžarsko in Bolgarijo, torej je pomenil modifikacijo vojnega načrta »S«. Oblikovan je bil v času, ko je bil načelnik Glavnega generalštaba

whentheywereneededandwhentheenemy planorattackwouldbediscoveredandthepatternofenemygroupinganddirectionof activitieswouldberevealed. Evenbeforethegeneralmobilization,thesetroopsweretobe transferredtotherearoftheendangeredfront lineinordertobeusedeithertoreinforcethe divisionsonthefirstlineofbattleanddefend newlythreatenedareasorforoffensivecounter-attack,dependingonthesituationatthefront concerned;

- organizing guerrilla detachments on the enemy's rear;
- measures were carried out to reduce the time of mobilization and concentration to 12 days and to avoid the possibility that mobilization and concentration would »be impeded or possibly even prevented by the enemy attack from the air«. ²¹

It can be assessed that the War Plan 'S' presented a mostly accurate reflection of the situation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and its army. Since the plan 'S' provided for an attack by Germany and Italy as the two most dangerous enemies, it planned for a retreat to the south because this was the only direction from which possible help of France and Great Britain would arrive. In addition, it »provides for guerrilla warfare on the enemy's rear taking place in the territory emptied by our own retreating units which would be consistent with the traditions of the Yugoslav nations and with the terrain which is very favorable for this type of combat«. ²²

²¹ AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, str. 18.

²² V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, str. 161.

²¹ AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, p. 18.

²² V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, p. 161.

armadni general Petar Kosić, ki je 15. 1. 1940 zamenjal generala Simovića. Besedilo tega vojne načrta je bilo sprejeto na konferenci maja 1940, na kateri so bili prisotni ministri vojske in mornarice Milan Nedić, general Petar Pešić (ob morebitni vojni v vlogi pomočnika vrhovnega poveljnika kneza Pavla) in vsi vojni poveljniki armadnih skupin. Sprejeli so tudi nekaj manjših sprememb, ki so bile le taktične narave (na podlagi povojne izjave generala Kosića).

Čeprav bi lahko že razčlenjen vojni načrt »S« prilagodili novim razmeram (okupacija Češkoslovaške in Albanije, začetek druge svetovne vojne, bolgarsko približevanje silam osi), ga armadni general Petar Kosić ni hotel sprejeti. Res je, da je načrt »R - 40« ohranil tudi nekatere ideje Simovićevega načrta, in sicer obrambo po globini na severni in severozahodni fronti, sprizadevanjem, danepride dopreseknanja povezave Solunom intakodo trganja in ločevanja vojske. Poleg tega je bila predvidena zasedba Zadra, da se proti Bolgariji začne z akcijo, ki bi bila v »duhu Balkanskega pakta, ki je predvideval koncentričen napad vseh članic Pakta, če bi Bolgarija napadla eno izmed držav članic Pakta«. ²³

Temeljna razlika je bila v velikosti in številu divizij, ki so bile predvidene za obrambo meja. Zdaj je bilo njihovo število povečano na račun strateške rezerve, ki bi ji ostalo skupaj samo 9 divizij (30 odstotkov skupnega števila).

Predviden je bil naslednji strateški razvoj jugoslovanske vojske:

- 2 armadi s 7 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijo na fronti proti Albaniji in Bolgariji;
- 2 armadi s 6 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijo ter odredom (do Donjega Miholjca) proti Madžarski;
- 2 armadi s 5 pehotnimi in konjeniško divizijo ter 2 planinskima odredoma proti Madžarski (od Donjega Miholjca), Nemčiji in Italiji;
- za obrambo obale Jadranskega morja in napad na Zadar enote Primorske armadne oblasti;
- 9 divizij v Slavoniji, okoli Zagreba, Niša in Skopja v strateški rezervi;
- vojna flota in mornariško letalstvo za obrambo obale;

War Plan 'R - 40'

This war plan was prepared for the eventuality of Yugoslavia being at war with Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. It is a modified version of the War Plan 'S' and was drawn up when the Chief of the General Staff was Army General Petar Kosić who replaced General Simović on 15 January 1940. This war plan was adopted on a conference of May 1940. Present at the conference were the Minister for Army and Navy Milan Nedić, General Petar Pešić (who would act as a assistant to the Commander-in-Chief Prince Pavle in case of war) and all the army commanders of the army groups. They also approved some minor changes of purely tactical nature (as General Kosić claimed in his statement after the war).

Although the War Plan 'S' was already elaborated and could be revised to reflect the new situation (occupation of Czechoslovakia and Albania, start of the Second World War, Bulgaria beginning to side with the Axis Powers), the Army General Petar Kosić refused to approve it. It is true that the plan 'R - 40' kept some of the ideas of Simović's plan - the in-depth defense on the Northern and Northwestern Fronts with every effort made to prevent being cut off from Thessaloniki so as not to have the army dispersed and scattered. In addition, Zadar would be captured in order to start activities against Bulgaria »in keeping with the spirit of the Balkan Pact that stipulated a concentric attack of all the Pact members should Bulgaria attack one of them«. ²³

The fundamental difference between the two plans derived from the number and size of divisions that would be sent to defend the borders. With the new plan, their number was increased and the strategic reserve reduced to 9 divisions (30 % of the total number).

The following strategic development of the Yugoslav Army was planned:

- 2 armies with 7 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions on the front against Albania and Bulgaria;
- 2 armies with 6 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions and 1 detachment (to the town of Donji Miholjec) against Hungary;
- 2 armies with 5 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions and 2 mountain detachments against Hungary (to the town of Donji Miholjec), Germany, and Italy;

²³ V. Terzić: *Slom ...*, II, str. 162.

²³ V. Terzić: *Slom ...*, II, p. 162.

- na Ohridskem jezeru rečna flotilja z Mor-nariškimi odredom.

Vendar se dogajanja leta 1940 nisotako končala, da bi vojni načrt »R – 40« lahko bil sploh ustrezen. Aprila 1940 je Nemčija popolnoma »pometla« z Dansko in Norveško, maja in junija pa so bile poražene Nizozemska, Belgija in Francija, v Dunkerqueu je britanski ekspedicijski korpus doživel zelo hud poraz (k sreči ni bil uničen), tako da je Nemčija lahko od junija 1940 naprej brez kakršnih koli obveznosti in dejavnosti na zahodni fronti pristopil k izvajanju pritiskana majhne države v jugovzhodni Evropi. Namen tega pritiska je bil, da se države priključijo trojnemu paktu. Temu pritisku stanovembra 1940 najprej podlegli Romunija in Madžarska, ki sta pristopili k trojnemu paktu. Italija je že oktobra 1940 napadla Grčijo. Po omenjenih dogodkih je Jugoslavija ostala tako rekoč osamljena, zlasti ker je bil pristop Bolgarije k trojnemu paktu pričakovani in je bilo le še vprašanje časa, kdaj se bota zgodilo. Stem je razpadel balkanski pakt in nanjegovo oživitve niso mogli računati.

Kljub temu Glavni generalštab ni nič ukrenil do 22. 2. 1941. Takrat so se odločili, da bi načrt »R – 40« dopolnili ali celo pripravili nov vojni načrt. Zaradi takšne neodločnosti vladajočih krogov so bile izvajane vse priprave jugoslovanske vojske na morebitno vojno na podlagi vojnega načrta »R – 40«, ki je bil veljaven do marca 1941.

Vojni načrt »R – 40« je imel te pomanjkljivosti:

- a) Glavni generalštab je izhajal iz prepričanja, da je treba braniti vse državne meje, kar so zahtevali zlasti hrvaški in slovenski politiki. To je vodilo k razpršitvi, raztegnitvi in slabšanju sil, predvsem rezervnih, ki so sestavljale samo 30 odstotkov skupne moči jugoslovanske vojske.
- b) Razporeditev glavne vojske je bila takšna, da so imeli dve veliki reki, Savo in Donavo za hrbtom, kar bi ob morebitnem umiku pomenilo veliko oviro.

Vseh omenjenih pomanjkljivosti, zlasti pomanjkanje rezervnih enot na področju proti Bolgariji, ob napačni domnevi, da se bo glavni napad zgodil s severne in severozahodne strani, ni mogel popraviti niti novi vojni načrt »R – 41«.

- Primorska Army Zone units for the defense of the Adriatic coast and the attack on Zadar;
- 9 divisions in Slavonija, near Zagreb, Niš, and Skopje as a strategic reserve;
- the War Fleet and the Navy Aviation Force for the defense of the coast;
- a River Flotilla and a Navy Detachment on the Ohrid Lake.

However, the developments in 1940 prevented the War Plan 'R-40' from being in anyway relevant. In April 1940, Germany literally »swept away« the armies of Denmark and Norway. In May and June, Netherlands, Belgium, and France were overpowered. In the meantime, the British expedition corps suffered a serious defeat at Dunkerque (but was luckily able to evacuate). Therefore, Germany did not have any engagements or activities on the Western front since June 1940. Accordingly, it was able to pressure small countries in Southeastern Europe. The objective of the pressure was to compel these states to join the Tripartite Pact. The first to succumb were Romania and Hungary. Both signed the Tripartite pact in November 1940. Even before that, in October 1940, Italy attacked Greece. Against this backdrop, Yugoslavia was virtually isolated, particularly because it was expected it was only a question of time when Bulgaria would accede to the Tripartite Pact, as well. Thus, the Balkan Pact (or the Balkan Entente) collapsed and there was no hope of its being revived.

In spite of this, the General Staff did not take any action until 22 February 1941 when it was decided to amend the 'R-40' plan or even create a new war plan. Due to this indecisiveness in the government circles, all the preparations of the Yugoslav Army for a possible war were carried out on the basis of the War Plan 'R – 40' that remained in force until March 1941.

The War Plan 'R-40' had some other weaknesses:

- a) The General Staff proceeded from the conviction that the state borders need to be defended in their entirety which was demanded particularly by the Croatian and Slovenian politicians. Such a course of action would lead to dispersal and deterioration of the troops and to their being spread too thin. This was especially true of the reserve troops that constituted only 30% of the total of the Yugoslav Army.



Vojni načrt »R - 41«

Priprava tega vojnega načrta se je začela v Glavnem generalštabu 22. 2. 1941.²⁴ Temeljno zamisel je dal takratni načelnik Glavnega generalštaba armadni general Petar Kosić. Načrt sta odobrila knez Pavle, kot vrhovni poveljnik, in armadni general Petar Pešić, ki je bil predviden za njegovega namestnika, če bi se začela vojna.²⁵

Temeljna zamisel novega vojnega načrta je bila: »... z maksimumom sil izpeljati preboj k Solunu in Grčiji zaradi združitve tamkajšnjih zavezniških silami, cilj pa, da se vojna poudaljša do zmage. Vse druge naše sile bi morale z bojem po globini in umikanjem proti jugu oziroma jugovzhodu pridobiti na vzhodni, severni in severozahodni fronti potreben čas za preboj glavnih sil proti Solunu in Grčiji za evakuacijo.«²⁶ Predvidena je bila tudi ofenziva v smeri Albanije in zasedba Zadra.²⁷

Osnovna razporeditev sil v omenjenem vojnem načrtu:

- 4 divizije in odred proti Albaniji;
- 4 divizije in odred proti makedonsko-bolgarski fronti;
- 4 divizije in 2 odreda proti srbsko-bolgarski fronti;
- 3 divizije in 5 odredov proti Romuniji;
- 7 divizij in 2 odreda proti Madžarski;
- 4 divizije in 2 odreda proti Nemčiji in Italiji;

b) The main force was deployed in a way that put two large rivers (the Sava and the Danube) behind its back constituting a great obstacle to retreat.

All these deficiencies, in particular the shortage of reserve units in the area next to Bulgarian border that was caused by the mistaken assumption that the main attack would come from the north and the northwest, could not be rectified even by a new war plan, the War Plan 'R - 41'.

War Plan 'R - 41'

The General Staff began drawing up this war plan on 22 February 1941.²⁴ The basic idea was provided by the then Chief of General Staff, Army General Petar Kosić. The plan was approved by Prince Pavle in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief and by the Army General Petar Pešić who would act as his deputy in case of war.²⁵

The fundamental idea of the new war plan was to: »... use the maximum number of troops to attempt a breakthrough to Thessaloniki and Greece in order to join the allies' forces with the objective of prolonging the war until victory is achieved. By in-depth fighting and the retreat to the south or southeast, all our other troops would have to increase the time available for the breakthrough and evacuation of the main force from the Eastern, Northern, and Northwestern fronts to Thessaloniki and Greece.«²⁶ It was also foreseen that an offensive would be carried out towards Albania and that Zadar would be conquered.²⁷

²⁴ Izjava generala M. Nikolića, ki je bila dana junija 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, br. 1.

²⁵ Prav tam.

²⁶ Prav tam.

²⁷ V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, str. 164.

²⁴ General M. Nikolić's statement of June 1946; AVII, P-17, k. 5, f. 1, br. 1.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ V. Terzić: Slom ..., II, p. 164.

- divizija, 2 trdnjavski poveljstvi in 2 odreda na primorsko-obalni fronti;
- v strateški rezervi 4 divizije (Mladenovac, Stara Pazova, Modriča, Nikšić).²⁸

Izzgornje razporeditve lahko vidimo, daje ostala samo osmina sil (4 od skupno 32 divizij) v strateški rezervi in še od teh 4 divizije nisobile sposobne izvajati kakršnih koli manevrov, ker niso bile motorizirane.

Naloga vojaškega letalstva je bila, da prepreči delovanje sovražnikovega letalstva na jugoslovanskem teritoriju oziroma nebu, da napada letališča, železniške in druge objekte v nasprotnikovih obmejnih področjih ter da podpira operacije kopenske vojske in mornarice.

Vojna mornarica je morala braniti obalo, preprečevati delovanje nasprotnikov mornarice in sodelovati v napadih na Zadar.

Eno ter rečne flotilje so dobile nalogo, da sodelujejo z enotami kopenske vojske ter dana sprotnika ovirajo na rekah itn.

Značilnosti vojnega načrta »R – 41« so:

- 1) Predviden je bil umik jugoslovanskih sil na jug, v Grčijo zaradi oblikovanja in vzpostavitve nove fronte, kibi nastalav zavezništvu z Grčijo in Veliko Britanijo.
- 2) Predvideno je bilo ofenzivno delovanje proti Albaniji in napad na Zadar. Ti ideji bi bil lahko uresničljivi, vendar sta postalimarca 1941, ko sone mške enote v korakale v Bolgarijo, ne uresničljivi in nerealni. Za uresničitev dela načrta, ki je predvideval nastanek nove solunske fronte, je bilo treba ujo zapustiti celotno državno ozemlje, kar je bilo v takratnih notranjepolitičnih razmerah ne uresničljivo, »... kersoslovenski in hrvaški ministri že napovedali, da se Slovenci in Hrvati ne bodo borili izven svojih nacionalnih teritorijev.«²⁹
- 3) Predvidenajebilakordonska obrambacelotnegaozmlja (opozoriti je treba, daje bila dolžinacelotnemejevečja od bodočevzhodne fronte), kar bi pripeljalodo obkolitve in zajetja celotne vojske.
- 3) Nevarnost, kije grozila Jugoslavijizbolgarske strani, saj so tam bile nemške enote že razporejene, nibilapravočasno opažena, kar

The basic deployment of troops according to this war plan was the following:

- 4 divisions and 1 detachment against Albania;
- 4 divisions and 1 detachment on the Macedonian – Bulgarian front;
- 4 divisions and 2 detachments on the Serbian – Bulgarian front;
- 3 divisions and 5 detachments against Romania;
- 7 divisions and 2 detachments against Hungary;
- 4 divisions and 2 detachments against Germany and Italy;
- 1 division, 2 fortress commands and 2 detachments on the Primorska – Coastal Front;
- 4 divisions in strategic reserve (Mladenovac, Stara Pazova, Modriča, Nikšić).²⁸

The deployment above shows that only 1/8 of the troops (4 out of the total of 32 divisions) was kept in strategic reserve. Furthermore, these 4 divisions were not capable to do any maneuvers since they were not motorized.

The Air Force was entrusted with preventing the activities of the enemy military aviation in the Yugoslav territory (or sky) and with attacking airfields, railway facilities, and other targets in the frontier-zone of the enemy, as well as with providing support to the land-based Army and the Navy.

The War Navy was charged with defending the coast, preventing the opponent navy's actions, and helping in the attacks on Zadar.

The river flotilla units were ordered to cooperate with the land-based troops and to impede the enemy on rivers, etc.

The characteristics of the War Plan 'R-41' are the following:

- 1) It envisaged the retreat of the Yugoslav forces to the south (to Greece) with the aim of forming and establishing a new front in alliance with Greece and Great Britain.
- 2) It expressed the intention of carrying out offensive operations against Albania and an attack on Zadar.

Up to a point, both of these plans were feasible. However, as soon as the German troops invaded Bulgaria in March 1941, they became unattainable and unrealistic.

To realize the part of the plan foreseeing the new

²⁸ Prav tam. Memoarji Dušana Simovića; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, str. 125–236, II. del.

²⁹ V. Terzić: *Slom ...*, II, str. 187.

²⁸ *Ibid.* Memoarji Dušana Simovića; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, p. 125 - 236, Part II.

je bilo v aprilski vojni usodno, ker so pravz operacijami iz Bolgarije preprečili uresničitve najpomembnejše jugoslovanske ideje – umik proti Grčiji.

Po 27. marcu 1941 ni bilo časa, da bi temeljiteje spreminjali vojni načrt. Bil pa je dovolj časa, da bi lahko odstopili od kordonske razporeditve enot. Tako bi se izognili frontalni vojni in sile omejili na obrambo državnih težišč, ki bi zajela Srbijo, Črno goro in Makedonijo,³⁰ kar so pričakovali tudi Nemci. Zelo pomembne bi bile akcije gverilskih odredov, ki so bile predvidene že v vojnem načrtu »S«, vendar od takrat nisobile vključene v kombinacije, kijih je Glavni generalštab predvidel v načrtih »R-40« in »R-41«.

Koje armadni general Dušan Simović kritiziral vojni načrt »R-41«, je v svojih Memoarih zapisal tudi naslednje: »Vojni načrt R-41' ni pomenil novega originalnega načrta s točno opredeljeno idejo, ampak slabopopravljeno izdajonačrta 'R-40', katerega strateške rezerve souporabili za zapolnitev lukenj in nadaljnorazširitev front, vendar vse to na podlagi še nezadostno zbranih podatkovosovražnikovih namenov in o grupiranju njegovih sil.«³¹

Thessaloniki Front, the entire territory of the country would have to be abandoned. However, the internal political situation forbade this course of action »...because the Slovenian and Croatian ministers stated Slovenians and Croats would not fight outside their national territories «.²⁹

- 3) A cordon defense of the entire territory was decided upon (it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that the border was longer than the future Eastern front) which could lead to the entire army being surrounded and captured.
- 4) The threat to Yugoslavia from the direction of Bulgaria (where the German troops were already amassed) was not noticed in time. In the April War, this was of fatal importance because the operations conducted from the Bulgarian territory prevented the realization of the main Yugoslav idea – a retreat to Greece.

After 27 March 1941, there was no time for any radical changes of the war plan. Nevertheless, it would still have been possible to abandon the idea of the cordon deployment of troops. Thus, a frontal war could be avoided and all the forces would be used for the defense of the central part of the state encompassing Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia,³⁰ which was what was expected by the Germans themselves. A very important role could be played by the guerrilla detachments' activities foreseen in the War Plan 'S', however, they were not part of combinations prepared by the General Staff in the plans 'R-40' and 'R-41'.

When the Army General Dušan Simović criticized the War Plan 'R-41' in his memoirs, he added the following: »The War Plan 'R-41' was not a new and original plan with a well-defined idea but a badly revised version of the War Plan 'R-40', employing the strategic reserves to fill in holes in the defense and to further extend the front lines, however, within complete information gathered on the enemy intentions and grouping of troops.«³¹

Fotografije: Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije na manevrih na območju Dravske banovine leta 1939.
Vir: Fototeka Muzeja novejšegodovine Slovenije, Ljubljana.

All Photos: The Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia manoeuvres in Dravskabanovina (Drava province) in 1939. Source: the National Museum of Contemporary History's collection of photography (Ljubljana).


³⁰ V. Terzić: *Slom ...*, II, str. 189.

³¹ Dušan Simović: *Memoari*; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, str. 125 - 236.

²⁹ V. Terzić: *Slom ...*, II, p. 187.

³⁰ V. Terzić: *Slom ...*, II, p. 189.

³¹ Dušan Simović: *Memoari*; AVII, P-16, k. 8, f. 1, br. 2, pp. 125 - 236.



Podoba agenta medvojne tajne službe Special Operations Executive (SOE)

Image of a Second World War Secret Organizations Special Operations Executive (SOE) Agent

BLAŽ TORKAR

Izvleček

Prispevek obravnava sistem rekrutiranja in urjenja britanske Uprave za posebne operacije (Special Operations Executive – SOE). SOE je svoje kandidate urilavšolah za specialno urjenje (Special Training Schools), v katerih so se urili v diverzantskih znanjih, radiotelegrafiji in padalstvu. Agenti SOE so imeli na voljo precejšen izbor internega orožja, opreme in posebnih naprav, namenjenih tajnemu vojskovanju. Kljub učinkovitemu sistemu urjenja, dobremu orožju in opremi, se cilj SOE, da zaneti uporvo zasadeni Evropi, ni popolnoma uresničil.

Ključne besede: SOE, STS, rekrutacija, urjenje, agent.

Uvod

Britanska uprava za posebne operacije ali Special Operations Executive (SOE) je bila britanska tajna služba, katere naloga je bila zanetiti in usklajevati upor proti silam osivo kupiranih državah med drugo svetovno vojno. SOE ni bila dovolj močna, da bi lahko nadzirala in dajala direktive odporniškim skupinam, lahko pa jih je prekosvojih misij naterenu opremljala, jim svetovala in nanje na različne načine vplivala. Take načrte je imela tudi v Jugoslaviji oziroma Sloveniji, kjer ji ni uspelo združiti obeh odporniških gibanj Tita in Mihajlovića, vendar je precej prispevala k odločitvi, da so zavezniki podprli partizansko gibanje in odtegnili pomoč Mihajloviću.

Abstract

The contribution deals with the recruitment and training system of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). SOE's Special Training Schools trained candidates in sabotage, wireless telegraphy and parachuting. SOE agents had at their disposal an extensive choice of internal collection of weapons, equipment and gadgets used in clandestine warfare. Although SOE used an efficient training system, weapons and equipment, its objective of sparking resistance in the occupied Europe was not entirely attained.

Keywords: SOE, STS, Recruitment, Training, Agent.

Introduction

The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was a British secret service organization responsible for stimulating and coordinating resistance against the Axis powers in countries occupied by Germany during the Second World War. SOE did not have the capacity to oversee or direct the resistance groups, although it was in the position to influence them as well as to provide equipment and advice through its representatives in the field. It had formed similar plans for its operations in Yugoslavia, including Slovenia. There, SOE failed to convince the two resistance movements (one led by Tito and one by Mihajlović) to join forces. However, it was largely instrumental in the Allied decision to withdraw support from Mihajlović and give it to the Partisans instead.

SOE je imela tudi učinkovit sistem rekrutiranja in usposabljanja, ki je potekal ovšolah za specialno usposabljanje (Special Training Schools – STS) od koder so svoje agente v obliki misij pošiljali na zasedena območja. Izurila je tudi nekaj Slovencev, ki so se med usposabljanjem izkazali kot uporaben in zanesljiv kader. Večina Slovencev se je po prihodu v Slovenijo z velikim veseljem pridružilo narodno osvobodilnemu gibanju (NOG), vendar proti koncu vojne doživelo tragično usodo, saj jih je Organizacija za zaščito naroda (OZNA) označila za britanske vohune. V članku so obravnavani temeljni postopki rekrutacije, usposabljanja agentov, oprema, ki jo je uporabljal pri svojih nalogah.

Rekrutacija agenta SOE

Uspeh vsake tajne službe temelji tudi na kakovosti njenih agentov, zato je pomembno, da je njihov rekrutacijski postopek natančno določen in premišljen. Vodstvo SOE se je zavedalo, da je nepopolni sistem rekrutiranja za organizacijo lahko usoden, zato je sama prevzela rekrutacijo svojih podrejenih.¹ Rekrutacija je kot najbolj tvegana del celotnega subverzivnega delovanja sledila trem osnovnim načelom. Prvo načelo je bilo, da je kakovost kandidatov pomembnejša od kvantitete, čeprav so nekatere subverzivne dejavnosti zahtevale veliko število agentov. Drugo načelo je bilo, da se rekrutira zanesljive in resne kandidate, saj jih je pozneje veliko odpadlo že na prvih ravneh usposabljanja. Organizatorji rekrutiranja so bili še posebej sumničavi do kandidatov, ki so se SOE želeli priključiti prostovoljno, saj je bilo veliko možnosti, da so dvojni agenti. Tretje načelo je bilo rekrutacija kandidata za nalogo in ne obratno. Poleg treh temeljnih načel je bilo pomembno, da je odgovorni častnik za rekrutiranje znal delati z ljudmi in da je bila ustreznost kadra odvisna tudi od območja in vrste agentov, ki jih je SOE iskala.²

SOE je največ kandidatov pridobila iz vrst nekdanjih vojakov, sindikatov, poklicnih združenj, različnih društev in verskih skupnosti. Omorebitnem kandidatu je skušal azbrati vse informacije, spoznati njegove šibke točke

SOE had an efficient system of recruitment and training, the latter being carried out at Special Training Schools (STS). These were serving as a base from which agents were sent to the field in order to operate in the occupied territories. SOE trained agents included some Slovenians who proved themselves as adept and dependable students during the training. Most of them eagerly joined the national liberation movement on their arrival in Slovenia, however, they suffered a tragic fate towards the end of the war when they were accused of being British spies by the intelligence agency OZNA (Department for Protection of the People). This article deals with the basic recruitment and training procedures and describes the equipment used by the agents on their missions.

Recruitment of an SOE Agent

The success of every secret service organization is partly dependant on the quality of its agents. Therefore, it is important that recruitment is well designed and planned. The SOE leaders were aware of a negative impact a faulty recruitment system could have on the organization. Accordingly they reserved the right to personally recruit their subordinates.¹ As the recruitment was the most uncertain part of the subversive activities, it was guided by three fundamental principles. The first principle was that the quality of the candidates is more important than the quantity, in spite of the fact that certain types of subversive operations demanded a large number of agents. The second principle was the recruitment of reliable and serious candidates since later many dropped out even in initial stages of training. The recruitment organizers were particularly suspicious of candidates who wished to join SOE as volunteers because there was a high likelihood they were double agents. The third principle was to choose a candidate according to the requirements of a task rather than vice versa. Next in importance to the three fundamental principles were the following factors: that the officer in charge of recruitment had good people skills and that the choice of operatives depended on the area involved and on the type of agents SOE considered appropriate.²

SOE selected most of the candidates from the ranks of former soldiers and from trade unions, professional associations, various societies and religious communities. All candidates were subjected to an extensive background

¹ The National Archives (hereinafter TNA), Records of SOE (hereinafter HS), 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 1.

² TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 13, November 1943, p. 1.

¹ The National Archives (hereinafter TNA), Records of SOE (hereinafter HS), 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 1.

² TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 13, November 1943, p. 1.

inugotoviti njegove osebnosti. Pomembno načelo vsake tajne organizacije je bilo, da se agent izogiba tistim, ki delajo za druge tajne službe. Vsaka tajna služba in prav tako SOE sta, predvstopom novega člana pripravila "posvetitveni obred", ki je kandidatu poudaril pomembnost njegovega položaja v organizaciji.³

Plačevanje, motivi in proces rekrutacije kandidatov

SOE je velikokrat pravljal preizkuse za neskljivosti, skaterim je dobila informacije, koliko je agent zavezan svoji organizaciji. Vsak organizator rekrutiranja je lahko kandidatu ponudil delo šele takrat, ko je zanj dobil primerno nalogo.

Največ kandidatov se je SOE pridružilo zaradi patriotizma, ki je bil najbolj pogost motiv za vstop v njene vrste. Denar je bil za kandidate velikokrat nepomemben, saj je bila želja po sodelovanju pri osvoboditvi svoje domovine zelo velika. Kljub temu je SOE razvila določena pravila glede plačevanja. Agenti so plačevali porednih plačilnih stopnjah, nazačetku z manjšim zneskom, ki se je pozneje skladno z uspešnostjo tudi povečeval. SOE se je zavezala, da bo plačevala točno in vnaprej, najbolj v gotovini.⁴ Pripravili so tudi seznam najpogostejših motivov, ki jih je bilo treba upoštevati pri rekrutaciji v svoje vrste: patriotizem, politične, verske in socialne ideje, sovraštvo do sovražnika, zamera posameznikom, dobiček po osvoboditvi ali vojni, pohlep in maščevanje. Najpomembnejši med vsem pa stabilni patriotizem in želja po osvoboditvi domovine.⁵

Pomembno pravilo rekrutacije je bilo, da je treba iskati človeka za nalogo in ne naloge za človeka. Kakovosten kandidat ni bil nikoli izbran v naglici, kajti moral je vzbujati zaupanje med ljudmi. Vsak kandidat je moral razviti občutek, da ga podpira cela država in da ceni ljudi na višjih položajih.⁶

investigation that included determining their weaknesses and examining their personal contacts. An important principle of every secret organization was that agents should avoid members of other such organizations. Every secret service organization, including the SOE, held an "initiation ceremony" for new members, the better to underline to the candidate his importance to the organization.³

Payment, Motives and the Candidate Recruitment Process

SOE often performed reliability tests to find out the extent of agent's true commitment. A recruitment organizer was only authorized to offer employment to a candidate when the latter was needed for a mission.

The most frequent reason for joining SOE was the patriotic motive. Money was often an unimportant consideration as most agents were predominantly influenced by the wish to liberate their countries. Despite this, SOE established some specific rules for payment. Agents were paid salaries according to grade. The beginners received less and later received a pay rise depending on their performance. SOE committed itself to paying on time and in advance, preferably in cash.⁴ A list of the commonest motives to be taken into account when recruiting into the SOE ranks was drafted. These included patriotism, political, religious and social convictions, enmity for the enemy, resentment for individuals, profits foreseen for the period after the liberation or after the end of war, greed, and revenge. Patriotism and the wish to liberate the home country were perceived as the most important motives.⁵

An important rule to follow during the recruitment procedure was to find the right person for the job instead of finding a job for an individual. A candidate of quality was never chosen in a hurry as he had to inspire trust. Each candidate had to feel he had the entire nation behind him as well as to have respect for his superiors.⁶

³ TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 13, November 1943, p. 2.

⁴ TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 14, November 1943, p. 1.

⁵ TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 2.

⁶ TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, pp. 3, 4.

³ TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 13, November 1943, p. 2.

⁴ TNA HS 7/55, Syllabus of Lectures at STS 103 (Camp X), Agent management, A 14, November 1943, p. 1.

⁵ TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, p. 2.

⁶ TNA HS 7/52, Group B Syllabus, Recruiting, 21. 7. 1944, pp. 3, 4.



Radiotelegrafski aparat B Mark II ali B2

A wireless set B Mark II or B2

Selekcijski postopki SOE

Selekcijo kandidatov je SOE uresničevala prek državnih sekcij SOE ali prek osrednjih komitejev kot je bil The Students Assessment Board (SAB),⁷ ki je nadomestil pripravljalnourjenje, nakaterem sokandidati dobili temeljno vojaško znanje. Državne sekcije so velikokrat urile neprimerne kandidate, ki jih je bilo treba navišjih ravneh urjenja odstraniti. Hkrati pasonevtralni komiteji stogimi metodami zavračali velikomorda primernih rekrutov. Zaradi takih pomanjkljivosti selekcije so ustanovili sekcijo za urjenje, ki je začela nadzorovati SAB. Ta je začela oskrbovati državne sekcije s tehničnimi sredstvi.⁸

Predvsakoselekcijosoizvedlitudisegregacijokandidatov, ki je bila izvedena ponačionalnem načelu ali kot segregacija posameznikovoziro ma operacijskih skupin. Največkrat so v isto državo pošiljali agente iste narodnosti, kar je ob izdaji lahko povzročalo veliko nevarnost. Vendar so bili agentje drugih nacionalnosti vdoločeni državi neučinkoviti,

SOE Selection Procedures

SOE selected its candidates either through SOE country sections or through central establishments such as Students Assessment Board (SAB)⁷. The latter took over the work related to introductory training, consisting of imparting the basic military skills to the candidates. Country sections often trained inappropriate candidates who had to be rejected in the later stages. On the other hand, the neutral establishments employed rigid methods and turned down many potentially appropriate candidates. Due to these deficiencies in selection, the training section of SOE was founded to supervise SAB and to supply technical resources to the country sections.⁸

Before starting the selection process the candidates were segregated either according to their nationality or as individuals and operative groups. As a rule the agents were sent to the country of their own nationality, which constituted a great danger in the event of treason. However, deploying agents of a different nationality caused poor performances since such agents were unfamiliar

⁷ SAB was a quick and rather efficient system of candidate selection determining a candidate's suitability for a certain type of work in a few days through extensive tests and interviews.

⁸ TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter IV, September 1945, also in HS 8/435.

⁷ SAB was a quick and rather efficient system of candidate selection determining a candidate's suitability for a certain type of work in a few days through extensive tests and interviews.

⁸ TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter IV, September 1945, also in HS 8/435.

insicer predvsem zaradi nepoznavanja jezika, območja in kulture.⁹

Prvotni načrt je vseboval segregacijo po narodnosti, ki je potekala na vseh ravneh urjenja. V tečajih signalizacije, na katerih so urili radiotelegrafiste, segregacije po narodnostih načeloma ni bilo.

Sekcija za urjenje SOE

Sekcija za urjenje SOE s sedežem v Londonu je upravljal direktor urjenja, ki je nadzoroval šole za specialno urjenje (STS) v Angliji in na Škotskem, kjer so urili kandidate za delovanje v vseh evropskih državah. Izjema so bile šole na Daljnem in Bližnjem vzhodu, saj so ohranile večjo avtonomnost, vodil pajih je lokalni upravnik SOE. Njihove temeljne naloge so bile urjenje kandidatov in tudi inštruktorjev urjenja.

Ker je bila SOE tajna služba, se nihče ni mogel rekrutirati na podlagi oglaševanja, zato je bil najučinkovitejši sistem rekrutiranja preko osebnih zvez in poznanstev. SOE je velikokrat primanjkoval profesionalnosti, zlasti Military Intelligence 6 (MI6)¹⁰ ji je večkrat očitala amaterstvo, saj so bili njeni agenti velikokrat izurjeni v naglici in slabopripravljeni poslani na misije.¹¹

Že predhodnice SOE so upravljele šolami za urjenje svojih agentov, ki jih je SOE po združitvi še naprej upravljala. Šole so urile kandidate različnih narodnosti z namenom, da jih po končanem urjenju pošljejo v njihove matične države. Dolgoročni cilji SOE so temeljili na oblikovanju mostičev v državah, ki so bile v središču zanimanja SOE, zato je ta v njih oblikovala mrežo agentov in sistem zvez. Kratkoročni cilji so bili v strogo tajnem območju delovanja SOE, saj so temeljili na izvajanju samomorilskih napadov in atentov.¹²

SOE je razvila mrežo šol za urjenje v diverzantskih znanjih, radiotelegrafiji in padalstvu. Sekcija za urjenje je postavila štiri stopenjsko urjenje, ki so ga najprej opravili inštruktorji in organizatorji urjenja. Ti so bili poslani v

with the language, area and culture of a foreign country.⁹

Originally it was planned the agents would be segregated according to nationality, applying to all stages of training. In principle, segregation according to nationality did not take place during signal training, where wireless operators received their instruction.

Training Section of SOE

The training section of SOE was headquartered in London and managed by a director whose responsibilities included overseeing Special Training Schools (STS) in England and Scotland, where the candidates were trained for operations in all European states. The schools in the Far East and the Middle East constituted an exception since they preserved a higher degree of autonomy and were administered by a local manager. The basic task of these schools was to train both the candidates and the training instructors.

Due to the secret service nature of SOE, recruitment through advertising was impossible. The system of recruitment through personal contacts and acquaintances proved to be the most efficient solution. SOE often came up short when it came up to professionalism and was frequently accused of amateurism, especially by Military Intelligence 6 (MI6)¹⁰. In fact, SOE agents were often trained in a hurry and sent to conduct operations badly prepared.¹¹

Even SOE forerunners administered operative training schools that were taken over by SOE after the latter was amalgamated from the existing departments. These schools trained candidates of various nationalities in order to send them to their countries of origin after they completed the training. The SOE long-term goals were based on forming networks of operatives and contacts in the countries of particular interest to SOE. The short-term goals were included in the strictly confidential part of SOE operations as their attainment depended on suicide attacks and assassinations.¹²

⁹ TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter XVII, September 1945.

¹⁰ MI6 or SIS was a British secret intelligence service that played an important role in the British intelligence and security system. Due to rivalry between the two organizations, it regarded SOE as superfluous.

¹¹ M.R.D Foot: *SOE, Special Operations Executive 1940–1946*, London 1999, pp. 446–488.

¹² TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter I, September 1945.

⁹ TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter XVII, September 1945.

¹⁰ MI6 or SIS was a British secret intelligence service that played an important role in the British intelligence and security system. Due to rivalry between the two organizations, it regarded SOE as superfluous.

¹¹ M.R.D Foot: *SOE, Special Operations Executive 1940–1946*, London 1999, pp. 446–488.

¹² TNA HS 7/51, History of the Training Section of SOE, Chapter I, September 1945.

pripravljale šole, nato paravojaške in nazadnje zaključne šole. Pripravljale šole s pomenilo preskusno dobo, v kateri so neprimerne kandidate odstranili. Na paravojaškem urjenju so kandidate učili o metodah rušenja, ravnanjaz orožjem, taktiki, topografiji, šifriranju, varnostinaterenuter metodah poizvedovanja inogledaterena. Paravojaški tečajje seboval tudi padalsko urjenje. Vsaka državna sekcija je imela svojo zaključno šolo, v kateri so se učili tudi o metodah delovanja tajnih službin aktualnih dogodkih v okupiranih državah. Do vpoklica na misijo so kandidate zadrževali v zaključnih šolah.

Sekcija za urjenje je leta 1943 dosegla svoj največji obseg, saj je zaposlovala kar 12 častnikov, potempase je začelo obdobje nenega krčenja. Tako so junija 1945 zaprli vse šole za urjenje, razen ene od šol na Bližnjem vzhodu, ki je ostala prehodni tabor za morebitne potrebe po urjenju.

Agentovo orožje, oprema in posebne naprave

Agentova oborožitev in oprema

SOE je od porniška gibanja oskrbovala s konvencionalnim orožjem, ki so ga takrat uporabljal evse zavezniške sile. Poleg konvencionalnega so imeli agenti SOE na voljo precejšen izbor interne zbirke orožja, opreme in posebnih naprav namenjenetajnemu vojskovanju. SOE oziroma njeniznanstveniki so svoje orožje razvijali le za interno distribucijo. Večino pošiljk orožja so sestavljale puške in lahki mitraljezi, poleg tega pasosvoje agente opremljali z različnimivrstami pištol za samo obrambo. Kljub temu daje SOE večino orožja dobila od vojske, jemajhne količine orožja izdelala tudisama s pomočjo svojih znanstvenikov in tehnikov.¹³

Raziskovalni sekciji SOE je načeloval vodja znanstvenih raziskovanj, kijenadzoroval delo naštirih ravneh: nafizikalno-kemijski, inženirski, operativni ravni in kamuflaži. Naprvih dveh ravneh so obravnavali probleme povezaneevžigalniki in napravami, kibijih tidetonirali. Prikemijskem raziskovanju so se usmerili

SOE developed a network of schools for training in sabotage, wireless telegraphy and parachuting. A four stage training programme was instituted by the training section that was first undergone by the instructors and training organizers. Both were sent to preliminary schools and then to paramilitary training and afterwards to a final training programme. Preliminary training was a test period where inappropriate candidates were rejected. Paramilitary training provided the candidates with sabotage, weapons, tactical, topography, and encoding knowledge, as well as teaching them about safety during field assignments, investigative methods, and the scoping of the terrain. The paramilitary course included parachute training. Every country section had its own final programme school where the secret services' operative methods and current events in the occupied countries were imparted. Candidates were kept at these schools until they were sent to a mission.

The training section achieved its greatest extent in 1943 when it employed as many as 12 officers, however, their number was subsequently reduced. All training schools were closed in June 1945 with the exception of a school in the Middle East that remained open as a transitional camp for eventual training needs.

Agent's Weapons, Equipment, and Gadgets

Agent's Weapons and Equipment

SOE was supplying the resistance movements with the conventional weapons used by all the Allied powers. Apart from these, SOE agents had at their disposal an extensive choice of internal collection of weapons, equipment and gadgets used in clandestine warfare. SOE, i.e. its scientists developed its own range of weapons intended for internal distribution only. Most shipments were composed of rifles and light machine guns. In addition, SOE agents were armed with various pistols intended for self-defense. Even though SOE received most of its weapons from the army, small quantities were produced in its own facilities by SOE scientists and technicians.¹³

¹³ Denis Rigden: *SOE Syllabus, Lessons in ungentlemanly warfare*, (hereinafter: Rigden: *SOE Syllabus*), pp. 18, 19; Mark Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook of Special Devices*, (hereinafter: Seaman, *Secret Agents Handbook*), p. 20.

¹³ Denis Rigden: *SOE Syllabus, Lessons in ungentlemanly warfare*, (hereinafter: Rigden: *SOE Syllabus*), pp. 18, 19; Mark Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook of Special Devices*, (hereinafter: Seaman, *Secret Agents Handbook*), p. 20.



Pištola Welrod 9mm z dušilcem

A Welrod 9mm pistol

predvsem nabiokemijo, pri čemer soraziskovali uporabo strupov, uspaval in samomorilnih tablet. Sestavljali so tudi posebne hranilne obroke primerne za vojskovanje v različnih pogojih obremenitve. Področje inženirstva je razvijalo različne naprave, med katerimi so prevladovale magnetne bombe, ki so jih pritrdili natarčo, največkrat ladjo. To so bile podvodne bombe, s katerimi so se urili tudi kandidati v šolah za specialno urjenje. Razvijali so tudi vse vrste posebnega orožja, ki se ga je dalo skriti na preprost način. Prednost vsakega agenta je bila v veščini, potrpežljivosti in poznavanju lokalnega okolja in neorožju, čeprav je bilo dovršeno izdelano.¹⁴

SOE je izdal tudi ilustriran katalog posebnih naprav in opreme, ki je bil namenjen agentom. To je bila interna publikacija, s pomočjo katere sonaročali željeno opremo. Vsebovala je opise, metode uporabe in vse glavne informacije o zažigalnih in osvetljevalnih bombah,

SOE research section was led by the head of scientific research who supervised four levels of work: physics and chemistry level, engineering, operations, and camouflage. The first two levels dealt with the problems with igniting fuses and detonating devices. Research in the chemistry field was centered primarily on bio-chemistry or, more specifically, the use of poisons, hypnotics and suicide pills. In addition, special nutritious meals, appropriate for warfare in different conditions of strain were developed. The engineering field concentrated on inventing various devices, predominantly magnetic bombs that could be stuck to a target, usually a ship. The use of such underwater bombs was another part of the Special Training Schools syllabus. Various kinds of special devices that could be easily concealed were invented as well. However, the agent's biggest advantages were his skill, patience, and the knowledge of the local area rather than the weapons, even though brilliantly designed.¹⁴

¹⁴ Rigden, *SOE Syllabus*, p. 19.

¹⁴ Rigden, *SOE Syllabus*, p. 19.



Welmanova podmornica

A Welman submarine

vžigalnikih, podvodnem eksplozivu in drugih napravah, ki so bile namenjene povzročiti eksplozije.¹⁵

Sekcija za kamuflažo SOE je svojim agentom zagotavljala primerna oblačila, ponavadi rabljena, ki so jih dobili iz starih zalog ali od beguncev, ki so prihajali iz okupiranih območij. Krojači so šivali predvsem civilne obleke glede na področje, kamor naj bi bil agent poslan, na zalogi pa so imeli številne vojaške uniforme, predvsem uniforme tretjega ranga. Med urjenjem so se agenti naučili, kako spremeniti videz in kako se obnašati v določeni obleki, da bi ostali čim bolj prikriti. Med agenti je bila zelo priljubljena padalska uniforma striptease jump, ki jo je začela uporabljati tudi konkurenčna tajna služba MI6–SIS. Kakovost padalske obleke je bil avhitrosti slačenja, poleg tega je agenta dobro zavarovala pred morebitnimi poškodbami in umazanijo. Zelo razširjena je bila tudi uporaba kovčkov inaktivk, ki so jih uporabljali kot nastavljive mine proti nasprotniku.¹⁶

For its agents, SOE issued an illustrated catalogue of special devices and equipment. It was an internal publication that aided the agents in ordering the needed equipment. The catalogue contained descriptions, methods of use, and main information on explosive incendiary bombs and night bombing flares, igniting fuses, underwater explosives, and other explosive devices.¹⁵

SOE camouflage section provided the agents with appropriate clothing, usually used clothes obtained from the warehouses or from the refugees arriving from the occupied territories. Tailors made predominantly civilian clothes in the style of the area agent would operate in. Many military uniforms were kept in stock, mostly the Third Reich uniforms. During training agents were taught how to change their appearance and how to behave in a certain kind of clothing so as to remain inconspicuous. A parachuting jump suit «striptease jump» achieved great popularity among agents and was soon used even by the rival secret service organization MI6–SIS. The popularity of this parachuting uniform was due to the fact it could be speedily removed. Besides,

¹⁵ Rigden, *SOE Syllabus*, p. 22.

¹⁶ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 15.

¹⁵ Rigden, *SOE Syllabus*, p. 22.

Eksplzivna in zažigalna sredstva

SOE je razvila različne vrste eksploziva, še posebej plastičnega, ki se ga je dalohitro spremeniti v željeno obliko, zapakiran pa je bil v raznovrstne predmete, kot so kipci in orientalske rezbarije. Eksploziv je potreboval detonator in vžigalnik z daljšim upočasnjem delovanjem. Največ so uporabljali vžigalnik Lagleys, ki je postal splošni delopremesaboterja. Znanstveniki SOE so izpopolnili tudi podvodni eksploziv, ki je pravitako postal standardna pravazapomorskosabotažo. Podvodni eksploziv je bil zelo učinkovito sredstvo, saj je potopil okrog 3000 ton sovražnikovega ladjevja.

Poleg podvodnega eksploziva je SOE razvila tudi tako imenovanega ježa (tyrebuster) – majhno mino, ki se je aktivirala na pritisk. Uporabljali so jo za razstrelitev koles in podvozja prevoznih sredstev. Teskrivnost nemine so agenti uporabljali v različnih prikritih oblikah kot opeke, kamenje, blato, ki jih je sovražnik težko opazil. Razvili so tudi razstrelivo v obliki tlačilke za kolo, granate v obliki svetilk in številne druge oblike razstreliva.¹⁷

Zadnje popularno eksplozivno in zažigalno sredstvo je bila tako imenovana eksplozivna podgana (the explosive rat), ki je bila izdelana za sabotaže na lokomotivah. Agenti so eksplozivne podgane nastavljali v bližino kotlov, ki so obstikuz ognjem eksplozirale in onemogočile nadaljnjo vožnjo vlaka.¹⁸

Radiotelegrafski aparati

Na začetku svojega delovanja je bila SOE popolnoma odvisna od MI6–SIS, saj je vsa radiotelegrafska komunikacija, torej šifre in kode, temeljila na konkurenčni tajni službi. Šele pozneje je organizacija dosegla avtonomijo in samazaela proizvajati radiotelegrafsko opremo, ki jo je začela uporabljati tudi MI6–SIS. Radiotelegrafisti so se v STS učili oddajati in sprejemati na različnih vrstah radiotelegrafskih aparatov (W/T)¹⁹. Ko dvostranska komunikacija med agentom in centralo ni bila več potrebna, so začeli uporabljati miniaturni komunikacijski sprejemnik.

it offered good protection from potential injuries and dirt. There was a widespread use of explosive devices that were concealed in suitcase and briefcases and could be used against the enemy.¹⁶

Explosive and incendiary devices

SOE conceived different kinds of explosives, particularly plastic explosives that could easily be molded and hidden in various items such as statuettes and oriental carvings. For the use of explosives, detonators and igniting fuses with a long time–delay were needed. The commonest type of igniting fuse was “Lagleys”, a standard part of an agent’s sabotage equipment. The SOE scientists perfected underwater explosives that became a standard device for maritime sabotage. The underwater explosives proved to be very efficient, sinking approximately 3000 tons of enemy ships.

Besides the underwater devices, SOE developed the so–called “tyrebuster” – a small pressure–activated mine. It was used to explode wheels and undercarriages of vehicles. These mysterious mines were used concealed as bricks, stones or mud that were difficult to notice by the enemy. Other inventions included an explosive device in the form of a bicycle pump, lamp–shaped grenades and many other forms of explosives.¹⁷

The last of the popular explosive and incendiary devices was the so–called “explosive rat” manufactured for sabotage of train engines. An agent would place the explosive rat next to the boilers where it exploded on the contact with fire and prevented the train from continuing.¹⁸

Wireless Sets

At the start of its activities SOE was entirely dependant on the MI6–SIS as it had to rely on the rival secret service organization for wireless communications, ciphers and codes. It wasn’t until later that the organization achieved autonomy and started manufacturing its own radiotelegraphic equipment that came to be used by the MI6–SIS as well. The Special Training Schools trained wireless operators to send and receive communications while using different kinds of

¹⁷ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 17.

¹⁸ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 18.

¹⁹ W/T (wireless telegraphy) or radio set was a wireless receiver and transmitter device used for sending and receiving coded communications by the missions.

¹⁷ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 17.

¹⁸ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 18.

¹⁹ W/T (wireless telegraphy) or radio set was a wireless receiver and transmitter device used for sending and receiving coded communications by the missions.

Najpogosteje uporabljena aparata stabila tip A Mark III in B Mark II (ali B2), ki so jih agentje kamuflirane nosili v običajnih kovčkih. Prenosni aparati W/T so imeli dva vira napajanja, in sicer električno napeljava ali pa baterije. Največ aparatov je kot vir napajanja uporabljalob baterije, kijih je bilo treba podoločenem času tudi napolniti. Napajanje baterij je potekalo s pomočjo ročnih ali parnih generatorjev.²⁰

Vodna plovila

SOE je za veliko svojih sabotažnih akcij in misij potrebovala različne vrste plovil od čolnov, manjših ladij do podmornic. Med poznanimi plovili, kijih je organizacija razvila, so bili motorizirani delno potopljeni kanuji primerni za transport agentov do sovražnikovih tarč ter manjša tovorna ladja *Sleepin Beauty*. Med podmornicami je slovela *Welmanova* podmornica za prevoz enega agenta, kipasev praksi ni izkazala.²¹

Ponavadi sousoabljanja iz pomorstva obsegala predavanja predmetov iz pomorstva in opravljanje praktičnih vaj iz pomorskih sabotažnih akcij.²² Urili so se v prikritem dostopu do posameznih točk, kjersomoralizvajatisabotažne akcije.

Sklep

SOE je velik naredil za razvoj urjenja svojih agentov, saj je postavila učinkovito mrežo šol za specialno urjenje (STS) skoraj po celem svetu. Vsi agentje so se v SOE vključili prostovoljno, z željo po osvoboditvi lastne domovine ali iz golega avanturizma. Kandidati so se urili v štiri stopenjskem procesu urjenja in se v nekaj mesecih urili v agente z različnimi vrstami specialističnega znanja. Orožje in oprema agentov sta prihajala iz vojske ali raziskovalnih sekcij SOE. Kljub učinkovitemu sistemu urjenja, orožja in opreme se cilj SOE, da zaneti uporvzasedeni Evropi ni popolnoma uresničil. SOE je dosegla tudi nekatere uspehe, kot so sabotažnostov, tovarn, železnic in uspešni atentati na pomembne naciste.

radios (W/T)¹⁹. When two-way communication between the agent and the central became unnecessary, a miniature communications receiver was used.

The most frequently used radios were the sets of the type "A Mark III" and "B Mark II" (or "B2") that an agent could camouflage as a normal suitcase. Transportable W/T sets could be powered either by electricity or batteries. Most sets were recharged by battery power. The batteries were recharged by manual or steam generators.²⁰

Sea vessels

For the sabotage purposes and missions, SOE often needed various types of vessels ranging from boats and small ships to submarines. Among the best known vessels developed by the organization were motorized semi-submersible canoes for transporting agents to enemy targets and a small cargo ship nicknamed the "Sleeping Beauty". The most famous submarine was a *Welman* one-man submarine, however, it did not work well in practice.²¹

Maritime training normally included courses on seafaring and practical exercises related to maritime sabotage operations.²² Exercises included clandestine approach to the target where a sabotage operation was carried out.

Conclusion

SOE placed high importance on the training of agents, therefore, it built an efficient network of Special Training Schools (STS) located throughout most of the world. All agents joined SOE voluntarily either in order to free their home countries or because they regarded it as an adventure. Candidates underwent a four-phase training process that took several months and during which they acquired different kinds of specialist skills. The agents' weapons and equipment were supplied by the armed forces or by SOE research sections. Although SOE used an efficient training system, weapons and equipment, its objective of sparking resistance in the occupied Europe was not entirely attained. SOE did achieve some success in carrying out sabotage operations on bridges, factories, and railways, as well as assassinations of some important Nazi party leaders.

²⁰ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 24.

²¹ Rigden: *SOE Syllabus*, p. 19.

²² TNA HS 5/917, *Wireless operators record sheets, 1941–1942*.

²⁰ Seaman: *Secret Agents Handbook*, p. 24.

²¹ Rigden: *SOE Syllabus*, p. 19.

²² TNA HS 5/917, *Wireless operators record sheets, 1941–1942*.

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
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NIEDERHAGEN

IN LAUBEN

Votanov hram namesto otoške cerkve Marijinega Vnebovzetja

K pričevanjem o nacističnih namerah
o neopoganskem kulturnem središču na Bledu

Temple to Wotan as a Replacement for the Church of the Assumption on the Bled Island

Testimonies on Nazi Intentions to Build a Neopagan Cult Center in Bled

dr. ANDREJ GASPARI

Izveček

Prispevek obravnava manj znane načrte nacistov ureditvi neopoganskega kulturnega središča na Bledu. Glavni vir so pričevanja obveščevalca Jožeta Jana, ki je ob koncu vojne zaplenil gradivo posebne službe Glavnega urada NSDAPs sedežem veni od blejskih vil. Službo, ki se je od konca leta 1943 ukvarjala s projektom gradnje Votanovega templja na Blejskem otoku in internata za izbranice SS na mestu nekdanjega dvorca Suvobor, je vodil dr. Matthes Ziegler, nekdanji protestantski duhovnik intesni sodelavec Alfreda Rosenbergater Martina Bormanna. Blejske namere spominjajo na delno uresničene načrte Heinricha Himmlerja o ustanovitvi akademije in religioznega središča na gradu Wewelsburg v Westfaliji ter SS-kolonij v Nemčiji in vzhodni Evropi, ki so nastajali ob psevdoznanstvenih podporizlogla-sne organizacije Ahnenerbe in njenih institutov. Dokumentacije blejskega urada v Sloveniji ni bilo mogoče izslediti, zato botreba iskanje razširiti na berlinske arhive.

Ključne besede: Slovenija, Bled, druga svetovna vojna, nacizem, cerkev, poganstvo, Votan, SS, Ahnenerbe, Matthes Ziegler.

Abstract

The contribution deals with the little-known plans of the Nazis to establish a neo-pagan cult center in Bled. The main source used is the testimony of the intelligence agent Jože Jan who confiscated the documents of the NSDAP Party Chancellor's special service (with headquarters in one of the Bled villas) at the end of the Second World War. The service was involved in the project of building a temple to Wotan on the Bled Island and an SS boarding school for selected individuals at the site of the former Suvobor Palace. It was headed by dr. Matthes Ziegler, an ex-protestant clergyman and a close associate of Alfred Rosenberg and Martin Bormann. The plans for Bled bear a close resemblance to Heinrich Himmler's partially realized plans for an academy and a religious center at the Wewelsburg castle in Westphalia and for SS colonies in Germany and Eastern Europe. Both of these plans were formed with the pseudoscientific support of the infamous Ahnenerbe organization and its institutes. The documents of the Bled office could not be traced in Slovenia, therefore, research will have to be extended to the Berlin archives.

Keywords: Slovenia, Bled, Second World War, Nazism, Church, paganism, Wotan, SS, Ahnenerbe, Matthes Ziegler

Uvod

Bled z okolico je bil zaradi termalnih izvirov in izjemne jezerske vedute zotokom ingradom v drugi polovici 19. stoletja eden najbolj znanih turističnih krajev v Avstro-Ogrski monarhiji, zaradi bivanja kraljeve družine v rezidenci Suvobor pa se je med obema vojnama razvil v živahno diplomatsko središče. Pozlom jugoslovanske vojske v aprilski vojni in kratkotrajni prisotnosti italijanskih enot je Bled postal središče nemške okupacijske oblasti na Gorenjskem. Taje za svoje sedeže izkoristilavečino zmogljivejših hotelov, v vlah in drugih hotelih na Bledu, Mlinem in Rečici ter na Blejskem gradu pa so serazporedile različne vojaške in policijske enote ter orožniki.¹

Zaradi razmeroma ugodnih varnostnih okoliščin je Bled ves čas vojne ostal priljubljena destinacija nemških dopustnikov in družin z bombardiranih območij, obiskali pa so ga tudi mnogi nacistični funkcionarji. Med slednjimi navaja Božo Benedik, eden najboljših poznavalcev krajevne zgodovine, tudi poveljnika SS in vodjo urada za utrjevanje nemštva Heinricha Himmlerja, vplivnega strankarskega ideologa in nosilca različnih vladnih funkcij Alfreda Rosenberga, šefa centralnega urada stranke Martina Bormanna, vodjo Hitlerjeve mladine Baldurj. v. Schiracha in vodjo Deutsche Arbeitsfront Roberta Leya.²

Med razloge za atakoviske obiske sodi tudi poseben blejski urad vodstva NSDAP za religiozne in svetovnonazorske zadeve, ki naj bi se po dovolj verodostojnih pričevanjih ukvarjal tudi s pripravo projektov za postavitev nacističnega kulturnega središča. Čeprav danes skoraj neverjeten načrt nadomestitve cerkve na Blejskem otoku z Votanovim templjem v ničemer ne odstopa od delno institucionaliziranega oživiljanja poganskih obredov Germanov, protiklerikalizma in protikatolištva ter odkritega spogledovanja nekaterih vodilnih nacistov z okultnim.

Na izbiro Bleda kot primerne kraja so poleg ambientalnih odlik in zgodovinskega pomena nedvomno vplivali tudi nacistično prikazovanje »Južne Koroške« (Südkärnten) kot

Introduction

In the second half of the 19. century, the thermal springs and the wonderful sight of the lake with its island and castle made Bled and its surroundings one of the most renowned tourist spots in Austria-Hungary. The fact that the royal family was often in residence at the Suvobor palace in the period between the two World Wars turned Bled into a lively center of diplomacy. After the defeat of the Yugoslav army in the April War Bled was briefly occupied by the Italian troops. The town later became the main base of the German occupying forces in Gorenjska. Most of the larger hotels were used as German headquarters while various military and police units and the gendarmerie established themselves in the villas and smaller hotels in Bled, Mlino, and Rečica.¹

Due to mostly favorable security conditions, Bled remained a popular destination for German holiday-makers as well as for the refugees from the bombed areas throughout the war. It was visited by many Nazi Party officials. According to Božo Benedik, one of the foremost experts on local history of Bled, these visitors included the SS commander and the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism Heinrich Himmler, a top party ideologue and holder of various government posts Alfred Rosenberg, the head of the Party Chancellery Martin Bormann, the head of the Hitler Youth Baldur von Schirach and the head of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront Robert Ley.²

One of the reasons for such prominent visitors was the NSDAP Leadership's Office for Religious and Ideological Matters in Bled. Satisfactorily trustworthy testimonies claim the Office's tasks included designing projects to build a Nazi cult center. Although the plan of replacing the church on Bled Island with a temple to Wotan hardly seems credible today, it is in line with partly institutionalized revival of Germanic pagan practices, anti-clericalism, anti-Catholicism, and open flirtation of some Nazi leaders with the occult.

Apart from the ambiental features and historical significance, the choice of Bled was undeniably partly influenced by the Nazi image of »Southern Carinthia« (Südkärnten) as »an ancient Germanic province«. Another influencing factor were

¹ Benedik 1984.

² *Ib.*, 2003, 75. V knjigi gostov blejskih hotelov 1887–1945 (Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana, Zdraviliška komisija Bled, RAD 65, knjiga 41) navedeni funkcionarji niso vpisani, domnevno zaradi varnostnih ukrepov.

¹ Benedik 1984.

² *Ib.*, 2003, 75. The names of the officials concerned cannot be found in the guestbook of the Bled hotels 1887–1945 (the Historical Archives Ljubljana, Zdraviliška komisija Bled – Bled Health Resort Committee, RAD 65, volume 41), probably due to security measures.

»prastare germanske pokrajine« in rezultati rasnega pregleda gorenjskega prebivalstva, ki je pokazal povečano prisotnost favoriziranega nordijskega tipa.³ Nemški značaj Gorenjske, v katero so nameravali poizseliti v nezaželjene – ga prebivalstva preseliti 20.000 pripadnikov nemških manjšin iz vzhoda, naj bi znanstveno utemeljil Inštitut za preučevanje koroške dediščine (Institut für Kärntner Landesforschung), ustanovljen septembra 1942 pri univerzi v Gradcu,⁴ in sicer predvsem na podlagi arheoloških, historično-geografskih, lingvističnih in folklornih raziskav.

Pri promociji Bleda je imel pomembno vlogo tudi medvojni župan Franc Paar,⁵ ugleden član NSDAP in Schwäbisch Deutsches Kulturbund. Paar, ki je bil leta 1940 zaprt zaradi sumov o hunstvanju in ponekaterih podatkih celo nosilec redke podeljevanega strankinega odlikovanja Blutorden, naj bi na Bled že pred vojno povabil Baldur von Schiracha in mu kraj predstavil kot mali raj v Evropi. V Paarovi korespondenci naj bi bil ohranjen dopis razvpitega Standartenführerja Otta Skorzenya, ki se je pri županu zanimal za katero od razpoložljivih blejskih vil, v kateri bi se lahko naselil s svojo družino.⁶

Blejski načrti v povezavi z nacističnimi načrti o novi svetovni ureditvi

Radikalna načrta zarušnje Marijine cerkve na otoku in gradnja poganskega svetišča odražata dvojen in oportunističen odnos nacistov do Cerkve: potrjuje, da je bilo oživiljanje germanskih kultov in njihovo prilagajanje ideološko-propagandni potrebam stvar osebnih nagibov vodilnih nacistov, med katerimi se zanimanje za okultno pripisuje predvsem Richardu Waltherju Darréju, Rudolfu Hessu, Alfredu Rosenbergu in Heinrichu Himmlerju. Hitler se je iz poganistov norčeval in »kič, ki ga vlačijo iz nemške prazgodovine« imel za žalitev pravega germanstva, iz ikonografije masovnih zborovanj stranke in začetega monumentalnega arhitekturnega preurejanja nemških mest pa je očitno njegova očaranost nad grško in rimsko antiko. Med vzponom na oblast je katoliški in protestantski Cerkvi zagotavljal,

the results of the racial tests of Gorenjska residents, showing a strong presence of the favored Nordid type.³ The Gorenjska region was envisaged to become home to 20.000 members of German minorities from the East following deportation of undesirable inhabitants. The German character of the region was to be proven mainly on the basis of archeological, historical geographic, linguistic, and folklore research by the Research Institute for the Land of Carinthia (Institut für Kärntner Landesforschung), established in September 1942 as part of the University of Graz.⁴

A certain role in the promotion of Bled was doubtlessly played by Franc Paar.⁵ Paar had been the mayor of Bled in the period between the World Wars and was a distinguished member of NSDAP and the Schwäbisch Deutsches Kulturbund. In 1940, he was imprisoned on suspicion of spying. Some claims state he was a recipient of a rarely awarded Nazi Party decoration Blutorden. He allegedly invited Baldur von Schirach to Bled before the war describing the town as a small paradise in Europe. Supposedly Paar's preserved correspondence includes a letter from the infamous Standartenführer Otto Skorzeny inquiring on available villas in Bled where he could stay with his family.⁶

Role of Bled in the context of nazi plans on the new world order

The radical plan of demolishing the St. Mary's church on the island and constructing a pagan temple reflects dual and opportunist relations of Nazis with the church. Besides, it confirms that restoration of Germanic cults and their adaptation to the ideological and propaganda needs was caused by personal inclinations of Nazi leaders. Among these, interest for the occult was attributed principally to Richard Walther Darré, Rudolf Hess, Alfred Rosenberg, and Heinrich Himmler. Hitler made the pagan worshipper the butt of his jokes and considered »the kitsch they're bringing out of German ancient history« an insult to real Germanism. Instead, he was fascinated by the Greek and Roman antique as the iconography of the mass rallies of the Nazi Party and the beginnings of large-scale architectural renewal of

³ Ferenc 1968, 221, 222.

⁴ Wedekind 2005, 117–120.

⁵ Benedik 2003, 76–79.

⁶ Za podatek se zahvaljujem Bogdanu Šanci.

³ Ferenc 1968, 221, 222.

⁴ Wedekind 2005, 117–120.

⁵ Benedik 2003, 76–79.

⁶ I thank Bogdan Šanca for the data.



Razglednica Blejskega otoka s cerkvijo Marije Pomagaj okoli leta 1938

A postcard of the Bled Island with the Church of the Assumption (app. 1938)

da njegova stranka ne namerava vzpostaviti germanskega poganstva. Postavljal se je celov vloga branitelj krščanstva pred komunističnim ateizmom, čeprav je v nekaterih govorih pred volitvami leta 1932 tradicionalno krščanstvo zavračal kot vero, temelječo na judovski kulturi. Uradno je stranka podpirala »pozitivno krščanstvo«, vendar Goebbels in Hitler nista skrivala namenov, da bi cerkev pokončni zmagi pripravili k razvoju v nemško socialno-evolucionistično organizacijo, ki bi namesto odrešitve in Mojzesovih desetih zapovedi, ki so jih imeli za preživete in judovske, razglašala kulturo rase, krvi in boja. Proti koncu vojne je režim postajal vedno bolj protiklerikalni, vendar je bila ideja o tako imenovani rajhovski Cerkvi zaradi rivalstva med institucijami in manipulacije vprašanji religije že vnaprejšje sojena neuspeh.⁷

Med omenjenimi visokimi obiskovalci Bleda so trije izrazito protikrščanski nastrojeni nacisti, ki so bili v takšni ali drugačni povezavi z Zieglerjem, in sicer Rosenberg, Bormann in Himmler. Svoje poglede soudejanjaliv različnih uradih ali službah.

German cities bear witness to. When he seized the power, Hitler assured the Catholic and the Protestant Church that his Party did not intend to establish German paganism. He even assumed the role of a defender of Christianity against the communist atheism, although he renounced traditional Christianity as a faith based on Jewish culture in several speeches prior to the 1932 elections. Officially, the Party advocated »Positive Christianity«, however, neither Goebbels nor Hitler tried to conceal their intention of inducing the church to evolve into a German social evolutionist organization after their final victory. Such a church would stop preaching Redemption and the Moses' Ten Commandments that were considered obsolete and Jewish. It would proclaim the cult of race, blood and fighting instead. Towards the end of the war, the regime's anti-clerical tendencies became more pronounced. Even so, the idea of a Reich's Church was doomed in advance owing to the rivalry between the institutions and the manipulation of religious issues.⁷

Three of the above-mentioned high-profile visitors to Bled were decidedly anti-Christian Nazi Party members Rosenberg, Bormann, and

⁷ Steigmann-Gall 2003, 160.

⁷ Steigmann-Gall 2003, 160.

Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946), ki ga je Hitler leta 1934 označil kot »unser Parteidogmatiker«, je v knjigi *Mit dvajsetega stoletja* (*Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, 1930) vpeljal koncept »religije krvi« (Religion des Blutes), utemeljene na prirojeni obrambi nordijskih ljudi pred kulturno in rasno degeneracijo. Religija krvi naj bi nadomestila krščanstvo, ki ga je označil kot pojuden ponaredek rimsko-katoliške cerkve in jezuitov. Cerkev in asprotniki pasomu oponašali nevdržnost njegovih zgodovinskih konstruktov in očitalitežnje pouvajanje Votanovega kulta. Rosenbergovo sklicevanje na nordijske bogove ni matipično poganskega obeležja, kar izhaja tudi iz njegovega zapisa v *Mitu*: »Votan je bil in je mrtev«. ⁸ Čeprav se odzdi, daje Rosenbergova ideologija utemeljevala zavračanje krščanstva, jo je avtor videl kot njegovo radikalno revizijo. ⁹

Januarja 1934 je bil Rosenberg razglašen za *Beauftragtes des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP*, ki se je v skrajšani obliki imenoval *Amt Rosenberg*. Taje imel urade za šolstvo, vzgojo, svetovno nazorsko informiranje, tisk, literaturo, prazgodovino in znanost, vendar je nateh področjih ostal njegov vplivomejen. Od oktobra 1940 je vodil *Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg* (ERR), ki je po Hitlerjevem ukazui zvršil obsežno zaplenboumetniških in drugih kulturno-zgodovinsko pomembnih predmetov ter knjižnic v zasedenih ozemljih. ¹⁰

Med zagovorniki različnih oblik poganske religije je bilo precej protestantov ali nekdanjih protestantskih duhovnikov in teologov, ki so izhod iz krize delu protestantske cerkve ob koncu 19. stoletja iskali v ničejski filozofiji vsestranske odrešitve in iz nje izhajajoče protikrščanske germanske vere. ¹¹ Med nekdanjimi protestantskimi teologi v Rosenbergovem uradunaj demotudi Matthesa Zieglerja, enega glavnih protagonistov blejske zgodbe. Popodatkih iz biografije ¹² je že med študijem izstopal zzbirkospisov *Kirche und Reich im Ringen der jungen Generation*, v katerih je nastopals tezami o »gosposki, plemiški krvi«, »nordijskem bistvu« in o kljukastem križu »kot

Himmler, all connected to Ziegler. Their ideas were being put into practice through various offices or departments.

Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946) to whom Hitler referred as »unser Parteidogmatiker« in 1934, introduced the concept of »religion of the blood« (Religion des Blutes) in his book *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (*Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, 1930). The concept was based on inborn defense of the Nordic peoples against cultural and racial degradation. Religion of the blood was to replace Christianity Rosenberg saw as a Judaized version of the Roman–Catholic Church and the Jesuits. His opponents from the church ranks reproached him for his untenable historical constructs and his wish to revive the cult of Wotan. However, Rosenberg's references to the Nordic gods do not bear typically pagan characteristics as can be gathered from his words in *The Myth*: »Wotan was and remains dead«. ⁸ From a distance it may seem Rosenberg's ideology was grounded in a rejection of Christianity but the author himself regarded it as a radical revision of Christianity. ⁹

In January 1934, Rosenberg was named *Beauftragtes des Führers für die Überwachung der gesamten geistigen und weltanschaulichen Schulung und Erziehung der NSDAP*, also called *Amt Rosenberg*. *Amt Rosenberg* consisted of various offices in the fields of education, upbringing, ideological propaganda, press, literature, prehistory and science, although its influence in these areas remained limited. Since October 1940 Rosenberg headed the *Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg* (ERR) that looted, acting on Hitler's orders, numerous works of art, culturally and historically significant objects, and library books in the occupied territories. ¹⁰

Supporters of various pagan religions included a number of protestants or ex-protestant clergymen and theologians seeking to resolve the crisis in the Protestant Church at the end of 19. century through Nietzsche's philosophy of redemption and the anti-Christian Germanic faith derived from it. ¹¹ One of the ex-protestant theologians in Rosenberg's office was Matthes Ziegler who was one of the main protagonists of the Bled story. According to his biography, ¹² he

⁸ Rosenberg 1930, 219.

⁹ *Ib.*, 99.

¹⁰ Nicholas 1994.

¹¹ Steigmann-Gall 2003, 111.

¹² Brückner 1986.

⁸ Rosenberg 1930, 219.

⁹ *Ib.*, 99.

¹⁰ Nicholas 1994.

¹¹ Steigmann-Gall 2003, 111.

¹² Brückner 1986.

simbolu življenja, ki premaga smrt«. V NSDAP se je včlanil leta 1931 in še istega leta postal pripadnik SA, leta 1935 pa član SS. Svojo pripadnost nacistični stvari je izkazal tudi s spremembami imena Matthäus v Matthes, ki naj bi zvenel bolj nordijsko.

Leta 1934 mu je Rosenberg predal uredništvo časopisa *Nationalsozialistischen Monatshefte*, leta 1937 pa je bil imenovan za predsednika *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Deutsche Volkskunde*. Istega leta je postal vodja oddelka v Rosenbergovem uradu, ki je bil najprej pristojen za cerkveno politiko, leta 1939 pa preimenovan v oddelek za svetovnonazorsko informiranje (*Weltanschauliche Information*). Na novem položaju je ustanovil časopis *Deutsche Volkskunde*, ki je izhajal do leta 1943 in je bil namenjen »Bearbeitung und Lösung parteiwichtigen Forschungsaufträge«. Najpomembnejši Zieglerjev delista *Leitfaden für die Schulungs- und Erziehungsarbeit der NSDAP* iz leta 1939 in frontni brevir *Soldatenglaube – Soldatenehre* iz leta 1940, ki je izšel v večstotih izvodih. Junija 1941 je nastal željo izstopiti iz Amt Rosenberg, pri čemer razlogi za to odločitev niso jasni. V rivalstvu med Amt Rosenberg in Ahnenerbe naj bi Ziegler kljub pripadnosti SS veljal za Rosenbergijanca.

Vorisu Zieglerjevega medvojnega delovanja, ki ga je podal M. Brückner v *Bayerische Blätter für Volkskunde* leta 1986, sovpada njegov prihod na Bled s koncem službovanja v SS – Totenkopfdivison, kjer je bil s činom Obersturmbannführerja odgovoren za propagando, na nov položaj pa naj bi prišel s posebnimi nalogami poukazu šefaglavnega urada NSDAP Martina Bormanna. Njegov prestop je najverjetneje povezan z medinstitucionalnim bojem za primat nad verskimivprašanji, predvsem pristojnostmi kristjanov in krščanskim prepričanjem v strankarskemu gibanju.¹³

Martin Bormann, ki je postal po Hessovem begu v Anglijo leta 1941 Hitlerjev tajnik in vodja glavnega urada stranke, je že pred tem veljal za najbolj protiklerikalno in protikrščansko nastrojenega nacista.¹⁴ Tesno je sodeloval pri prepovedi opravljanja funkcij strankinih vodij v religiozih organizacijah, izključitvi pastorjev iz stranke, vodil je kampanjo za zasedanje premožnjake katoliške cerkve, izozadja pa je deloval tudi

was noticed as early as his student years due to his collection of essays entitled *Kirche und Reich im Ring der jungen Generation*, presenting theses on »noble aristocratic blood«, »Nordic essence« and on the swastika as »the symbol of life that defeats death«. He joined NSDAP and SA in 1931 and became a member of the SS in 1935. He demonstrated his allegiance to the Nazi cause by changing his name Matthäus to the more Nordic sounding Matthes.

In 1934, Rosenberg made Ziegler the editor of the *Nationalsozialistischen Monatshefte* newspaper and in 1937, he was appointed the President of *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Deutsche Volkskunde*. In the same year, he became the head of one of the Rosenberg's office departments that was originally charged with overseeing church policy but was renamed *Ideological Information Office (Weltanschauliche Information)* in 1939. While in this post he founded a newspaper *Deutsche Volkskunde* that was published until 1943 and intended for »Bearbeitung und Lösung parteiwichtigen Forschungsaufträge«. Ziegler's most important works are *Leitfaden für die Schulungs- und Erziehungsarbeit der NSDAP (1939)* and *abreviary intended for soldiers Soldatenglaube – Soldatenehre (1940)*, published in hundreds of thousands of copies. In June 1941, he voluntarily left Amt Rosenberg, however, his reasons for this are not clear. Even though Ziegler was an SS member, he was supposedly on Rosenberg's side in the rivalry between Amt Rosenberg and Ahnenerbe.

According to the outline of Ziegler's activities during the war presented in *Bayerische Blätter für Volkskunde* by M. Brückner in 1986, Ziegler's arrival to Bled was simultaneous with the conclusion of his service in SS – Totenkopfdivison with the rank of Obersturmbannführer, responsible for propaganda. Apparently, his new posting involved special tasks he was entrusted with by the head of the NSDAP Party Chancellery Martin Bormann. It is very likely his transfer to another service was caused by interinstitutional struggle for supremacy over religious matters, especially over the role of the Christians and the Christian beliefs should have in the Party movement.¹³

Martin Bormann was considered the most anti-clerical and anti-Christian Nazi even before he assumed responsibilities of Hitler's secretary and the head of the Party Chancellery following

¹³ Steigmann-Gall 2003, 236.

¹⁴ *Ib.*, 260.

¹³ Steigmann-Gall 2003, 236.

priposkusu odstranitver religiozne ikonografije iz šol leta 1941.¹⁵ Bormann je kritiziral Baldur von Schirach zaradi bogoslužju namenjenih nedelj v Hitlerjugendu in domnevno preveč prijateljskih odnosov z duhovščino, ki naj bi jih imel na novem položaju dunajskega guvernerja. Napadal je tudi Speerjevo vključevanje protestanskih in katoliških organov v načrtovanje lokacij cerkev v grandioznem projektu pozidave novih berlinskih četrti. Predlagal je tudi dokončno rušenje v zračnih napadih poškodovanih sakralnih objektov in nasprotoval njihovi obnovi. Z izgovorom, da vojna prizadevanja zahtevajo sproščeno narazvedrilo na področju, je ukazal začasno prekinitev predvajanja cerkvenega glasbe, ki naj bi se nadomestila z »lepo nemško glasbo«.¹⁶

Heinrich Himmler je bil med vsemi visokimi predstavniki tretjega Rajha najbolj prevzet nad panarijanskim rasizmom in določenimi oblikami germanskega neopaganstva, sampa naj bi se imel za duhovnega naslednika saškega kralja Henrika Ptičarja (Heinrich der Vogler, 919–936). Kralju, ki je porazil Madžare v bitki pri Augsburgu in utrdil konfederacijo knezov, poznejše Svetorimsko cesarstvo, je Himmler posvetil svoje osebne prostore na gradu Wewelsburg. Po Himmlerju je »včasudokonega zatonakršćanstva« med naloge SS sodila tudi priprava svetovnonazorskih podlag, po katerih naj Nemci vodijo in oblikujejo svoja življenja. Njegov nepopustljiv protiklerikalizem se je nanašal na katoliško cerkev, hkrati pa je bil naklonjen protestantizmu.

Tako jipoimenovanju zavodjo Schutzstaffel je Himmler začel preoblikovati SS v rasno elito iz mladih nordijskih moških, za kar naj bi od januarja 1932 skrbel nov urad Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA). Za vodjo je bil imenovan kmetijski ekspert in rasni teoretik Walther Darré, ki je presojal rasno in dedno ustreznost kandidatov za SS in pripravil odlok o pogojih zaporokenjegovih pripadnikov. Izdaja soglasja je predvidevala tudi enakost opke preverjanja in selekcije za neveste za zagotovitev čistosti nordijskega rodu, ki naj bi poživil ves nemški narod.¹⁷

Skladno s Himmlerjevimi pogledi naj bi poroke sesovce v potekale v družinskem krogu in

Hess' escape to England in 1941.¹⁴ He was closely involved in adopting the interdiction against Party leaders holding important positions in religious organisations and in expelling pastors from the Party. Bormann managed the campaign to confiscate the Catholic Church property and was in the background of the attempt to remove religious symbols from schools in 1941.¹⁵ Bormann criticized Baldur von Schirach because Hitler Jugend devoted Sunday to religion and for allegedly being on too friendly terms with the clergy in his new post as the Gauleiter of Vienna. He also attacked Speer for involving the Protestant and Catholic bodies in deciding on church locations as a part of the grandiose project of the rebuilding of Berlin. Besides, he suggested completed demolition of sacral buildings that had been damaged in air raids and opposed their renovation. Claiming that the war effort called for the lightness in entertainment he ordered a temporary ban on performing church music that was to be replaced by »beautiful German music«.¹⁶

Among the important personages of the Third Reich, Heinrich Himmler was the one who was most fascinated by Panarian racism and certain forms of Germanic neopaganism. He allegedly saw himself as the spiritual successor to the Saxon king Henry I, or Henry the Fowler (Heinrich der Vogler, 919–936). Himmler's private apartments at the Wewelsburg castle were dedicated to this king who defeated the Magyars at Augsburg and strengthened the confederation of dukes that subsequently became the Holy Roman Empire. Himmler claimed that part of the SS mission in the »time of the final decline of Christianity« was to form the ideological bases according to which the German people should lead and shape their lives. His relentless anticlericalism was aimed against the Catholic church while he was favorably disposed towards Protestantism.

Immediately after becoming the leader of Schutzstaffel, Himmler began transforming SS into a racial elite of young Nordic males. From January 1932, this task fell under the responsibility of the new office Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA) led by an agrarian expert and racist theorist Walther Darré. Darré was in charge of judging the racial and genetic appropriateness of the SS candidates and prepared a decree on conditions for

¹⁵ *Ib.*, 243–246.

¹⁶ *Ib.*, 250.

¹⁷ Padfield 1990, 102–104.

¹⁴ *Ib.*, 260.

¹⁵ *Ib.*, 243–246.

¹⁶ *Ib.*, 250.

nevo kvirujavne ceremonije, ki bi predvidevala na primer špalir regimenta SS. Poročeni pari soki darilo prejeli srebrne kupe, družinam SS pa so pošiljali masivne svečnike (Julleuchter), izdelane po predlogi »izzgodnje preteklosti našega ljudstva«. V javnem življenju naj bi krščanske praznike nadomestil izdvemaglavni ma ceremonijama ob poletnem in zimskem enakonočju, kot je bil leta 1936, ko je po Rosenbergovi zamisli izbor Hitlerjeve mladine pel poganske litanije in častil arijskega boga.

Del Himmlerjevega širšegana črtazasistematičnostvaritev nove »germanske« kulture in religije kot temelj apovojne svetovne ureditve je bil tudi organizacija Deutsches Ahnenerbe – Studiengesellschaft für Geistesurgeschichte.¹⁸ Društvo, katerega krajšano ime pomeni dobesedno »dediščina«, je bilo ustanovljeno leta 1935. Pospremembistatutainpreimenovanju v Forschungs – und Lehrgemeinschaft das Ahnenerbe. V. leta 1937 sonjenicilji obsegalipredvsem interdisciplinarno dokazovanje teorijo rasi superiornosti ter preučevanje in oživiljanje germanskih tradicij. Navišku delovanjaje organizacijazaposlovala 137 znanstvenikovs področjadružboslovja, naravoslovjain medicine v več deset raziskovalnih oddelkih, ki so imeli navoljo fotografski in filmski laboratorij, kiparsko delavnico, muzej ter različne knjižnice in arhive.

Eno od glavnih raziskovalnih področij so bile študije pozabljene zgodovine umišljene arijske rase. Čeprav je večina raziskav pripadnikov Ahnenerbe temeljilana rasistični psevdoznanosti, so zavračali okultno razmišljanje ariozofskih skupin kot na primer društva Thule, in dajali prednost pragmatični metodologiji natemelju Mendlove genetike, darvinizmain biologije. Nadruge strani so senjeniastronomi ukvarjalizbizarnoteorijooizvorusolarne gasistema, ki naj bi pojasnila domnevni zaton prve arijske civilizacije.

Ahnenerbe je bila leta 1940 vključena v služboosebnega uradavodje SS kot Amt A, čeprav so bili že pred tem vsi člani akademskega in medicinskega osebja vsaj častni (zaslužni) člani SS. Med vojno je na zasedenih ozemljih srednje in vzhodne Evrope plenila znanstvene zbirke in knjižnice, arhivsko gradivo,

SS members' marriages. For the consent to be given, the brides had to undergo the same procedure of checks and selection in order to ensure the racial purity of the Nordic race that was to revitalize the entire German nation.¹⁷

Himmler's views demanded that the weddings of the SS officers be in the family circle and not in a public ceremony with, for example, an honor guard of an SS regiment. Newlyweds were presented with silver goblets and the SS families received massive candlesticks (Julleuchter), with the design inspired by »the early history of our nation«. In public life, the Christian holidays were to be replaced by two principal ceremonies held at the summer and winter solstices. A ceremony of this type took place in 1936, based on Rosenberg's idea, with a Hitler Jugend chorus singing pagan litanies and worshipping the Aryan god.

Himmler's wider plan for a systematic creation of a new »Germanic« culture and religion on which the world was to be founded after the war consisted of another component: the organization Deutsches Ahnenerbe – Studiengesellschaft für Geistesurgeschichte.¹⁸ The Society (its shortened name Ahnenerbe means simply »heritage«) was founded in 1935. After it changed its statute and was renamed Forschungs – und Lehrgemeinschaft das Ahnenerbe e. V. in 1937, its main aims included proving the racial superiority theories through interdisciplinary research and restoration of Germanic traditions. At its height, the organization employed 137 scientists in the fields of humanities, science, and medicine who were organized in dozens of research departments with a photography and film laboratories available, as well as a sculpture workshop, a museum and a variety of libraries and archives.

One of the main research areas was the study of a forgotten history of a fictionalized Aryan race. Although most of the Ahnenerbe research was based on racist pseudoscience its members rejected the occult thinking of ariosophic groups like the Thule Society. They preferred a pragmatic methodology founded on Mendelian genetics, Darwinism, and biology. On the other hand, the association's astronomer tried to prove a bizarre theory on the origin of the solar system that was supposed to explain the alleged decline of the first Aryan civilization.

¹⁸ Kater 1986; Pringle 2006.

¹⁷ Padfield 1990, 102–104.

¹⁸ Kater 1986; Pringle 2006.

arheološke najdbe in umetniška dela, v »germanskih robnih območjih« (Nizozemska, Belgija, Danska, Norveška) pa se je ukvarjala s propagando in novačenjem prostovoljcev za Waffen-SS. Podokriljem Ahnenerbe so potekali tudi zloglasni medicinski poskusi v koncentracijskih taboriščih Dachau in Natzweiler.

Praktični pomen spoznanj Ahnenerbe o preteklosti arijske rase in znanju prednikov je bil v zavračanju življenja v »moralno propadlem« okolju nemških mest in promoviranju vrnitve k prostemu družinskemu življenju v kolonijah SS. Spoljedelskim rajem, ki bi nadomestili industrijsko Nemčijo, naj bi bila ustvarjena plodna podlaga za razmnoževanje arijske rase in prehod v novo zlato dobo. Zaradi pomanjkanja zemljišč je v letih 1937 in 1938 poveljstvu SS uspelo ustanoviti levzorčno kolonijo Mehrow vzhodno od Berlina, v kateri so naselili 12 SS-družin ter manjše število kolonij drugod po Nemčiji, največji uspeh pa je Himmler računal po aneksiji Avstrije in Sudetov, še posebej paznemškim prodorom navzhod. Poimenovanju zavodjokomisije za utrjevanje nemštva (Reichskommissar für die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums) oktobra 1939 je začel skupaj s Konradom Meyerjem pripravljati Generalplan Ost, načrt za trivlekenemške kolonije navzhodnih okupiranih ozemljih. Prvo je obsegalo Leningrad in južno ležeči prostor, drugo ozemlje severne Poljske, Litve in jugovzhodne Latvije, tretje pa Krim in rodovitna območja jugovzhodne Ukrajine. Kolonija na Krimu naj bi se imenovala Gotengau, in sicer v počastitev germanskega plemena Gotov, v katerih so nacisti videli arijske prednike Nemcev. Rasno ustrezni prebivalci bi lahko ostali, Slovane in druge nezaželene skupine pa bi bodisi izgnali oziroma usmrtili bodisi zasužnjili po vzoru grških Helotov. Tako sproščen prostor naj bi zapolnili z etničnimi skupinami Nemcev in SS-naseljencev, ki bi poselili obrambne vasi vzdolž meja Gotengau.

Načrti za naselbine svetlo lasih in modrookih vojakov-kmetovalcev (Wehrbauern) z ženami in otroki so predvidevali hišo župana, v kateri bi bival vodja SS ali NSDAP, stavbe lokalne odbore stranke, SS, Hitlerjeve mladine in ženskih organizacij, Thingplatz ali zbirališče za slavlja ob poletnem enakonočju in drugih nacističnih praznikih, pokopališče, kjer bi lahko družine častile svoje prednike, in športno vadlišče. Poleg radikalne spremembe regionalne

In 1940, the Ahnenerbe was incorporated into the personal office of the SS leader under the name of Amt A, even though all of its academic and medical staff were at least honorary (meritorious) members of the SS before that. During the war, the Ahnenerbe looted scientific collections and libraries, archives, archeological artifacts, and works of art in the occupied territories of Central and Eastern Europe. In »Germanic border areas« (Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway), it devoted most of its attention to propaganda and recruitment of volunteers for the Waffen-SS. In addition, Ahnenerbe sponsored and carried out the infamous medical experiments at Dachau and Natzweiler concentration camps.

The practical implication of Ahnenerbe's findings on the past of the Aryan race and the forebears' knowledge was in renunciation of life in »morally corrupt« German cities and promotion of the return to simple family life in the SS colonies. The agricultural paradise that was to replace the industrial Germany would supposedly create a fruitful basis for proliferation of the Aryan race and bring about the transition to the new Golden Era. However, due to land shortage, the SS command only succeeded in founding a limited number of colonies in 1937 and 1938: a model colony in Mehrow east of Berlin that became home to 12 SS families and a few others in other parts of Germany. Himmler hoped for better results after the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland and particularly following the German drive to the east. After his appointment to the post of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism (Reichskommissar für die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums) in October 1939, he began, in cooperation with Konrad Meyer, laying the foundations for Generalplan Ost proposing three large German colonies in the eastern occupied territories. The first was to include Leningrad and the area to its south, the second a region consisting of northern Poland, Lithuania and southeastern Latvia, and the third was to encompass the Crimea and the fertile fields of southeastern Ukraine. The Crimea colony would be named Gotengau in honor of the Goths, a Germanic tribe seen by the Nazis as the Aryan ancestor of the German people. Racially valuable inhabitants were to be permitted to stay while the Slavs and other undesirable groups were to be exiled, put to death, or enslaved like the Greek Helots. Once the area was emptied the defense villages along the Gotengau borders would be repopulated with the ethnic groups of German and SS settlers.

demografske slike je Himmler nameraval z nasadi hrastain breze ustvariti posnetek tradicionalnih gozdov severne Nemčije ter spodbuditi kmetovanje z uvedbo novih kulturnih rastlin, ki jih je odprava leta 1939 prinesla iz Tibeta. Zato je bila pri Gradcu ustanovljena novaraziskovalna enota Ahnenerbe, ki je pod načelovanjem vodje odpravedr. Ernsta Schäferja razvijala nove kulturne rastline.¹⁹

Grad Wewelsburg in Himmlerjev načrt o viteškem redu SS

Arhitekturni koncept sakralnega kompleksa središčem v Wotanovem templju na Blejskem otoku se po svojem namenu in zasnovi približuje delnourešničenim ameriškim akademijam in psevdoreligioznem središču SS na pozno-renesančnem gradu Wewelsburg v Westfaliji. Poleg slikovite pokrajine z gozdnatimigričim in grapami ter majhimi kmetijami je Himmlerja prevzela trikotna tlorisna zasnova gradu ter njegova lega nedaleč od prizorišča odločilne bitke v Teutoburškem lesu leta 9. n. št., v kateri so Germani pod vodstvom Arminija uničili tri rimske legije.

Grad, ki ga je leta 1934 Himmler vzel v 100-letninajem od krožja Paderborn, je bil najverjetneje izbran na predlog Karl Maria Wiliguta-Weisthorja, vodje oddelka za prazgodovino pri Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA) in takrat najbolj vplivnega mistikav organizaciji SS. Himmler je želel Wewelsburg oblikovati povzoredo vni gradovnemškega viteškega reda, pokončni zmagi pa naj bi postal središče novega sveta. Alegorično središče svetaja bila tema, ki jo je Wiligut pogosto omenjal, zato skoraj ni dvoma, da je on prepričal Reichsführerja v koncept kvazipoganskih praks, kot tudi v zamisel o viteškem redu Schutzstaffel. Poodstranitvi Wiliguta, certificiranega duševnega bolnika, ki se je prikazoval kot potomca Arminija in varuha svetega znanja starih Germanov, je pri načrtovanju in izvedbi projekta imela pomembno vlogo tudi posebna sekcija Ahnenerbe.

Večino gradbenih del, ki so potekala med 1939 in 1943 pod vodstvom glavnega arhitekta Hermanna Bartelsa, so opravili zaporniki iz vtanamen ustanovljenega koncentracijskega

The plans for the settlements of blond and blue-eyed soldier-farmers (Wehrbauern) with their wives and children envisaged a mayor's house that was to be occupied by the SS or the NSDAP leader, buildings that would house the local committees of the Party, SS, Hitler's Youth, and women's organizations, a Thingplatz (a form of amphitheatre) where the celebrations of the summer solstice and other Nazi holidays would take place, a graveyard where families would honor their ancestors, and a sports field. Besides radically changing the regional demographic landscape, Himmler intended to replicate the traditional forests of northern Germany by planting oak and birch groves and to stimulate agrarian production by introducing new agricultural plants, brought from Tibet in 1939. For this purpose, a new Ahnenerbe research unit was set up near Graz. It was headed by the Tibet expedition leader dr. Ernst Schäfer and its mission was to develop new crops.¹⁹


The Wewelsburg Castle and Himmler's plan on the Knightly order of SS

The purpose and the design of the architectural concept of the sacred structures with the Wotan temple on the Bled Island as its central point bears a closer resemblance to the partially realized design of an academy and a pseudo-religious SS center at the Late-Renaissance castle Wewelsburg in Westphalia. Himmler was impressed by the picturesque landscape of forest-covered hills, ravines, and small farms, as well as by the triangular ground plan of the castle and Wewelsburg's proximity to the site of the decisive battle of Teutoburg forest in 9. A. D. where the Germanic tribes led by Arminius destroyed three Roman legions.

In 1934, Himmler leased the castle from the district of Paderborn for 100 years. The site had probably been chosen on the suggestion of Karl Maria Wiligut-Weisthor, the head of the prehistory department of Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt (RuSHA) and the most influential mysticist in the SS organization at the time. Himmler wanted to model Wewelsburg on the castles of the German Knightly Order and intended making it the center of the new world order after the final victory. Since Wiligut liked to talk about an allegorical center of the world, it is almost certain he was the one who convinced the Reichsführer to introduce

¹⁹ Pringle 2006, 218–220.

¹⁹ Pringle 2006, 218–220.



Arhitekturna črtureditve gradu Wewelsburg z okolico iz leta 1944 (po Hüser, Brebeck 2002)

Architectural plans for remodelling the Wewelsburg Castle and its surroundings, 1944 (taken from Hüser, Brebeck 2002)

taborišča Niederhagen. Gleden projektni načrt in maketo iz leta 1944 je bil severni stolp gradu zamišljen kot središče monumentalne krožne instalacije premera 1,2 kilometra, ki so sestavljale krožno in radialno potekajoče ceste, spremljajoče stavbeter koncentrični pregradni zidovi. Floris kaže, da je bil adovozna cestazasnovanakot drog, osrednjastavbainstalacije pakotsuličnaost, kisekončav severnem stolpugradu. Načrtovana oblika osrednje stavbez gradomposnemaslavnosuličnoostiz muzeja Hofburg na Dunaju, kije bilapotakra tne prepričanjuost, skaterojerimskicenturion Longinus medkrižanjemzabodel Kristusa, in je bila takrat že v posesti nacistov. Izvedba tega megalomanskega projektabi povzročila popolno izginotje vasi Wewelsburg, sajso biliv načrtutudidolinskazapora, lastna elektrana, avtocestni priključek in letališče.

Zaradi vojnih dogajanj sta bili v okviru gradbenega načrta deloma urejeni ledvedvoraniv severnem stolpu, zamišljenem kot središče sveta. Iz romanike in klasicizma prevzete gradbene forme so v obliki prostorih ustvarjale slovesen in dinamičen videz, sodobna izvedba pa je slonela na betonski osnovi s prevleko iz naravnega kamna. Nekdanja cisterna v kletije bila spremenjena v kripto, zgrajeno povzoru mikenskih kupolastih grobnic, ki naj bi bilav spomin na mrtve. V središču prostora z mojstrsko izvedeno akustiko in osvetlitvijo je bil urejen plinski priključek za napajanje skled z večnim ognjem, obkrožen z 12 betonskimi podstavki neznane namembnosti. Na zenitu kupole je bilav zidan relief nasvastikas kraki v obliki črke sig v runski pisavi.

Prtiličjestolpa, vkaterem je bilaprejkapela, so preurediliv Obergruppenführersaal, dvorano z 12 stebri. Središčetalnega mozaika iz belosivega marmorja je sestavljaltetnozelen motiv sončnega kola iz treh obročev z dvanajstimi kraki, kije bil najverjetneje izdelan povzoru okrasnih sponkalamanskih žensk iz 3. stoletja n. št. in jedanesvskrajnodesničarskih in ezoteričnih krogih znankot črnosonce (Schwarze Sonne). Vzvezi zarhitekturno zasnovokompleksain njenimikoneptualnim navezavami nalegendookralju Arthurju invitezihokroglemize so se pojavile tudi špekulacije, daje bila središčnavdolbinav spodnjidvoranipredvidenazasvetigral, kijenavduševal Himmlerjain Wiliguta.

quasi-pagan practices and form the Schutzstaffel as a knightly order. After the removal of Wiligut, a certified mental patient who claimed to be a descendant of Arminius and the guardian of sacred knowledge of the old Germans, a special section of Ahnenerbe played an important role in the design and the implementation of the project.

Most of the construction work between 1939 and 1943 under supervision of the head architect Hermann Bartels was done by the prisoners from the concentration camp Niederhagen that was established for that purpose. According to the architectural schematics and the model from 1944, the north tower was conceived as the center of the monumental circularly shaped installation of a 1,2 km diameter. The inside would consist of radial and circular roads, buildings and concentric partition walls. The ground plan reveals that the access driveway was designed in the shape of a shaft and the central building as spear-head in the north tower of the castle. The design of the central building and the castle imitates the famous lance from the Hofburg Museum in Vienna. The lance, already in the hands of Nazis, was then considered to be the lance Roman centurion Longinus used to stab Jesus during crucifixion. The implementation of this megalomaniac project would completely eradicate the Wewelsburg village because the plans foresaw a valley dam, a power plant, freeway access and an airport.

Due to war events, only two halls in the north tower, designed to be the center of the world, were partially completed in the framework of the building plan. The architectural forms were an imitation of the Classical and Romanesque styles giving the two rooms a solemn and dynamic look. The modern elements of the building consisted of natural stone covered concrete. A former cistern in the cellar was remodelled into a crypt inspired by Mycenaean vaulted tombs and intended for commemoration of the dead. The room had excellent acoustics and illumination. In the center, there was a gas connection where a bowl with an eternal flame was to be installed. It was encircled by 12 concrete pedestals of unknown purpose. In the zenith of the vault, a relief of a swastika was walled in, shaped as the Sig-rune.

The former chapel on the ground floor was turned into the Obergruppenführersaal, a twelve-pillared chamber. The central motive of the grey-white marble floor mosaic was a dark green sun wheel. It was composed of three rings with twelve »spokes« and was probably inspired by



V stavbi hotela Park je bil med vojno sedež gestapa in varnostne službe. Hotel so porušili leta 1975 (zbirka Poldi Kolmana).

During the war, the Park Hotel was used as Gestapo and Security Service headquarters. The hotel was demolished in 1975 (Leopold Kolman's collection)

Nablejsko zgodbo spominjajo tudi name-reosestankih, slovesnih prisegah in porokah vodij SS, ki naj bi potekale na Wewelsburgu, čeprav je o njih le malo znanega. Tako naj bi Wiligitov prijatelj Manfred von Knobelsdorff na gradu izvajal različne rituale irminizma, religije, nastale po Wiligitovi zamisli. Eden teh dogodkov je bila krstna ceremonija za najstarejšega sina SS-Obergruppenführerja Karla Wolffa 4. januarja 1937, pri kateri sta bila navzoča tudi pomembna člana SS Reinhard Heydrich in Karl Diebitsch. V ceremonijah je bil uporabljan domnevno staro germanski izraz Got, ki sta ga razvila Diebitch in Wiligit zaradi razlikovanja boga SS od tradicionalnega krščanskega Gott. Himmler in Wolff stav pogovorih za boga uporabljal izraz Uralten, kar naj bi se nanašalo na prastaro germansko božanstvo.²⁰

Na Wewelsburgu je bil načrtovan tudi muzej, v katerem naj bi razstavili tako originalne kospone germanskega izvora, na primer

the brooches Alemannic women wore in the third century. Currently, it is known as the Black Sun (Schwarze Sonne) to the extreme right and esoteric groups. The architectural design of the complex and its conceptual links to the legend of King Arthur and the knights of the Round Table have given rise to the speculation that the central niche in the hall was intended for the Holy Grail, a topic of fascination to both Himmler and Wiligit.

Another element reminiscent of the Bled story is the intention of holding meetings, ceremonial oaths and weddings of the SS leaders such as allegedly took place at Wewelsburg even though there is a lack of information on them. Wiligit's friend Manfred von Knobelsdorff allegedly performed various rituals of Irminism (religion professed by Wiligit) at the Wewelsburg castle. One of these events was the baptism of the eldest son of SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff on 4 January 1937. Among the guests at the ceremony were prominent SS members Reinhard Heydrich and Karl Diebitsch. The supposedly old Germanic

²⁰ Padfield 1990, 175, 176.

meče, ščite, keramične posode in nakit, kot njihove posnetke in umetniško izdelane predmete z obeležji večnega Rajha. Med izdelki posebne sekcije Ahnenerbe, ki veljajo danes vdoločenih krogih za prvo vrstno zbirateljsko blago, izstopajo svečniki s simbolom SS, prstani ter srebrne in lesene skodele z runskimi napisi, na trgu pa se je pojavil eden od stolov z bogato rezbarjenim okrasom. Stoli naj bi bili izdelani prav za Himmlerja. Med ikonografski motivi in kovaških izdelkih, rezbarijah, slikah in bronasti plastiki je eden najbolj značilnih Irminsul, drevo usode in Votanov simbol.

Z muzejem nagrađu Wewelsburg je povezan tudi malabronasta plastika doprsja mladeniča, ki je bila najdena leta 1923 med ostanki rimske vile pri Šentjurju pri Celju. Med drugo svetovno vojno je plastiko, ki so jo ob najdbi prepoznali kot Germanika, Avgustovega posvojenca in prvo zgodovinsko osebnost rimskega sveta, ki je dobila ime po Germanih, štajerski Gauleiter dr. Siegfried Uiberreiter poklonil Himmlerju. Ob koncu vojne je bila najdena na »Himmlerjevem gradu«, ki je bil v britanski zasedbeni zoni, po restituciji pa jo je vlada LRS zaupala Narodnemu muzeju v Ljubljani.²¹

Pričevanja in viri

Glavni vir za poskus pojasnitve te blejske epizode so pričevanja Jožeta Jana – Iztoka, obveščevalca VOS za Gorenjsko, ki jih dopolnjujejo poročila iz arhiva OZNE ter navedbe drugih medvojnih prebivalcev Bleda. Jan je svoje medvojno udejstvovanje opisal v dveh feljtonih. Prvega, ki je izhajal pod naslovom »Koordinate na nedrčku« v Nedeljskem dnevniku med julijem in septembrom leta 1968, sta pripravila tedanjim urednikom časopisa Miranom Sattlerjem, feljton v treh nadaljevanjih Moje obveščevalne akcije 1943–1945 paje leta 1991 objavila Revija Obramba. V Janovem pripovedovanju naj več pozornosti pritegnilo pridobivanje informacij o nemški raketni bazi Peenemünde in jedrskem raziskovalnem centru na polotoku Rügen.²² Pred nekaj leti se je pripravedokumentarne oddaje o njegovih stikih z nemškimi znanstveniki in posredovanju

word Got was used, propagated by Diebitch in Wiligut in order to make a distinction between the SS God and the traditional Christian Gott. In conversation, Himmler and Wolff alluded to God by the word Uraltenth that was supposed to refer to an ancient Germanic deity.²⁰

The plans for Wewelsburg included a museum with original artefacts of Germanic provenance, e.g. swords, shields, ceramic vessels, and jewelry, as well as replicas and objects of artistic merit bearing symbols of the eternal Reich. The Ahnenerbe special section's products are considered to be first-rate collectibles in some circles, especially candlesticks decorated with the SS symbol, and the silver and wooden bowls with runic inscriptions. Even one of the carved chairs allegedly made for Himmler appeared in the market. One of the most distinctive iconographic motives appearing on forged iron works, carvings, paintings, and bronze statues is Irminsul, tree of destiny and the symbol of Wotan.

There is another connection to the Wewelsburg museum: a small bronze bust of a youth that was discovered in the remains of a Roman villa in Šentjur pri Celju in 1923. The statuette was identified as Germanicus, the adopted son of Augustus and the first famous personage of the Roman world to receive an agnomen after Germania. During the Second World War, it was presented to Himmler by the Gauleiter of Styria, dr. Siegfried Uiberreiter. After the war, it was found in »Himmler's castle« in the British occupation zone. After its restitution, it was entrusted to the National Museum of Slovenia by the government of the People's Republic of Slovenia.²¹

TESTIMONIES AND SOURCES

The main source for the attempt to illuminate the Bled story is the testimony of Jože Jan – Iztok, a Security and Intelligence Agency (VOS) informer for Gorenjska. Other sources consist of a report from the archives of the Department for Protection of the People (OZNA) and the statements of people who resided in Bled during the war. Jan described his wartime activities in two sets of installments. The first set appeared in the Nedeljski dnevnik newspaper from July to September 1968

²¹ Petru 1970.

²² Janove navedbe o obiskih in delovanju berlinske pisateljice in nasprotnice režima Inge van Straaten na Bledu potrjuje županov dopis na okrajnega vodjo NSDAP 14. julija 1944 (Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana, Občina Bled, RAD 4, Šk. 94, 3150/197/10).

²⁰ Padfield 1990, 175, 176.

²¹ Petru 1970.

podatkov Sovjetom lotila RTV Slovenija, vendar oddaja ni bila predvajana.

Jan, ki je kot predvojni komunist zahvaljujoč družinskim stikom s Paarom ušel domobranskim preganjalcem in se naselil v hišo izseljenih staršev na Rečici, je v začetku leta 1943 na Gorenjskem oblikoval samostojno obveščevalno mrežo, ki je prek Staneta Kersnika – Jelovčana tujim vojaškim misijam posredovala podatke o nemških oboroževalnih centrih in objektih v Rajhu, zbirala pa je tudi podatke o načrtovanih vojaških akcijah Nemcev proti OF in partizanom.

Kersnik je Jan povezal s Francem Sokličem, lastnikom trafike v Hotelu Park, ki je Janu posredoval stik z dvema nemškima podoficirjema SS – policije, od katerih je bileden vodjar dijske postaje na Blejskem gradu, drugi pa vodjatelefoneke centrale v hotelu Park. Oba podoficirja sta bila koroška Nemca, ohranilo pa se je le ime Rudolfa Weisa iz St. Veita (Glan).

Po Janovih besedah sta mu zaupnika večkrat pripovedovala o dveh posebnih službah oziroma analogah, zaradi katerih najbitjamed vojnovičkrat prišel tudi Himmler. Vodstvo nacionistične stranke (Zentraleitung der NDSAP) je imelo na Bledu poseben urad, ki je snoval novo Hitlerjevo religijo, dva inženirja SS pa najbi ponaročilu Urada za utrjevanje nemštva (Verein für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums) delo na projektu Elektrizitätswerke Niedertauern in podnaslovom Südwall – als endgültige Lösung der Slowenischen Frage. Dokumentacija o obeh službah je Jan pridobil šele po umiku Nemcev v Bleda, ki se je zgodil v noči z 8. na 9. maj 1945.

Sedež omenjenega urada stranke najbi bil v reprezentančni vili Podhorn (Bonačeva vila), ki se je imenovala po prvi lastnici Amaliji Podhorn iz družine ljubljanskega industrialca Ivana Bonača.²³ Število uslužbencev urada ni znano, zasnovavile z večjim dnevnim prostorom v pritličju in več spalnicami v nadstropju paje omogočaladelo okvirno 8 do 10 osebam. Na sedežu urada najbi bila »obsežna knjižnica filozofskih in verskih knjig z vsega sveta, tudi zelo starih, ki so bile pisane na pergamentu in papirnatih zvitkih«.

under the title of »Koordinaten aned rčku« (Bra Coordinates). It was written in collaboration with the then editor of the Nedeljski dnevnik, Miran Sattler. The second set was published in three installments in the Obramba magazine in 1991 and was titled »Moje obveščevalne akcije 1943–1945« (My Activities as an Intelligence agent in 1943–1945). The part of Jan's narrative that attracted most attention was his account of obtaining information on the German rocket development facilities at Peenemünde and the nuclear research center on Rügen.²² Some years ago, RTV Slovenija (Slovenian national television) began preparing a documentary on Jan's contacts with German scientists and communicating the data to the Soviets. However, the documentary was never finished.

Although Jan had been a communist even before the war, he managed to escape the Slovenian Home Guard (domobranci) due to his family contacts with Paar. He settled in his deported parents' house in Rečica. In the beginning of 1943, he established an independent information network in the Gorenjska region. This network imparted the information on German armament centers and the Reich's facilities to foreign military missions with the help of Stane Kersnik – Jelovčan. It also collected data relating to German plans for military operations against the Liberation Front (OF) and the partisans.

Kersnik introduced Jan to Franc Soklič, the owner of a newspaper stand at the Park Hotel. Through him Jan met two German SS police officers one of whom was the head of the radio communication station at the Bled castle and the other of whom was the head of the telephone exchange at the Park Hotel. Both were Carinthian Germans, however, only one of them is known by name: Rudolf Weis from St. Veit an der Glan.

Jan claims his two acquaintances often told him about two special services or issues that supposedly brought Himmler to Bled several times during the war. The Nazi Party leadership (Zentraleitung der NDSAP) had a Bled department entrusted with designing Hitler's new religion while two SS engineers were allegedly ordered by the Association for the Strengthening of Germanism (Verein für die Festigung des

²³ Benedik 1984, 210.

²² Jan's claims about the visits and activities of the Berlin writer and regime opponent Inge van Straaten in Bled are corroborated by the mayor's letter to the district NSDAP leader of 14 July 1944 (the Historical Archives Ljubljana, Občina Bled – the Bled municipality, RAD 4, box 94, 3150/197/10)

Velik sklepni dokument z zlato obrobo in usnjeno vezavo z letnico 1943 ali 1944 je po Janu vseboval »nekakšno nacistično svetopisno«. Poglavlje osvetišču na Blejskem otoku je bilo opremljeno s skicami templja in zlategakipa Votana, vrhovnega bogazahodnogermanskih ljudstev, kivskandinavskempanteonu ustreza Odinu. Votana, ki je bil upodobljen v dokumentu, je Jan po spominu opisal kot pošast. Na oltarju naj bi po posebnem protokolu potekale krvne prisege vodilnih ljudinovega raja.²⁴

V okviru priprav za gradnjo svetišča naj bi začeli graditi na mestu, kjer je stala, kraljeva rezidenca Suvobor (na mestu današnje Vile Bled), internat za izbrance, ki bi bili pošolanju posvečeni na Blejskem otoku. Glede na načrte, navedene v dokumentu, naj bi bile tam kajšnje vile rezervirane za vojne junake, nosilce viteškega križca (Ritterkreusträger). Neizseljeni del prebivalstva bi postal osebna last novega plemstva, za katerega bi bil Bled nekakšen ekskluzivni nacistični raj.²⁵ Janovo pričevanje o arhitekturni ureditvi kompleksa dopolnjuje še nepreverjeni podatek o načrtu, ki naj bi ga našli pri obnovi vile Podhorn v začetku devetdesetih let, in na katerem naj bi k templju na otoku vodil most.²⁶ Omeniti velja še pričevanje Franca Jarca, ki je med leti 1930 in 1941 poveljeval blejskim orožnikom, med vodjo pa je vodil občinski prijavni urad.²⁷ Jarc je ob več priložnostih razlagal o načrtih zaporo, ki naj bi potekala na otoku po nacistični ceremoniji.

Dokumentacijo urada, ki naj bi je bilo zato-vornjak, je Jan poslal v Ljubljano z naročilom, da knjižnico odpeljejo v NUK, sklepni dokument pa je odposlal s posebno pošto.²⁸ Dose danja po izvedovanju za arhivom, ki ga je imela med pripravami poročila OZNA, in sklepni dokumentom obravnavanega urada, nisodala oprijemljivejših rezultatov. Knjige iz Federalnega zbirnega centra, ki so prihajale iz knjižnic okupatorjevih institucij, večinoma hrani Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, starejše in dragocenejše primerke terrokopise pa je prevzemala Narodna in univerzitetna knjižnica.²⁹

deutschen Volkstums) to develop a project named Elektrizitätswerke Niedertauern and subtitled Südwall – als endgültige Lösung der Slowenischen Frage. Documentation on both services was only obtained by Jan after the German retreat from Bled (that took place in the night from 8 May to 9 May 1945).

The headquarters of the aforementioned Party department were supposedly in the representative Podhorn villa (the Bonač villa) that was named after its first owner Amalija Podhorn, a relative of the Ljubljana industrialist Ivan Bonač.²³ The number of the department's employees is unknown. However, the design of the villa (a large living room on the ground floor and several bedrooms upstairs) would offer work space to approximately 8 to 10 persons. The department's headquarters apparently included »a large library of philosophy and religious books from every corner of the world, some very old and written on parchment or scrolls«.

According to Jan, a large concluding document with gold borders and leather binding, dated 1943 or 1944, contained »some sort of a Nazi bible«. The chapter dealing with the Bled Island temple contained sketches of the temple and of the golden statue of Wotan, the main god of the West Germanic peoples and the equivalent of Odin in the Scandinavian pantheon. Jan remembered Wotan's depiction in the document as a monster. There was an altar where blood oaths of the leaders of the new Reich were to take place using a special protocol.²⁴

As part of the preparations for the construction of the temple, the site of the »Suvobor« (the king's residence and the location of the present-day Bled Villa) was to be rebuilt as a boarding school for selected individuals. After their schooling they would be ordained at the Bled Island. According to the document, the villas in Bled would be reserved for war heroes, i.e. Knight's Cross recipients (Ritterkreuzträger). The undeported population would become personal property of the new nobility that would live in Bled as in some sort of exclusive Nazi paradise.²⁵ Jan's testimony on the architectural arrangement of the complex is corroborated by information (as yet unconfirmed)

²⁴ Jan 1991, 51.

²⁵ *Ib.*, 52.

²⁶ Za podatek se zahvaljujem Marjanu Jarcu.

²⁷ Benedik 2003, 77.

²⁸ Jan 1991, 52.

²⁹ Kodrič-Dačić 2000.

²³ Benedik 1984, 210.

²⁴ Jan 1991, 51.

²⁵ *Ib.*, 52.



Mladinski letoviški dom nacionalsocialističnega skrbstva v vili Vovk, ki je deloval pod okriljem Urada za utrjevanje nemštva (arhiv Gorenjskega muzeja v Kranju; št. neg. 373/10)

The youth holiday home of the National Socialism welfare system in the Vovk villa, organized under the auspices of the Association for the Strengthening of Germanism (the archives of the Museum of Gorenjska in Kranj; neg. Number 373/10)

Teoretično bi moralo morebitne zaplembe z Bleda najprej prevzeti skladišče FZC v Kranju, vendar v Knjigi prevzetih in inventiranih knjig in knjižnic v NUK knjižnica obravnava nega urada ni omenjena. Ne omenja je niti seznam knjig, ki je bil izročeni verski komisiji pri Slovenskem narodnoosvobodilnem svetu. Manj verjetnain upajmota di neuresničenaje možnost, da je bil v povojnem pomanjkanju surovindel gradiva skupaj s »plažo« in propagandno literaturo odpeljan v mlino Papirnice Vevče kot »švabski papir«.

Drugivir podatkovodelovanju omenjenega posebnega urada je zapisnik iz dosjeja razvpitih *Hauptsturmführer*ja (stotnika) gestapa Helmuta Rozumekavarhivu OZNE, ki ga hrani Arhiv Republike Slovenije.³⁰ V mapinekdanjega policijskega inšpektorja, ki je med leti 1942 in 1944 poveljeval IV. oddelku varnostne službe ter povzročil partizanskemu gibanju z

onaplanthatwasallegedlyfoundduringrenovation of the Podhorn villa in the early 1990's and that foresaw a bridge leading to the island with the temple.²⁶ It is worth mentioning, too, the testimony of Franc Jarc who commanded the Bledendarmerie in 1930–1941 and managed the municipal registration office during Second World War.²⁷ Jarc often mentioned the plans for weddingsthatwouldtakeplaceontheislandina Nazi influenced ceremony.

The documents of the Office (apparently a full truck load) were sent to Ljubljana by Jan with the instructions to transport the library to the National and University Library (NUK). He sent the concluding document through special mail.²⁸ So far, the inquiries about the archives (in the hands of OZNA during the preparation of the report) and the concluding document of the Office concerned had not tangible results. The majority of books from the Federal Collection Center

³⁰ AS 1931, tehnična enota 409, mapa 122 ZA (Helmut Rozumek).

²⁶ I thank Marjan Jarc for the data.

²⁷ Benedik 2003, 77.

²⁸ Jan 1991, 52.

igrone več straneh veliko žrtev in medsebojnegasumnichenja, jetudine podpisano poročilo o različnih obveščevalno zanimivih osebah, ki so se med vojno zadrževale na Bledu, datirano z 21. 7. 1945. V četrti poglavju, ki nima navedenega vira, vendar jemogo česklepati, da gaje napisal avtor poročila, je omenjen dr. Ziegler, v katerem lahko prepoznamo Matthesa Zieglerja (1911–1992), protestantskega teologa in enega vidnejših nemških nacistov. Neznani avtor poročila je iz »dela arhiva«, ki gaje pridobila OZNA, razbral, da je bil do prihoda na Bled Ziegler zaposlen v Amt Rosenberg, kjer naj bi deloval v oddelku za cerkveno politiko, na Bledu pa naj bi ponatlogu Zentralleitung der NSDAP izvajal »nadzor nad verstvi, posebej nad katoliško vero«. V tem poročilu vila Podhorn ni predstavljenakotsedežurada, temveč kot bivališče Zieglerjeve družine, kar bi lahko potrjeval tudi naslov Schloß 206 v seznamu priseljenih Nemcev, ki gahrani iz postava Zgodovinskega arhiva Ljubljana v Kranju.³¹ Ziegler je v kartoteki prebivalstva imenovan kot Dienstleiter, napovojnem pripisu nakarticiprebivalstvapaje označen kot strankarski propagandist. Na Bled naj bi se preselil iz Posdama 8. novembra 1943, z ženo Lilli in petimi otroci pa je bil nastanjen v vili Beli dvor. Dr. Zieglerja navaja Benedik tudi kot vodjo blejske pisarne NSDAP, ki naj bi imela sedež na njegovem domačem naslovu skupaj s Koroško deželno zvezo.³²

Poročilo OZNE opisuje Zieglerja kot zelo visoko in vplivno osebnost, pisca je bilo znano tudi njegovo osebno poznanstvo s Hitlerjem. Na Bledu naj bi imel stike z generalom SS (Obergruppenführer) in vodjo 18. vojaško-policijskega okrožja Erwinom Rössenerjem, podpolkovnikom SS (Obersturmbannführer) in poveljnikom SD Aloisom Perstererjem ter majorjem SS (Sturmbannführer) Njuwboksem (zapisantudikotNjuboks) iz Nachricstendenst SD–West v Bruslju.³³ Poročilo navaja, da naj bi se pri Zieglerju ustavljali tudi drugi visoki obiskovalci iz Rajha. Napodlagi njegovih

(FZC) that were acquired from the libraries of the institutions of the occupying army are kept at the Institute of Contemporary History. The older and more valuable documents as well as the handwritten ones were sent to the NUK.²⁹ In theory, the documents confiscated in Bled should have been sent to the FZC storehouse in Kranj first, however, the records of the received and inventoried books do not mention the library of the Office concerned. Likewise, it is not mentioned in the list of books submitted to the Committee for Religion of the Slovenian National Liberation Council (SNOS). In an unlikely and hopefully hypothetical scenario, part of the archives was perceived as »German paper« and taken to the Vevče paper mill together with »pulp fiction« and propagandal literature due to the shortage of raw materials after the war.

Another source of data on the activities of the special Office concerned is the minutes from the file on the infamous Gestapo Hauptsturmführer Helmut Rozumek. This file from the OZNA archives is kept at the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia.³⁰ Rozumek was an ex-police inspector who commanded the IV department of the Security Service from 1942 to 1944 and caused many deaths and much mutual distrust in the partisan movement. His file contains an unsigned report, dated from 21 July 1945, on several individuals who spent time in Bled during the war and were of interest to intelligence services. Chapter 4 of the report mentions dr. Ziegler which can be taken to refer to Matthes Ziegler (1911–1992), a protestant theologian and one of the better known German Nazis. The source is not stated, however, it can be surmised the chapter was written by the author of the report. From »part of the archives« obtained by OZNA the unknown author inferred that Ziegler worked for Amt Rosenberg's department charged with overseeing church policy prior to his arrival to Bled. In Bled, he allegedly »supervised religions, particularly the Catholic one« on orders of Zentralleitung der NSDAP. The report does not allude to the Podhorn villa as to the Office headquarters but as to the Ziegler family residence. This is possibly confirmed by the

³¹ Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana, Občina Bled, RAD 4, šk. 94.

³² Benedik 1984, 99.

³³ Zelo verjetno gre za Alfreda Helmuta Naujocksa (1911–1966?), ki je bil že leta 1941 odpuščen iz SD. Leta 1943 je bil poslan na vzhodno fronto, zaradi slabega zdravja pa so ga leto pozneje nastavili kot intendantskega uslužbenca enot v Belgiji. Tam je bil vpleten v smrti večih članov odpora, še istega leta pa je bil po napredovanju v Obersturmführerja premeščen v Rössenerjev štab HSSPF Alpenland.

²⁹ Kodrič-Dačić 2000.

³⁰ AS 1931, technical unit 409, file 122 ZA (Helmut Rozumek).

stikovavtorizražapodrobneje neutemeljeno domnevo, daje Ziegler deloval kot zveza med SD in Vatikanom. Zaznamek se konča s pripombo, da bilahkonjegovopravovlogopojasnihanjegovatajnicahelenaWeiss,³⁴ki je bila med 1941 in 1943 zaposlenapri blejskem gestapu, pred tempav centralnem vodstvu NSDAP.

Sklep

Razmeromapoznadatacijasklepnegadokumentazieglerjevega uradaje presenetljiva, saj kaže vztrajanje naročnika kljub preobratu na evropskih bojiščih, zaradi katerega naj bi bila od januarja 1943 vsa gradbena delav Rajhu, ki nisobila neposredno namenjenavojnim prizadevanjem, zaustavljena. Iz dostopnih virov tudi ni mogoče razbrati neposredne povezave med teoretskim izhodiščim in infrastrukturnimi projekti sakralnega kompleksa ter gradnjo »grajskega hotela« namestu nekdanjegadvorca Suvobor, ki gaje nemška oblast namenila za Hitlerjevo mladino (Kvart und Freunde).³⁵ Ponačrtih nekega arhitekta iz Beljaka so Nemci novi stavbi kraljeve rezidence dodali dva stranska traktata, s katerima je v nemškem slugu zgrajeni kompleks dobil tloris v približni obliki črke H.³⁶ Pri izvedbi je sodeloval tudi Plečnikov učenec Danilo Fürst, od leta 1941 zaposlen v projektivnem uradu za Gorenjsko, ki gaje vodil sudetski Nemec arhitekt Just. Stavba strmo streho iz skodelje bila skoraj končana, vendar brez ometov in notranjih nape-ljav. Konec vojne je dočakala skoraj opustošena. Morda so bila v okviru pripravljanih del opravljena tudi poskusna arheološka izkopavanja zgodnje srednjeveškega grobišča v okolici že porušenega dvorca Suvobor, ki so potekala julija 1943 v okviru Inštituta za preučevanje koroške dežele.³⁷

address Schloß 206 in the list of German settlers kept by the Historical Archives Ljubljana's Unit for Gorenjska, Kranj.³¹ Ziegler is included in the residents' records as a Dienstleiter while an afterwar note on the residents card states he was a party propagandist. He had supposedly moved to Bled from Potsdam on 8 November 1943 and lived with his wife Lilli and their five children in the Beli dvor villa. On the other hand, Benedik specifies dr. Ziegler was the head of the NSDAP's Bled Office and states its headquarters shared Ziegler's home address together with the Carinthian Landbund.³²

The OZNA report describes Ziegler as a very important and influential personage. The author of the report was aware even of Ziegler's personal acquaintance with Hitler. In Bled, Ziegler allegedly kept in contact with the SS general (Obergruppenführer) and the leader of the 18th army and police district Erwin Rössener, the SS lieutenant colonel (Obersturmbannführer) and the SD (Security Service) commander Alois Persterer, and the SS major (Sturmbannführer) Njuwboks (also referred to as Njuboks) from the Nachrichtendienst SD-West in Brussels.³³ Report states that all other important Reich visitors paid calls on Ziegler. Based on Ziegler's contacts, the author presents a detailed and unfounded hypothesis on Ziegler's acting as a contact between SD and Vatican. The note ends with a remark that Ziegler's true role could be explained by his secretary Helena Weiss³⁴ who worked for the Bled Gestapo from 1941 to 1943 and had been previously employed at the NSDAP central leadership.

Conclusion

It is surprising that the concluding document of the Ziegler's office is dated relatively late since this shows the client persisted in spite of the changes in the battlefield situation that were supposed to bring an end to all construction work in

³⁴ Bivanje H. Weiss na Bledu je dokumentirano v seznamu priseljenih Nemcev z dne 1. 4. 1945 in seznamu članov NDSAP z dne 4. 10. 1912 (Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana, Občina Bled, RAD 4; šk. 94).

³⁵ Prim. Prelovšek 1998, 26.

³⁶ Prelovšek 1998, 12.

³⁷ Knific 1984, 100.

³¹ *The Historical Archives Ljubljana, Občina Bled – the Bled municipality, RAD 4, box 94.*

³² *Benedik 1984, 99.*

³³ *Probably Alfred Helmut Naujocks (1911–1966?) who had been dismissed from the SD in 1941. In 1943, he was sent to the Eastern Front. Due to poor health, he was transferred to an army commissariat department in Belgium in the following year. There, he was implicated in the deaths of several Resistance members. Later in the same year, he was promoted to Obersturmführer and transferred to the staff of Rössener's HSSPF Alpenland.*

³⁴ *H. Weiss' stay in Bled is documented in the list of immigrant Germans of 1 April 1945 and in the list of the NDSAP members of 4 October 1912 (the Historical Archives Ljubljana, Občina Bled – the Bled municipality, RAD 4; box 94).*

Zahvale

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the Reich that was not directly connected to the war effort from January 1943. These sources available do not permit understanding of the connection between theoretical premises, infrastructural projects of the sacral structures, and the building of a «castle hotel» on the former site of the Suvobor Palace that the German authorities intended for Hitler's Youth (Kvart und Freunde).³⁵ The Germans, using the plans drawn by an architect from Villach, added two side wings to the new building on the site of the king's residence. The side wings gave the ground plan of the complex (built in German style) the approximate shape of the letter H.³⁶ One of the individuals involved in the performance of work was Plečnik's disciple Danilo Fürst. From 1941, Fürst was employed at the Gorenjska Design Office headed by a Sudeten German, architect Just. The building with a steep shingled roof was roughly finished, even though without wall coatings and fittings. At the end of the war, it was almost in ruins. The trial archaeological excavation of the early medieval cemetery near the site of the already demolished Suvobor Palace that took place in July 1943 under the patronage of the Research Institute for the Land of Carinthia was possibly carried out in the framework of preparatory works.³⁷

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³⁵ *Prim. Prelovšek 1998, 26.*

³⁶ *Prelovšek 1998, 12.*

³⁷ *Knific 1984, 100.*

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Preoboroževanje enot zagrebško-ljubljanske armadne oblasti s tehniko iz programa zahodne vojaške pomoči v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja

Rearmament of the Zagreb-Ljubljana Army Authority with Technical Assets from the Western Military Assistance Programme in the 1950s

mag. DMITAR TASIĆ

Izveček

Prispevek obravnava problematiko preoboroževanja Jugoslovanske ljudske armade (JLA) v 50. letih 20. stoletja z zahodno oborožitvijo. Preoboroževanje je izvajalokot posledica zaostritve odnosov z vzhodnim blokom po objavi resolucije Informbiroja. Za zahodne sile, ZDA, Veliko Britanijo in Francijo je bilo pomembno, da ustrezno zavarujejo prehod do Italije, ob morebitnem napadu sovjetskih in njenih satelitskih enot, prek Ljubljanskih vrat, torej čez slovensko ozemlje. Opisani sta dve tristranski jugoslovanski konferenci in reorganizacija enot JLA. Nove enote so v primerjavi s starimi dobile večjo ognjeno moč in bile tudi organizacijsko boljše postavljene.

Ključne besede: Jugoslovanska ljudska armada, Jugoslavija, preoboroževanje, Ljubljanska vrata, Blejski sporazum, Nato, American Military Assistance Staff, hladna vojna.

Resolucija Informbiroja, ki je bila sprejeta junija 1948, je temeljnih spremenila podobo mednarodnih odnosov v jugoslovanski sosesčini. Še večerajšnji zavezniki so postali zaprižen sovražniki, hkrati pa so sovražniki postali posili razmer zavezniki. Jugoslavija je v nekaj

Abstract

The article discusses the problem of the rearmament of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) with western weapons, which took place in the 1950s. The rearmament was a result of the exacerbation of relations with the eastern block after the adoption of the Resolution of the Communist Party Information Bureau. The most important consideration for the western powers (USA, Great Britain and France) was to ensure a safe passage to Italy through the Ljubljana Gate (Slovenia) in case of attack by Soviet forces or its satellites. Two tripartite Yugoslav conferences and the reorganisation process of the YPA are described. As opposed to the old units, the new units gained greater firepower and were better organised.

Keywords: Yugoslav People's Army, Yugoslavia, rearmament, Ljubljana gate, the Bled Agreement, NATO, American Military Assistance Staff, Cold War.

The Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau, adopted in June 1948, fundamentally changed international relations around Yugoslavia. Former allies became sworn enemies, while, under the stress of the situation, enemies became allies. Within a period of few years,

letih prehodilapotod »najzvestejšegasatelita« ZSSR dodržave z »lojalnim in kooperativnim pristopom« do zahodnih držav (beri ZDA).¹ Tako je Jugoslavija nadaljevala svojo udeležbov dogajanjih hladne vojne, vendar zdaj nadruzi strani in ne več znotraj sovjetskega bloka.²

Jugoslovanska državna vodstva je bilo prisiljeno, da se obrne proti Zahodu, saj se je soočalo z nevarnostjo z Vzhoda, ekonomsko krizo, nekaj zaporednimi sušnimi leti in z dotrajanostjo virov Jugoslovanske armade (JA). Združene države Amerike so skupaj z drugimi zahodnimi silami, zlasti z Veliko Britanijo in Francijo, pokazale pripravljenost, da podprejo jugoslovanski upor proti ZSSR. Podpora se je kazala v množici neuradnih in uradnih stikov med predstavniki Jugoslavije in ZDA v začetku 50. let, ki so pripeljali do sklenitve sporazuma o prejemanju ameriške vojaške pomoči.³ Sprejem Grčije in Turčije v Nato leta 1952 je še bolj aktualiziral približevanje in sodelovanje z Jugoslavijo. Diplomatska sprememba je bila uradno objavljena pravna ozemlju Slovenije. V nekaj letih (1948–1954) je jugoslovanska zunanja politika prehodila pot od skupnih načrtov za oblikovanje Balkanske federacije z Bolgarijo in Albanijo do sklepanja vojaškega zavezništva z dvema članicama Natovega zavezništva, in sicer Grčijo in Turčijo, obasporazuma pa sta bila podpisana na Bledu.

Vojaški pomen Slovenije, opremljenost Jugoslovanske armade in prvi stiki z zahodnimi predstavniki

Najugoslovanskem vojskovališču je imela slovenska, natančneje tako imenovana ljubljanska smer, zaradi koda južne in centralne, majhno globino in neposredno kopensko povezavo z Zahodno Evropo. Učinkovit prodor sovjetskih in satelitskih sil iz zahodne Madžarske po dolini reke Drave proti ljubljanskim vratom in naprej proti Trstu bijim zagotovil izhod na Jadransko morje, neposredno bi ogrozil Italijo, zavezniške zračne in pomorske povezave

Yugoslavia went from “the most devoted satellite” of the USSR to adopting a “loyal and cooperative approach” towards western countries (i.e. USA).¹ Consequently, Yugoslavia continued to participate in Cold War developments; however no longer as a part of the Soviet block, but on the opposite side.²

Yugoslav state authorities were forced to turn towards the West due to threat from the East, economic crisis, several successive years of drought and the decrepit resources of the Yugoslav Army (YA). The United States of America along with several other western countries, particularly Great Britain and France, demonstrated the will to support the Yugoslav revolt against the USSR. Support included a number of formal and informal exchanges between Yugoslav and US representatives in the early 1950s, which subsequently led to the Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia.³ In 1952, the integration of Greece and Turkey into NATO contributed to the popularity of approaching Yugoslavia and developing cooperation with it. The diplomatic change was officially announced in the Slovenian territory. Within a few years (1948–1954) Yugoslav foreign policy moved from common plan to create a Balkan federation with Bulgaria and Albania to entering into a military alliance with two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey. Both agreements were signed at Bled.

Military Significance of Slovenia, Equipment of the Yugoslav Army and First Contacts with Representatives from the West

Within Yugoslav battlespace, the Slovenian route (more precisely the “Ljubljana route”), as opposed to south and central routes, was not very deep and it provided a direct land connection with Western Europe. An effective penetration of Soviet and satellite forces from west Hungary through the Drava valley and toward the Ljubljana gate and Trieste would provide access to the Adriatic Sea and pose a direct threat to Italy as well as to

¹ Lorejn M. Lis, Održavanje Tita na površini – Sjedinjene države, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat, BMG, Belgrade 2003.

² Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, Globus, Zagreb 1988, p. 58, Hereinafter: *Bekić 1988*

³ For details see: Ivan Laković, Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958, Master's Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2005, pp. 28–36. Hereinafter: *Laković 2005*

¹ Lorejn M. Lis, Održavanje Tita na površini – Sjedinjene države, Jugoslavija i Hladni rat, BMG, Belgrade 2003.

² Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, Globus, Zagreb 1988, p. 58, Hereinafter: *Bekić 1988*

³ For details see: Ivan Laković, Zapadna vojna pomoć Jugoslaviji 1951–1958, Master's Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2005, pp. 28–36. Hereinafter: *Laković 2005*

v tem delu Sredozemlja ter postavil velik del Zahodne Evrope v doseg sovjetskih vojaških sil. Zahodni vojaški predstavniki so v stikih z jugoslovanskimi kolegi redno kazali veliko zanimanje za jugoslovanske obrambne načrte na ljubljanski smeri. Poveč dnevnem bivanju v Washingtonu, zaradi pogovorov o ameriški vojaški pomoči Jugoslaviji, se je načelnik Generalštaba JA general Koča Popović srečal s poveljnikom zavezniških sil v Evropi generalom Eisenhowerjem 10. julija v Parizu.⁴ Ameriškega generala so zanimala številna podrobnosti o JA, njeni formaciji, moči, kakovosti oborožitve. Popović je ameriškega kolega seznanil, da bi bil v primeru uspešnega preoboroževanja enot JA zahodno oborožitvijo obramba Ljubljanskih vrat zagotovljena, še posebej, če bi se zgodil napad le satelitskih sil.⁵

Za ZDA je pošiljanje vojaške pomoči Jugoslaviji pomenilo krepitev južnega in jugovzhodnega krila Natovega zavezništva v Evropi, kar s obodo čia ameriško-jugoslovanski tiki tudi potrdili. Načelnik Združenega generalštaba ameriške vojske, general Lawton Collins, je med sestankom v Beogradu oktobra 1951. leta izrazil zadovoljstvo glede jugoslovanskih načrtov, da za obrambo ljubljanske smeri predvidi sile šestih pehotnih in ene oklepne divizije. Med obiskom je general Collins obiskal tudi Ljubljansko in Skopsko vojaško oblast.⁶ Naslednjim mesec, in sicer 14. novembra, so v Beogradu podpisali sporazum med ZDA in Jugoslavijo o posredovanju vojaške pomoči.⁷

Konec vojne in prva povojna leta je JA pričala razno vrsto oborožitvijo. V njeni heno-tah so imeli jugoslovansko, trofejno nemško in italijansko ter tudi zavezniško oborožitev in opremo: ameriško, britansko in sovjetsko. Jugoslovanska vojaška industrija se ni obnavljala dovolj hitro, da bi lahko nadomestila odvisnost od ZSSR, ki se je kazala v prvih povojnih letih. Povojni poskus unifikacije oborožitve je propadel po zaustavitvi dobav iz ZSSR. V uporabo so vrnila velike količine trofejne oborožitve, počasi pa se je kot največjatežav pokazalo

allied air and maritime connections in this part of the Mediterranean. A large part of the Western Europe would fall within the range of the Soviet Armed Forces. In meetings with their Yugoslav colleagues, western military representatives repeatedly showed interest in the Yugoslav Ljubljana defence line. On 10 July 1951 in Paris, after having spent a few days in Washington due to talks about US military assistance for Yugoslavia, the Chief of YA General Staff, General Koča Popović, met the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Eisenhower⁴. The US General was interested in many details concerning the YA, its formation and strength as well as the quality of its weapons. Popović informed General Eisenhower that a successful rearmament of YA units with western weapons would enable successful defence of the Ljubljana gage, especially in the event of a satellite forces attack.⁵

The USA saw the potential provision of military assistance to Yugoslavia as an opportunity to reinforce the southern and eastern block of the NATO alliance in Europe. This assumption was confirmed by future US-Yugoslav contacts. During his visit to Belgrade in October 1951, General Lawton Collins, Chief-of-Staff of the United States Army, expressed his contentment with the Yugoslav intention to deploy six infantry and an armoured division to defend the Ljubljana route. General Lawton also visited with Ljubljana and Skopje military authorities.⁶ The following month, 14 November, in Belgrade, the Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia was signed.⁷

The weapons of the YA at the end of WW II and in the early after-war period were diverse. They included Yugoslav weapons, German and Italian trophy weapons as well as allied-American, British and Soviet - weapons and equipment. The Yugoslav military industry was not revamping fast enough to compensate for its dependence on the USSR in the early post-war period. The post-war attempt to unify the weaponry failed after the supply from the USSR ended. Vast amounts of trophy weapons were returned

⁴ Laković 2005, pp. 38–43. During his stay in Washington, General Koča Popović met Averel Hariman, Robert Joyce, General Omar Bradley and General Clyde Eddleman as well as the Secretary of State Dean Acheson. (note by D. Tasić).

⁵ Laković 2005, p. 46.

⁶ Laković 2005, pp. 53–58.

⁷ Laković 2005, p. 59.

⁴ Laković 2005, pp. 38–43. During his stay in Washington, General Koča Popović met Averel Hariman, Robert Joyce, General Omar Bradley and General Clyde Eddleman as well as the Secretary of State Dean Acheson. (note by D. Tasić).

⁵ Laković 2005, p. 46.

⁶ Laković 2005, pp. 53–58.

⁷ Laković 2005, p. 59.



Tank M4 A3 Sherman

M4 A3 Sherman tank

pomanjkanje rezervnih delov. Uporabljali so 61 vrst oborožitve z 49 vrstami streliva, ki je imelo popolnoma različne kalibre. Kot primer lahko navedem, da so voklepnih enotah imeli ameriške tanke Stuart in sovjetske T-34, v letalstvu sovjetska jurišna in lovska letala jak-3, jak-9 in il-2, ameriške lovce-bombnike Thunderbolt, nemške lovce prestreznike Messerschmitt 109, britanske lovce prestreznike Spitfire, Hurricane, izvidniška letala Mosquito in še nekatera druga letala. Podobno je bilo tudi v šolskem in transportnem letalstvu. Vojna mornarica je bila še na začetku. Primanjkovali so kakovostni sistemi zvez, radarji, rezervni deli, inženirski material in drugo.⁸ Na jugoslovanski strani so bile v začetku petdesetih let, natančneje 1950. leta, izpeljane večje organizacijsko-formacijske spremembe naravnih celotnih vojsk. Dotere organizacije je bila za obrambo Slovenije in Hrvaške pristojna Peta vojaška oblast s poveljstvom v Zagrebu. V svoji sestavi je imela 10. in 12. armado, ki sta imeli poveljstva v Ljubljani in Zagrebu. S spremembami je bilo opredeljeno, da se Peta vojaška oblast v vojni reorganizira v Peto armadno

inouto; however the supply of spare parts soon became a major problem. Yugoslav units used 61 different types of weapons with 49 types of ammunition of completely different calibres. For example, armoured units used American Stuart tanks and Soviet T-34 tanks and air forces used the Soviet Jak-3, Jak-9 and Il-2 attack and fighter aircraft, American Thunderbolt fighter-bombers, German Messerschmitt 109 fighter-interceptor aircraft, British Spitfire and Hurricane fighter-interceptor aircraft, Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft and others. The situation in the Air Force training and transportation units was similar. In that period, the development of the Navy had only just started. The forces lacked quality communications systems, radars, spare parts, engineering materials etc.⁸ In the early 1950s, more precisely in 1950, the entire YA faced significant organisational and formational changes. Until the reorganisation process, the defence of Slovenia and Croatia was within the competence of the "Fifth Military Authority", which was based in Zagreb. Its organic units included the 10th and 12th Army with their respective headquarters in Ljubljana and Zagreb. After the implementation of changes

⁸ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 42–47.

⁸ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 42–47.

oblast in 5. armados poveljstvom v Zagrebu. Vnjeni sestavi stabila dva korpusa in ena samostojnatankovskadivizija. V Ljubljani je bilo poveljstvo 23. korpusa, ki bi se v vojni razvil v 10. operativno skupino, ki pa je imela v svoji sestavi pet pehotnih divizij: 33., 129., 60., 1. in 69.. V Zagrebu je bilo poveljstvo 11. korpusa, ki je imelo v svoji sestavi: 14., 137., 6., 56. in 85. pehotnoter 118. gorsko divizijo. V Sisku je bil sedež poveljstva 20. tankovske divizije.

Ameriški vojaški strokovnjaki so opazili v analizah stanja in potreb JA po oborožitvi in opremiočitno pomanjkanje težeke artilerije in prevladovanje zastarelega letalstva. Američani so želeli, da bi prek dobav prvih kontingentov pridobili jugoslovansko soglasje za nadaljevanje strateških pogajanj, hkrati pa so se želeli izogniti vzbujanju občutkov političnega pogojevanja, na kar so bili Jugoslovani zelo občutljivi. Na začetku so se dogovorili, da bodo dostavili oborožitev in opremo, ki je ostala iz druge svetovne vojne. V pogajanjih so predvideli, da moderno oborožitev pripeljejo leta 1952. Med pogajanjmi, ki so potekala na Bledu 19. julija 1952. leta, sta zahtevala ameriška predstavnika generala Eddleman in Olmsted, zaradi vztrajanja veleposlanika ZDA v Jugoslaviji Georga Allena, da se odobreni kontingent tankov in artilerijskih sredstev razporedi venotah vseverozahodnem delu države, torej v Sloveniji in na Hrvaškem. S tem bi okrepili obrambo Ljubljanskih vrat in severne Italije. Poleg tega so zato leto ob Ljubljani okrepitev programa, kakor tudi pospešitev dobav reaktivnih letal. Takšen pristop se je pokazal kot koristen in Tito je poudaril, da v tistem trenutku niso obstajale nikakršne ovire za začetek pogajanj o usklajevanju modalitet skupne obrambe. V naslednje pogovore so se vključili tudi predstavniki oboroženih sil Velike Britanije in Francije. Tako so bili postavljeni temelji za nadaljevanje, zdaj že tripartitno-jugoslovanskih strateških pogajanj. Prva konferenca je bila novembra 1952. leta v Beogradu.

Prva tripartitno-jugoslovanska konferenca

Načelu tripartitne delegacije zahodnih sil, ki je med 15. in 20. novembrom 1952 obiskala Beograd, je bil ameriški general Thomas Troy Handy, ki je bil tudi poveljnik zavezniških sil v Nemčiji. Tokratni pogovor so bili zelo teški in

the Fifth Military Authority was reorganised into the Fifth Army Authority and the 5th Army with commands in Zagreb. Two corps and an independent Tank Division were assigned to the 5th Army. The 23rd Corps was based in Ljubljana. In the event of war it would reorganise into the 10th Operational Group which would include the following five Infantry Divisions: 33rd, 129th, 60th, 1st and 69th. The headquarters of the 11th Corps was in Zagreb. It included the 14th, 137th, 6th, 56th and 85th Infantry Divisions and the 118th Mountain Division. The 20th Tank Division was based in Sisak.

The analyses of the situation and needs in the YA carried out by American military experts identified a severe lack of heavy artillery and the prevalence of obsolete aircraft. The first few US deliveries were aimed at acquiring Yugoslav consent for the continuation of strategic negotiations. However, they did not wish to arouse the feeling of political conditioning which the Yugoslavs were very sensitive to. The initial agreement was to deliver weapons and equipment from World War II. According to the negotiations, modern equipment would be delivered in 1952. Based on the insistence of George Allen, the US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, during negotiations at Bled, on 19 July 1952, the US representatives, General Eddleman and General Olmsted demanded that an approved contingent of tanks and artillery be deployed within the north-western units, i.e. in Slovenia and Croatia. This would reinforce the defence of the Ljubljana gate and north Italy. In addition, they promised to enhance the programme and expedite the delivery of jet planes. The adopted approach proved useful and Tito emphasized that, at the time, no obstacles existed concerning the beginning of negotiations about the coordination of common defence modalities. The representatives from the Armed Forces of Great Britain and France participated in subsequent talks. The above-mentioned developments provided the basis for the continuation of tripartite Yugoslav strategic negotiations. The first conference was held in November 1952 in Belgrade.

The First Tripartite Yugoslav Conference

The tripartite delegation of the western powers, which visited Belgrade between 15 and 20 November 1952, was led by US General Thomas Troy Handy who was at the time the Supreme



letalo T-33 (šolsko, reaktivno); T-33 (trainer, jet plane)

potem so se razlikovali od prejšnjih. General Handy je imel mandat, da se pogovarja samo o vojaških vprašanjih, brez sprejemanja kakršnih koli obveznosti. Pogovore so zaznamovale številne razlike v obveščevalnih podatkih, predvsem o številu sovjetskih sil, ki so obkrožale Jugoslavijo, in kakovosti oborožitve satelitskih enot, nato ozavračanju jugoslovanskega predloga, da bi zahodni predstavniki podrobneje predstavili svoje poglede, načrte in različice, kot tudi vztrajanje na zagotavljanju pogojev za obrambo Ljubljanskih vrat, vendar ne kot sodelovanje z zahodnimi silami v Avstriji in severni Italiji, temveč le v obliki posredovanja materialne pomoči Jugoslaviji.⁹ Potrdilo so že prej sprejeta stališča in sklepe, da se enote Ljubljanske armade opremijo izključno z ameriško oborožitvijo s ciljem lažjega oskrbovanja ter zmanjšanja raznolikosti v jugoslovanski oborožitvi.¹⁰ Ko je general Handy četrtega dne konference spoznal, da je takšen pristop, kije jugoslovanska stran potisnila iz položaja morebitnega zaveznika v položaj navadnega prosilca pomoči, neustrezen in neuspešen, je odobril, da se jugoslovanski strani predstavijo podatki o zavezniških silah v Avstriji in Italiji. Majhnost Natovih sil in zahodni načrti, da se njihove sile v primeru sovjetskega napada umaknejo, tertako odkrijejo jugoslovanski bok, je vodilo jugoslovansko stran k sklepu, da Nato nima pripravljene strategije za obrambo Avstrije ali ne želi vzpostaviti tesnejših stikov z Jugoslavijo tertako koordinira obrambne načrte. To spoznanje je zaznamovalo nesmiselnost nadaljevanja pogovorov, ki so bili naslednjega dne 20. novembra zaključeni iz vladnostnima izjava ma o uspešnosti srečanja in izkazano potrebo po nadaljevanju sodelovanja.¹¹

Allied Commander in Germany. As opposed to the earlier talks, these talks were hard. General Handy was mandated to discuss exclusively military issues without assuming any obligations whatsoever. The talks were marked by several considerations: numerous differences in intelligence, especially concerning the number of Soviet forces surrounding Yugoslavia and the quality of satellite units' weapons; the denial of Yugoslavia's proposal that the western representatives introduce in detail their views, plans and variations as well as their determination to provide conditions for the defence of the Ljubljana gate. However, the latter was not to take place in the form of cooperation with western forces deployed in Austria and Italy but only in the form of providing material assets to Yugoslavia.⁹ The already agreed positions and resolutions that the units of the Ljubljana Army be equipped only with US weapons were reaffirmed. This would facilitate the supply and reduce the diversity of the Yugoslav weaponry.¹⁰ On the fourth day of the conference, General Handy realised that the assumed approach, which pushed Yugoslavia from being a potential ally to being a simple candidate for assistance, was inappropriate and unsuccessful. He therefore agreed to give Yugoslavia information about allied forces in Austria and Italy. Due to the small size of NATO forces and western plans to withdraw forces in the event of a Soviet attack, thereby revealing the flank of Yugoslav forces, Yugoslavians realised that NATO had no defence strategy concerning Austria and nor did it wish to develop closer contacts with Yugoslavia and coordinate its defence plans. The continuation of the talks was therefore useless. The next day, 20 November, the talks were concluded with courteous statements regarding the success of the meeting and the recognition that cooperation was to be continued.¹¹

The continuation and the characteristics of the subsequent Yugoslav communications with the USA, Great Britain, France, Greece and Turkey in the light of concluding the Balkan Pact in 1953/54 prove that the lessons learned during the first tripartite Yugoslav conference were seriously considered. Yugoslavians realised that the West lacked proper understanding of Yugoslavia's

⁹ Laković 2005, pp. 71–73.

¹⁰ Laković 2005, p. 94.

¹¹ Laković 2005, pp. 94–102.

⁹ Laković 2005, pp. 71–73.

¹⁰ Laković 2005, p. 94.

¹¹ Laković 2005, pp. 94–102.

Nadaljevanje in značilnost poznejših jugoslovanskih stikov z ZDA, Veliko Britanijo in Francijo, pa tudi z Grčijo in Turčijo v kontekstu sklepanja Balkanskega pakta 1953./54. leta, dokazujejo, da so bile izkušnje iz Prve tripartitno-jugoslovanske konference resno obravnavane. Spoznali so, da na Zahodu ni obstajal pravi razumevanje trenutnega jugoslovanskega položaja in njenih realnih potreb, da so iz zahodni vojaški predstavniki drugače predstavljali sodelovanje in izmenjavo podatkov ter da niso nastopili enakopravno. Vse to je posledično okrepilo stališče jugoslovanskega vodstva protivstopu Jugoslavije v Nato. Kot alternativa tem razmeram se je pokazala okrepitev stikov z Grki in Turki.¹² Kljub temu so nadaljevali stiki, beograjski pogovoripaso pomenili uvod v resnejše sodelovanje med Jugoslavijo in Zahodom.¹³



Letalo F-84G in T-33; F-84G in T-33 Thunderjet aircraft

Druga tripartitno-jugoslovanska konferenca

Nove zunanje politične okoliščine (Stalinova smrt in sklepanje zavezništva med Jugoslavijo, Turčijo in Grčijo ter svojevrstni izhod Jugoslavije iz diplomatske osamitve) in analize prejšnjih pogovorov so vplivale na to, da je prišlo do sprememb v ravnanju/stališčih/ravnanju ZDA, Velike Britanije in Francije.¹⁴ Predstavniki JLA so bili povabljeni julija 1953

existing standpoints and its actual needs as well as that western military representatives did not share the same idea of cooperation and information exchange and that they did not act in a unified manner. Consequently, all of the aforementioned facts reinforced the position of Yugoslav governing authorities to oppose Yugoslavia's integration into NATO. The alternative was to enhance relations with Greece and Turkey.¹² Nevertheless, the communications continued and the Belgrade talks set up a more serious cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West.¹³

The Second Tripartite Yugoslav Conference

The new situation in foreign policy (the death of Stalin, the formation of an alliance with Greece and Turkey as well as the unique end to Yugoslavia's diplomatic isolation) and the analysis of former talks contributed to the changes in the behaviour of the USA, Great Britain and France.¹⁴ In July 1953, representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) were invited to Washington to continue negotiations. In addition to the provision of military assistance, they especially stressed the importance of military negotiations.¹⁵ The return of General Eddleman into the US negotiations group, who was considered in favour of Yugoslavia, introduced another approach. The expectations were achieved. The scope and significance of the talks between Yugoslav representatives and the representatives of the USA, France and Great Britain, held in Washington in August 1953, exceeded all previous talks.¹⁶ The western representatives expressed their concern about the "lack of effective coordinated defence arrangements between Yugoslavia and other forces of the free world". They stressed the importance of the Yugoslav territory for the defence of "NATO's south wing" as well as the fact that defence against Soviet aggression was not only within the domain of Yugoslavia but also of their respective governments. They welcomed the Ankara agreement which connected Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey. They also

¹² Bekić 1988, p. 445.

¹³ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zbornik dokumenata, Belgrade 2005, p. 20; (Hereinafter: Balkanski pakt 1953/1954).

¹⁴ Laković 2005, p. 109.

¹² Bekić 1988, p. 445.

¹³ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zbornik dokumenata, Belgrade 2005, p. 20; (Hereinafter: Balkanski pakt 1953/1954).

¹⁴ Laković 2005, p. 109.

¹⁵ Bekić 1988, p. 531.

¹⁶ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 356; AVII, JNA GS-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

v Washington na nadaljevanje pogajanj. Poleg ponujanja vojaške pomoči so posebej poudarjali strateško vojaško pogajanja.¹⁵ Vrnitev generala Eddlmana, za katerega so mislili, daje naklonjen Jugoslovanom, v pogajalsko skupino ZDA, je nakazal drugačen pristop. Tapričakovanja so setudi uresničila. Pogovori, ki so jih imeli jugoslovanski predstavniki s predstavniki ZDA, Francije in Velike Britanije v Washingtonu avgusta 1953. leta, so z obsegom in pomenom presegli vse prejšnje.¹⁶ Zahodni predstavniki so izrazili zaskrbljenost »zaradi odsotnosti učinkovitih usklajenih obrambnih aranžmajev med Jugoslavijo in drugimi silami svobodnega sveta«. Poudarili so pomen jugoslovanskega ozemlja za obrambo »južnega krila območja Nata«, kakor tudi stališče, da obramba pred sovjetsko agresijo ni le odgovornost Jugoslavije, temveč tudi njihovih vlad. Pozdravili so sklenitev Ankarskega sporazuma, skaterim se je Jugoslavija povezala z Grčijo in Turčijo. Sprejeli so dnevni red s sedmimi točkami, v katerih so bili predvideni izčrpana izmenjava vseh bistvenih podatkov, s poudarkom na zagotavljanju pomoči Jugoslaviji, če bi prišlo do sovjetskega ali satelitskega napada, analiza obrambnih načrtov s posebnim pogledom na Slovenijo, kakor tudi podatki o stanju pripravljenosti JLA, njeni mobilizacijski načrti in logistične sposobnosti za izvajanje učinkovitega odpora.¹⁷ V nadaljevanju pogovorov so bili zahodni predstavniki temeljito seznanjeni z organizacijo in formacijo JLA, sistemi mobilizacije, popolnjevanja, usposabljanja in šolanja po zvrsteh – kopenski vojski, letalstvu in mornarici, kakor tudi z dolgimi seznami jugoslovanskih potreb po oborožitvi in spremljajoči opremi. Še posebej so prikazali razlike v formaciji »stare« in »nove« pehotne divizije, saj je preoboroževanje divizij ameriško oborožitvijo na območju Ljubljana–Zagreb že potekalo.

Formacije preoboroženih enot

Formacija »stare« pehotne divizije:

- trije pehotni polki,

adopted these seven-item agenda which envisaged a detailed exchange of all essential information, especially regarding the provision of assistance to Yugoslavia in the event of a Soviet or satellite attack; the analysis of defence plans with special focus on Slovenia; as well as the information about the readiness of the YPA, its mobilisation plans and logistic capabilities for providing an effective resistance.¹⁷ Later in the talks, the western representatives learned about the organisation and formation of the YPA, its mobilisation, manning, training and education systems pertaining to individual services (Army, Air Force and Navy). They were also introduced to a long list of Yugoslav requirements concerning weapons and the support equipment. The Yugoslav representatives focused on presenting formation differences between the "new" and the "old" Infantry Division, since the rearmament of the divisions with US weapons in the areas of Ljubljana and Zagreb was already in motion.

Formations of Units With New Weaponry

Formation of the "old" Infantry Division:

- three Infantry Regiments
- Artillery Regiment
- Anti-Tank Battalion composed of two batteries of 76mm self-propelled guns, 76mm Anti-Tank Batteries and supply services
- Anti-Aircraft Battery with six 37 mm guns and four 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine guns
- Liaison Battalion composed of one Staff Company, one Wire-Liaison Company and rear-area institutions
- Engineer Battalion composed of one Staff Platoon, two Engineer Companies, one Flame-Thrower Company and a supply unit
- Reconnaissance Company
- Chemical Company
- Motorised Transport Company with 36 trucks
- necessary rear-area and supply units

The Infantry Regiment included:

- three Infantry Battalions with three Rifle

¹⁵ Bekić 1988., p. 531.

¹⁶ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 356; AVII, JNA GS-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

¹⁷ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, pp. 354–355; AVII, JNA GS-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

¹⁷ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, pp. 354–355; AVII, JNA GS-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

- artilerijski polk,
- protitankovski (PT) divizion z dvema baterijama samohodnih topov 76 mm, protitankovske baterije 76 mm in službe oskrbovanja,
- protiletalska (PL) baterija s šestimi topovi 37 mm in štirimi mitraljezi PL 12,7 mm,
- bataljon zvezod štabne čete, čete za žično zvezo in zalednih ustanov,
- inženirski bataljon s sestavo: štabni vod, dve inženirski četi, vod plamenometalcev in enote za oskrbo,
- izvidniška četa,
- kemijska četa,
- moto-transportna četa s 36 tovornjaki,
- potrebni zaledni in oskrbovalni deli.

Pehotni polk je imel v svoji sestavi:

- tri pehotne bataljone stremištrejskimi četami, čete mitraljezov, čete za podporo in službe za oskrbovanje,
- baterijo topov 76 mm,
- baterijo minometov 120 mm,
- baterijo topov PT 57 mm,

Artilerijski polk je imel v svoji sestavi:

- dva divizion topov 76 mm, enega z 12, drugega z 8 orožji,
- divizion havbic 105 mm z osmimi orožji in službi za oskrbo.

Osnovna oprema »stare divizije« v vojni formaciji je imela:

5162 pušk, 2705 brzostrelk, 275 ročnih metalcev raket (RRB), 18 netrajnih topov 75 mm, 319 lahkih mitraljezov, 81 težkih mitraljezov, 54 minometov 82 mm, 12 protitankovskih (PT) topov 57 mm, 12 topov 76 mm, 18 minometov 120 mm, 28 topov ZIS-2 76 mm, 8 samohodnih topov 76 mm, 8 havbic 105 mm, 28 PL mitraljezov 12,7 mm, 6 PL topov 37 mm, 48 plamenometalcev, 74 različnih radijskih postaj, 7 radijskih sprejemnikov, 222 telefonov, 5 džipov, 88 tritonskih tovornjakov, 20 posebnih motornih vozil, 506 dvoosnih in 378 enoosnih vozov. Moč »stare« divizije je v mirnodobnem času znašala od 7000 do 8000 vojakov, v vojni pa bi se to število povečalo na 12.000 vojakov.

V osnovni opremi »nove divizije« je bilo v vojni formaciji:

7252 pušk, 2609 brzostrelk, 322 ročnih metalcev raket (RRB), 45 netrajnih topov 75

Companies, a Machine Gun Company, a Support Company and supply services

- 76 mm Gun Battery
- 120 mm Mortar Battery
- 57 mm Anti-Tank Gun Battery

The Artillery Regiment included:

- two 76 mm Gun Battalions, one with 12 and one with 8 weapons
- 105 mm Howitzer Battalion with eight weapons and two supply services

The basic equipment of the "old" division's war formation included:

5162 rifles, 2705 submachine guns, 275 hand-held rocket launchers, 18 x 75 mm recoilless guns, 319 light machine guns, 81 heavy machine guns, 54 x 82 mm mortars, 12 x 57 mm anti-tank guns, 12 x 76 mm guns, 18 x 120 mm mortars, 28 x 76 mm ZIS-2 guns, 8 x 76 mm self-propelled guns, 8 x 105 mm howitzers, 28 x 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, 6 x 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, 48 flamethrowers, 74 different radio stations, 7 radioreceivers, 222 telephones, 5 Jeeps, 88 x 3-tonnet trucks, 20 special motor vehicles, 506 two-axle and 378 single-axle carriages. The peacetime strength of the "old division" was 7,000 to 8,000 men. In war, the number would increase to 12,000.

The basic equipment of the "new" division's war formation included:

7252 rifles, 2609 submachine guns. 322 hand-held rocket launchers, 45 x 75 mm recoilless guns, 320 light machine guns, 81 heavy machine guns, 54 x 82 mm mortars, 16 x 57 mm anti-tank guns, 12 x 76 mm guns, 18 x 120 mm mortars, 36 x 90 mm self-propelled guns, 36 x 105 mm howitzers, 12 x 155 mm howitzers, 24 x 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, 108 x 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, 31 tanks, 332 different radio stations, 11 radioreceivers, 152 Jeeps, 586 motor vehicles of different types. In war, the strength of the division was 13,500 men.

The difference between the "old" and the "new" divisions was that the Artillery Regiment of the "new" Infantry Division was composed of four battalions: 3 x 105 mm Howitzer Battalions and 1 x 155 mm Howitzer Battalion.

The Anti-Tank Battalion was equipped with 16 x 57 mm guns.

There was also a battalion with 18 x 90 mm

mm, 320 lahkih mitraljezov, 81 težkih mitraljezov, 54 minometov 82 mm, 16 topov PT 57 mm, 12 topov 76 mm, 18 minometov 120 mm, 36 samohodnih topov 90 mm, 36 havbic 105 mm, 12 havbic 155 mm, 24 topov PL 40 mm, 108 mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm, 31 tankov, 332 različnih radijskih postaj, 11 radijskih sprejemnikov, 152 džipov, 586 motornih vozil različnih vrst. V vojni je divizija štela 13.500 vojakov.

Razlika med »starimi« in »novimi« divizijami je bila ta, da je v »novih« pehotnih divizijah artilerijski polk imel štiri divizione: tri divizione havbic 105 mm in divizion havbic 155 mm.

Divizion PT je imel 16 topov 57 mm.

Obstajal je tudi divizion z 18 samohodnimi topovi 90 mm, namesto baterije PL pa je bil divizion PL s 24 topovi 40 mm.

Moto-transportna četa je imela 90 vozil.

Pehotni polk je imel namesto baterij PT 57 mm samohodno baterijo s šestimi samohodnimi topovi 90 mm.

Pomembna novost je bila, da je imela vsaka pehotna divizija tankovski bataljon, ki je štel 31 tankov.

Vse to je bilo precej več in tudi močnejše v primerjavi s »staro« divizijo. Če bi primerjali ognjeno moč, zveze, inženirske zmožnosti in transport divizije starega in novega tipa z označenim numeričnim indeksom 100, ima »nova« ali ljubljanska divizija indeks ognjenosti 141, zvez 110, inženirski indeks 330, transportni 446. Spreoboroževanje sodobili precejšnjo razliko moči med staro divizijo in ljubljansko divizijo. Preoboroževanje so izvedli tudi v tankovski in gorski diviziji.

Tankovska divizija je imela:

- dve tankovski brigadi,
- pehotni motorizirani polk,
- artilerijski polk,
- kemijsko četo,
- bataljon zvez, ki so ga sestavljali štabna četa, četa za žične zveze in služba za oskrbovanje,
- izvidniški bataljon s sestavo: četa motorizirane pehote, oklepna izvidniška četa, motociklistična četa, vod minometov 82 mm in službe za oskrbovanje,
- divizion samohodnih topov s štirimi baterijami, štabnim vodom in službo za oskrbovanje,

self-propelled guns. The Anti-Aircraft Battery was replaced by the Anti-Aircraft Battalion with 24 x 40 mm guns.

Motorised Transport Company had 90 vehicles.

Anti-tank batteries of the Infantry Regiment were replaced with a 57 mm self-propelled Battery with 6 x 90 mm self-propelled guns.

There was an important innovation – every fifth Infantry Division had a tank battalion with 31 tanks.

All of the above-mentioned units were much bigger and stronger in comparison to the "old" division. If the firepower, liaison, engineer and transport capabilities of the old and the new types of divisions were measured by the numeric index of 100, the index of the "new" or the "Ljubljana Division" would be 141 for firepower, 110 for liaison, 330 for engineer and 446 for transport capabilities. The process of rearmament brought about a significant difference in the strength between the old division and the Ljubljana Division. The rearmament was also carried out in the Tank Division and Mountain Division.

The Tank Division included:

- two Tank Brigades
- Motorised Infantry Regiment
- Artillery Regiment
- Chemical Company
- Liaison Battalion, composed of one Staff Company, one Wire-Liaison Company and supply services
- Reconnaissance Battalion, composed of one Motorised Infantry Company, one Armoured Reconnaissance Company, one Motorcycle Company, one 82 mm Mortar Platoon and supply services
- Self-Propelled Gun Battalion, composed of four batteries, one staff platoon and a supply service
- 37 mm Anti-Aircraft Battalion, composed of two 37 mm Gun Batteries and one 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft Company
- 37 mm Anti-Aircraft Battalion, composed of two 37 mm Gun Batteries and one 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft Company
- Engineer Battalion, composed of two Engineer Companies, one Pontoon Company, one Reconnaissance Platoon and one Liaison Squad
- Motorised Transport Battalion, composed of

- divizion PL 37 mm, ki je imel v svoji sestavi 2 bateriji topov 37 mm in četo PL 12,7 mm,
- inženirski bataljon z dvema inženirskima četama, pontonirsko četo, izvidniškim vodom in oddelkom zvez,
- moto-transportni bataljon z dvema moto-transportnima četama, oddelkom zvez in delavnicami,
- bataljon za popravilo bojnih vozil s sestavo: četa specialnadel, voda evakuacijoozioroma izvleko, moto transportni vod in oddelek za oskrbovanje.

Tankovska brigada je imela:

- tritankovske bataljone z dvema tankovskima četama, štabni vod in potrebne enote za oskrbovanje,
- bataljon motorizirane pehote, ki je imel v svoji sestavi štiri čete avtomatičarjev, minometne čete 82 mm, PT-voda, voda zvez in delov za oskrbovanje,
- inženirski vod,
- izvidniško četo in službo za oskrbovanje,
- štabno četo,
- protitankovski divizion z dvema baterijama topov ZIS-3 76 mm,
- divizion topov PL 37 mm z dvema baterijama, štabnim vodom in enim vodom za oskrbovanje.

Polk motorizirane pehote je imel:

- tri bataljone motorizirane pehote s tremi motoriziranimi pehotnimi četami, eno mitralješko četo, minometno četo 82 mm, vodom PT, vodom zvez, službo za oskrbovanje,
- divizion PT 76 mm z dvema baterijama, štabnim vodom in vodom za oskrbovanje,
- četo zvez,
- izvidniško četo,
- četo avtomatičarjev,
- minometno baterijo 120 mm,
- četo mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm in službo za oskrbovanje.

Artilerijski polk je imel v svoji sestavi:

- divizion topov PT 76 mm s tremi baterijami,
- dva divizona z dvema baterijama havbic 122 mm,
- štabne baterije,
- minometne baterije 120 mm ter službe za oskrbovanje.

two Motorised Transport Companies, one Liaison Squad and workshops

- Repair Battalion for combat vehicles, composed of one Special Works Company, one Evacuation/Recovery Platoon, one Motorised Transport Platoon and a Supply Squad

The Tank Brigade included:

- three Tank Battalions with two Tank Companies, one Staff Platoon and there required supply units
- Motorised Infantry Battalion, composed of four Submachine Gun Companies, 82 mm Mortar Companies, two Anti-Tank Platoons, two Liaison Platoons and supply units
- Engineer Platoon
- Reconnaissance Company and a supply service
- Staff Company
- Anti-Tank Battalion with two 76 mm ZIS-3 Gun Batteries
- 37 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion with two Batteries, one Staff Platoon and one Supply Platoon

The Motorised Infantry Regiment included:

- three Motorised Infantry Battalions, composed of three Motorised Infantry Companies, one Machine Gun Company, one 82 mm Mortar Company, one Anti-Tank Platoon, one Liaison Platoon and a supply service
- 76 mm Anti-Tank Battalion with two Batteries, one Staff Platoon and one Supply Platoon
- Liaison Company
- Reconnaissance Company
- Submachine Gun Company
- 120 mm Mortar Battery
- 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Company and supply service

Artillery Regiment was composed of:

- 76 mm Anti-Tank Gun Battalion, composed of three batteries
- two battalions with two 122 mm Howitzer Batteries
- Staff Batteries
- 120 mm Mortar Batteries and supply services

The Mountain Division included:

- three Mountain Regiments
- Artillery Regiment
- Engineer Battalion
- Liaison Battalion

Gorska divizija je imela:

- tri gorske polke,
- artilerijski polk,
- inženirski bataljon,
- bataljon zvez,
- divizion PT,
- mitralješko četo PL,
- izvidniško četo,
- avto četo,
- kemijsko četo,
- pomožne enote in enote za oskrbovanje.

Artilerijski polk je imel:

- divizion gorskih topov z 12 gorskimi topovi 76 mm,
- dva divizion gorskih havbic, vsak z 8 gorskimi havbicami 100 mm v dveh baterijah.

Gorski polk je imel:

- tri gorske bataljone,
- minometno četo s štirimi minometri 120 mm,
- baterijo gorskih topov s štirimi gorskimi topovi 76 mm,
- četo avtomatičarjev,
- četo zvez,
- mitralješko četo PL,
- polkovne enote za oskrbovanje in pomožne enote.

Tankovska divizija je imela:

4043 pušk, 2185 brzostrelk, 111 ročnih metalcev raket (RRB), 214 lahkih mitraljezov, 18 težkih mitraljezov, 33 minometov 82 mm, 36 topov ZIS-3 76 mm, 8 minometov 120 mm, 12 havbic 122 mm, 12 mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm, 24 topov PL 37 mm, 135 tankov, 16 samohodnih topov 76 mm, 26 oklepnih avtomobilov, 30 oklepnih transporterjev, 12 tankovskih delavnic, premični most z nosilnostjo 15 ton, 12 džipov, 564 tovornjakov, 139 vlačilcev, 191 specialnih vozil, 288 različnih radijskih postaj in 47 radijskih sprejemnikov.

Oprema gorske divizije je imela:

6649 pušk, 2677 brzostrelk, 168 ročnih metalcev raket (RRB), 314 pušk mitraljezov, 81 mitraljezov, 54 minometov 82 mm, 18 netrajnih topov 57 mm, 24 gorskih topov 76 mm, 12 topov PT 76 mm, 16 gorskih havbic 100 mm, 33 mitraljezov PL 12,7 mm, 116 radijskih postaj, sedem radijskih sprejemnikov, devet specialnih

- Anti-Tank Battalion
- Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Company
- Reconnaissance Company
- Automobile Company
- Chemical Company
- supporting units and supply units

The Artillery Regiment included:

- Mountain Gun Division with 12 x 76 mm mountain guns
- two Mountain Howitzer Battalions, each with two batteries of 8 x 100 mm mountain howitzers

The Mountain Regiment included:

- three Mountain Battalions
- one Mortar Company with 4 x 120 mm mortars
- one Mountain Gun Battery with 4 x 76 mm mountain guns
- Submachine Gun Company
- Liaison Company
- Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Company
- regimental supply units and assisting units

The Tank Division was equipped with:

4034 rifles, 2185 submachine guns, 111 hand-held rocket launchers, 214 light machine guns, 18 heavy machine guns, 33 x 82 mm mortars, 36 x 76 mm ZIS-3 guns, 8 x 120 mm mortars, 12 x 122 mm howitzers, 12 x 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, 24 x 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, 135 tanks, 16 x 76 mm self-propelled guns, 26 armoured vehicles, 30 armoured personnel carriers, 12 tank-repair workshops, a mobile bridge with 15-tonne loading capacity, 12 Jeeps, 564 trucks, 139 towing vehicles, 191 special vehicles, 288 different radio stations and 47 radio receivers.

The Mountain Division was equipped with:

6649 rifles, 2677 submachine guns, 168 hand-held rocket launchers, 314 light machine guns, 81 machine guns, 54 x 82 mm mortars, 18 x 57 mm recoilless guns, 24 x 76 mm mountain guns, 12 x 76 mm anti-tank guns, 16 x 100 mm mountain howitzers, 33 x 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns, 116 radio stations, seven radio receivers, nine special vehicles, 56 trucks, 2235 carriers, 635 two-wheelers, 313 two-axle carriages and 4432 horses. The Mountain Division was composed of 11,798 soldiers.



Brzostrelka Thompson M-1

Thompson M-1 Sub Machine Gun

vozil, 56 tovornjakov, 2235 sedel, 635 dvokolesnikov, 313 dvoosnih vozov in 4432 konjev. Gorska divizija je imela 11.798 vojakov.

V nadaljevanju konferencesopodrobno analizirali obrambna načrta, zlasti ljubljansko smer, izpostavili pasovsebinsko spremembov zahodnih stališčih: priznavanje strateškega pomena uspešne obrambe Jugoslavije, dvom v možnost omejenega vojaškega spopada ob sovjetskem ali satelitskem napadu in prepričevanje, da se bodov takšnem primeru tripartitne sile pridružile Jugoslaviji in ji dajale »tako operativno kot tudi materialno pomoč«. ¹⁸ Hkrati so nadaljevali z izmenjavo in analizoveli kega številapodatkov, za katere stabilizainteresirani obe strani, med njimipasoprevladovala analize, kisosenanašalenaprihodnjedobave zahodne vojaške pomoči, predvsem na podlagi potreb JLA, ki jih je ob tej priložnosti predstavilazelopodrobno. General Vučković je poudaril, daje glavnicilj, dase celotna JLA preoborožipovzorudivizijiz ljubljansko-zagrebške oblasti. ¹⁹

Taktično-tehnične karakteristike posameznih zahodnih oborožitvenih sistemov

Med številnimi oborožitvenimi sistemi, ki so jih dobili na podlagi programa vojaške pomoči, so polastnosti, količini in obdobju uporabe izstopali tanki, artilerijska orožja, letala in inženirska oprema. Tanka sherman in M47 patton, mitraljez browning 12,7 mm,

Later during the conference, the participants analysed the defence plans in detail, particularly the Ljubljana direction. They highlighted the substantive changes in western positions, which recognised the strategic significance of a successful defence of Yugoslavia, expressed doubts about the possibility of a military conflict in the event of an attack by Soviet or satellite forces and tried to persuade conference participants that in such a case the tripartite forces would join Yugoslavia and provide "operational and material assistance". ¹⁸ The conference participants also continued to exchange and analyse a vast amount of information which both parties were interested in. The prevailing analyses regarded the future delivery of western military assistance based on the needs of the YPA. General Vučković stressed that the main goal was to rearm the YPA according to the model of the Zagreb-Ljubljana authority divisions. ¹⁹

Tactical and Technical Characteristics of Individual Western Weapon Systems

Due to their characteristics, quantity and the period in which they were used, tanks, artillery weapons, aircraft and engine equipment dominated within the numerous weapons systems received from the Military Assistance Programme. Sherman and M47 Patton tanks, 12.7 Browning machine guns, 155 mm howitzers, 90 mm self-propelled guns, Bailey bridges and very simple types of folding spades were used by numerous

¹⁸ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 413; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

¹⁹ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 414; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

¹⁸ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 413; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.

¹⁹ Balkanski pakt 1953/1954, Zapisnik sa razgovora tripartitno-jugoslovenske vojne konferencije, Washington, August 1953, p. 414; AVII, JNA GŠ-2, k. 16, fas. 2, reg. br. 1/1, copy.



Letalo F-86E sabre

F-86E Sabre aircraft

havbice 155 mm, samohodni topovi 90 mm, mostovi tipa bailly pa tudi najpreprostejše preklopne lopatke so uporabljale številne generacije nabornikov JLA, mnogi med njimi celodovojni jugoslovanski tlehi v 90. letih 20. stoletja.

YPA generations. A lot of them were used until the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.

JLA je dobila skupno 599 tankov Sherman v različici M4A3, ki je bila njegova zadnja in najbolj izpopolnjena. Po lastnostih je zaostajal za tankom T-34, vendar ga je bilo lažje upravljati. Posadka tanka je štela 5 članov, največja hitrost je bila 47 km/h, akcijski radij pa 160 km. Pogonjal ga je bencinski motor s 400 KM. Največje pomanjkljivosti tanka so bile prevelika poraba goriva, kar je lastnost vseh ameriških tankov, majhen akcijski radij in zato posledično prevelika odvisnost od logistike. Njegov top kalibra 76 mm je bil presežen, visoka silhueta pa ga je ustvarila za lahko ranljivo tarčo na bojišču. Nasproti tem pomanjkljivostim so postavljali potrebe po

The YPA received a total of 599 x M4A3 Sherman tanks, which was the latest and the most sophisticated model. Its characteristics were not as good as those of the T-34; however the M4A3 was much easier to manoeuvre. The tank crew was composed of 5 people. It reached a maximum speed of 47 km/h and it had a range of 160 km. It was powered by a 44 Hp petrol engine. The greatest disadvantages included substantial fuel consumption, which is characteristic of all American tanks, and a short range which subsequently required a great reliance on logistics. The tank's 76 mm gun was too big and created a high silhouette which made the tank a very vulnerable battlefield target. In contrast to the aforementioned deficiencies the tank provided sustainability, high protection of the crew and a good quality engine.²⁰

²⁰ Laković 2005, p. 274. The tank was additionally armed with two 7.62 mm M1919A4 machine guns and a 12.7 mm HB M2 anti-aircraft machine gun attached to the turret.

²⁰ Laković 2005, p. 274. The tank was additionally armed with two 7.62 mm M1919A4 machine guns and a 12.7 mm HB M2 anti-aircraft machine gun attached to the turret.

vzdržljivosti, velikivarnostiposadkeinkakovosten motor.²⁰

M 47 patton je bil drugi tank, ki ga je dobila JLA. Vseh skupaj je dobila 319 primerkov. Tako kot prejšnji je tudi ta tank imel posadko s petimi člani in je prav tako zaostajal za sovjetskimi tanki. Slabosti in dobre lastnosti so bile podobne kot pri Shermanu, akcijski radij je bil še manjši, le 130 km, motor pa je imel 810 KM. Imel je močnejši top – 90 mm. Rezervoar za gorivo je imel prostornino za 881 litrov, sovjetski T-34 pa za 540 litrov. Poraba goriva je znašala sedem litrov na kilometer, kar je precej več kot T-34, pri katerem je znašala od 1,6 do 2,3 litra.²¹ Tank patton je bil le začasna rešitev, zato seni obdržal v ameriških oboroženih silah, temveč so ga podarjali kot vojaško pomoč ali prodajali za zainteresiranim državam. V posameznih državah so ga uporabljali tudi do 90. let 20. stoletja. JLA pri tem ni bila izjema.²²

Kakovost artilerijske oborožitve JLA s precej izboljšali s pošiljkami, in sicer z 2876 kosi ameriškega in 450 francoskega ter britanskega orožja (topovi in havbice). Najpomembnejše so bile havbice M2 kalibra 203 mm in M1 kalibra 155 mm, havbice 105 mm modela M2 in M3 ter topovi M2 kalibra 155 mm (66 kosov). Vsi modeli so imeli izjemno tehnične lastnosti in so jih uporabljali vse do 80. let, med drugim tudi v (SEDA IZPISATI?) oboroženih silah ZDA. Jugoslovanska vojaška industrija je dobila licence za proizvodnjo večine naštetih modelov v 60. letih 20. stoletja.²³

Kopenska vojska je dobila:²⁴

Orožje in oprema	Dobavljena količina
brzostrelka 11,43 mm – thompson	34.000
mitraljez 12,7 mm	2466
reaktivni metalec 60 mm	1000
reaktivni metalec 90 mm	4090
top 37 mm	210
top PT 57 mm M-1	280
top PL 40 mm M-1	381
netrzajni top 57 mm	360
netrzajni top 75 mm	760
top PL 90 mm M1A3 in A1	100

The M47 Patton was the other type of tank that the YPA received. They received a total of 319 such tanks. As the above-mentioned tank, the M47 Patton had a 5-member crew and was not as good as the Soviet tanks. Its advantages and disadvantages were similar to those of the Sherman; however, the range was shorter, only 130 km. It was powered by an 810 Hp engine and was equipped with a more powerful 90mm gun. The engine tank had a volume of 881 litres while the tank engine volume of the Soviet T-34 was 540 litres. The fuel consumption was 7 litres per kilometre which was much more than the consumption of the T-34 which ranged between 1.6 and 2.3 litres.²¹ The Patton tank was only a temporary solution and was therefore no longer used by the US Armed Forces. It was given away as military assistance or sold to interested countries. In some countries, including Yugoslavia, Pattons remained in use until the 1990s.²²

The quality of the YPA's artillery was significantly improved with additional weapon deliveries: 2876 pieces of American weapons and 450 pieces of French and British weapons (guns and howitzers). The most important pieces included the addition of 203 mm M2 howitzer, 155 mm M1 howitzer, 105 mm M2 and M3 howitzers and 155 mm M2 guns (66 pieces). All models possessed extraordinary tactical and technical characteristics and were used until the 1980s, also in the US Armed Forces. In the 1960s, the Yugoslav military industry acquired the necessary licences for the production of the majority of the above-mentioned models.²³

YPA Land Forces received the following equipment:²⁴

Weapons and equipment	Quantity delivered
11.43 mm Thompson submachine gun	34000
12.7 mm machine gun	2466
60 mm jet thrower	1000
90 mm jet thrower	4090
37 mm gun	210
57mm M-1 anti-tank gun	280
40 mm M-1 anti-aircraft gun	381
57 mm recoilless gun	360
75 mm recoilless gun	760

²¹ Taktičko-tehnički potsetnik, VIZ »Vojno delo«, Belgrade 1954, p. 232.

²² Laković 2005, p. 275.

²³ Laković 2005, p. 257.

²⁴ Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 50.

²¹ Taktičko-tehnički potsetnik, VIZ »Vojno delo«, Belgrade 1954, p. 232.

²² Laković 2005, p. 275.

²³ Laković 2005, p. 257.

²⁴ Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 50.

havbica 105 mm M2 in M3	403
top in havbica 155 mm	333
havbica 203 mm	24
samohodni top 37 in 76 mm	260
samohodni top 90 mm	399
samohodna havbica 105 mm	56
oklepni avtomobil M8	265
izvidniško vozilo M3A1	300
srednji tank M4A3 sherman	599
srednji tank M-47 patton	319
tovornjak-traktor 12 do 18 ton	1.001
tovornjak, 1,5 in 2,5 ton	10.390
most bailly	20
radijska postaja	1.399
radar	23

Vojno letalstvo je dobilo:²⁵

<u>Orožje in oprema</u>	<u>Dobavljena količina</u>
letalo F-84G thunderjet	167
letalo F-47 thunderbolt	150
letalo C-47 (transportno)	20
letalo T-33 (šolsko, reaktivno)	25
letalo izvidniško (reaktivno)	22
letalo F-86E sabre	43
helikopter S-51	10
letalski motor hispano	80
letalski motor lycoming	500
letalski motor R-1340 AN-1	210

Vojna mornarica je dobila:²⁶

<u>Orožje in oprema</u>	<u>Dobavljena količina</u>
patruljna ladja 400 t	1
minolovec 400 t	3
minolovec 137 t	1
radar	79
motor	174
mitraljez 12,7 mm	305
top PL 20 mm	352
top PL 40 mm	117
top PL 66 mm	66

Poleg naštetih oborožitve in opreme so dobavili tudi strelivo in veliko količino dodatne opreme: smodnik, eksploziv, vžigalnike, prikolice, avtomobilske delavnice, signalna sredstva, minoiskalce, plamenometalce, letalske bombe, letalske rakete, sanitetna, gasilska in druga specialna vozila, izvenladijske motorje, generatorje, podvodne mine, lokatorje,

90 mm M1A3 and A1 anti-aircraft guns	10
105 mm M2 and M3 howitzers	403
155 mm gun and howitzer	333
203 mm howitzer	24
37 and 76 mm self-propelled guns	260
90 mm self-propelled gun	399
105 mm self-propelled howitzer	56
M8 armoured vehicle	265
M3A1 reconnaissance vehicle	300
M4A3 Sherman middle tank	599
M-47 Patton middle tank	319
12 - 18 tonne tractor-truck	1.001
1.5 and 2.5 tonne truck	10.390
Bailly bridge	20
radio station	1.399
radar	23

YPA Air Force received the following equipment:²⁵

<u>Weapons and equipment</u>	<u>Quantity delivered</u>
F-84G Thunderjet aircraft	167
F-47 Thunderbolt aircraft	150
C-47 (transport) aircraft	20
T-33 (trainer, jet plane)	25
Reconnaissance (jet) aircraft	22
F-86E Sabre aircraft	43
S-51 helicopter	10
Hispano aircraft engine	80
Lycoming aircraft engine	500
R-1340 AN-1 aircraft engine	210

YPA Navy received the following equipment:²⁶

<u>Weapons and equipment</u>	<u>Quantity delivered</u>
400-tonne patrol boat	1
400-tonne mine hunter	3
137-tonne mine hunter	1
radar	79
motor	174
12.7 mm machine gun	305
20 mm anti-aircraft gun	352
40 mm anti-aircraft gun	117
66 mm anti-aircraft gun	66

Ammunition and a significant quantity of equipment were supplied in addition to the above-mentioned weapons and equipment: gunpowder, explosives, exploders, trailers, car workshops, signalling equipment, mine detectors, flame

²⁵ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 50–51.

²⁶ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51.

²⁷ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51.

²⁵ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, pp. 50–51.

²⁶ Razvoj orožanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Belgrade 1989, p. 51.



Havbica M1 155mm

agregate, filtre zavoda, inženirske stroje, orodje, vremenske postaje, črpalke in drugo.²⁷

Z jugoslovansko-ameriški sporazum je bilo urejeno vprašanje obstoja ameriškega tima za nadzor in administriranje programa American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS). Člani tega tima so izvajali tudi nadzore (inšpekcije) in obhode preoboroženih enot. Preoboroževanje enot v zagrebško-ljubljansko vojaško oblasti potrjuje tudi podatek, da je bilo do konca leta 1955 od skupno 285 obiskov v kopensko vojaško kar 197 realiziranih v Peti (zagrebško-ljubljanski) vojaški oblasti. Na armadni ravni je bilo 19, korpusni 48, divizijski 83 obiskov, 17 pajih je bilo opravljenih v zalednih enotah.²⁸

Jugoslavija se je začela postopno približevati Zahodu, ko so se začele spreminjati zunanje-politične razmere zaradi resolucije IB. Političnemu je sledilo tudi vojaško približevanje. V številnih stikih, ko so obravnavali predvsem količino in modalitete dobavljanja zahodne

M1 155mm Howitzer

throwers, aircraft bombs, aircraft rockets, sanitation, fire fighting and other special vehicles, outboard motors, generators, underwater mines, netsounders, aggregates, water filters, engineering equipment, tools, weather stations, pumps etc.²⁷

The Yugoslav-US agreements regulated the establishment of a US team which would be responsible for control and the American Military Assistance Staff (AMAS) administration. Team members carried out control and inspections of the rearmed units. The fact that rearmament was carried out in units subordinated to the Zagreb-Ljubljana Military Authority was also confirmed by information that, by the end of 1955, 197 out of 285 visits within the land forces had been made within the Fifth (Zagreb-Ljubljana) Military Authority. There were 19 army-level visits, 48 corps-level visits, 83 division-level visits and 17 visits to the rear-area units.²⁸

²⁸ Laković 2005, p. 220.

²⁷ Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, Opremanje naoružanjem, VINC, Beograd 1989, p. 51.

²⁸ Laković 2005, p. 220.

vojaške pomoči Jugoslaviji, je bila zahodna stran opazno zainteresirana za jugoslovanske obrambne načrte natakomenovani» severni smeri«, ker bi morebitni izostanek učinkovite obrambe pred sovjetsko-satelitskim napadom na tej občutljivi smeri resno ogrozil pozicije zahodnih zaveznikov v tem delu Evrope in Sredozemlja. Prav zato so bili prvi kontingenti zahodnih oborožitvenih sistemov iz programa vojaške pomoči sporazumno namenjeni enotam zagrebško-ljubljanske oblasti. Tako so neposredno povečali njeno ognjeno in gibljivost. Po začetnih težavah in nesporazumih ali »tipanju utripa« stado segli jugoslovanska in zahodna stran visoko stopnjo izmenjave podatkov o lastnih in sovražnikovih silah, in sicer tako v ofenzivnih kot v obrambnih dejavnostih. Vozračju izjemne državne, partijske, vojaške in zunanje politične monolitnosti sta bila realen pomen in posebnost Slovenije poudarjena levk kontekstunjenega izjemnega strateškega položaja za obrambo južnega krila Nata. Po navezavi ponovnih stikov in ureditvi odnosov s Sovjetsko zvezo je jugoslovansko vodstvo izrazilo pripravljenost, da se odpove ameriški vojaški pomoči. Prekinitev soursadno sporočilijulija 1957. leta.²⁹ Zmanjševanja nepetosti, ki so bile posledica hladne vojne, in obojestranske rezerve so vplivale, da se je vojaško sodelovanje z Zahodom, namesto vstopa Jugoslavije v Nato, končalo les sprejemanjem ameriške vojaške pomoči in s podpisom balkanskega pakta, ki je zaživel le za kratek čas.

Yugoslavia had just started its gradual rapprochement with the West, when the foreign policy situation started to change due to the Resolution of the Communist Information Bureau. Political rapprochement was followed by military rapprochement. On numerous occasions when the quantity and modalities of the military assistance delivery to Yugoslavia were discussed, western parties demonstrated an obvious interest in Yugoslav defence plans on the so-called "north route". This was especially due to the fact that a potential lack of effective defence against a Soviet-satellite attack on this sensitive route would pose a serious threat to the locations of western allies in this part of Europe and Mediterranean. Consequently, the first contingents of defence systems from the Military Assistance Programme were intended for Zagreb-Ljubljana Authority units. This directly contributed to the increase of its firepower and movability. Following some difficulties and misunderstandings at the outset or "the testing of the atmosphere", Yugoslav and western parties attained a high-level of information exchange, both within offence and defence activities, concerning their own as well as enemy forces. Within the context of an extremely monolithic nature of national policies, Communist Party, military entities and foreign policy, the actual significance and specifics of Slovenia were emphasised only with regard to its extraordinary strategic location, important for the defence of NATO's south wing. After having renewed their contacts and resolved their relations with the Soviet Union, Yugoslav national authorities announced their preparedness to renounce US military assistance. The renunciation was formally announced in July 1957.²⁹ The reduction of tension, which emerged after the Cold War, as well as the reserves on both sides contributed to the fact that military cooperation with the West did not result in Yugoslavia's integration into NATO, but in the US military assistance to Yugoslavia and the signing of the short-lived Balkan Pact.

Prevod iz srbskega jezika: mag. Zvezdan Marković

Translate from Serbian language: ma. Zvezdan Marković

²⁹ Laković 2005, p. 246.

²⁹ Laković 2005, p. 246.




»Knjižna Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina, s tematiko vojaške in vojne zgodovine Slovencev in slovenskega etničnega prostora, je projekt znanstvenoraziskovalnega delavcev in zunanjih sodelavcev Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske. Zapisana zgodovina svetaja veliki meri zgodovinarov skovanja, saj je politična kartasvetavečinomaposledicaosvajanj, državljskih uporov in spopadov zaneodvisnost. Tudinaša.

V slovenski vojaški zgodovini je marsikaj ostalo neodkrito in nezapisano. Zato zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina odpira nova poglavja v nacionalni vojaški preteklosti


ter s tem pomaga razumeti našo sedanost, prav tako pa prispeva k razvoju slovenske vojaške misli.«

Podpolkovnik dr. Tomaž Kladnik,
načelnik Vojaškega muzeja Slovenske vojske, glavni urednik Zbirke Slovenska vojaška zgodovina



SLOVENSKA PARTIZANSKA IN DOMOBRA NSKA VOJSKA

Knjiga avtorja podpolkovnika **dr. Tomaža Kladnika** Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska je prva knjiga v zbirki Slovenska vojaška zgodovina. Obravnava obe slovenski vojaški formaciji, ki sta bili v 2. svetovni vojni na naših tleh nasprotnici in katerih cilj je bila ustanovitev slovenske vojske. Nastajali in delovali pa sta v različnih okoliščinah in pod različnimi pogoji. Kljub nepremostljivim razlikam in sovraštvu, ki so si jih izkazovali pripadniki obeh formacij, pa lahko ugotovimo tudi nekatere stične točke obeh vojaških sistemov.



JUGOSLOVANSKA LJUDSKA ARMADA

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